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Abstract 
 
Attitudes towards Tsar Nicholas II and Empress Alexandra Fedorovna can be 
characterised by extremes, from hostility to sentimentality. A great deal of what has been 
written about the imperial couple (in modern times) has been based on official records 
and with reference to the memoirs of people who knew the tsar and empress. This thesis 
recognises the importance of these sources in understanding British perceptions of 
Nicholas and Alexandra but it also examines reactions in a wider variety of material; 
including mass circulation newspapers, literary journals and private correspondence. 
These sources reveal a number of the strands which helped form British understanding of 
the tsar and empress.  In particular, perceptions were influenced by internal British 
politics, by class and by attitudes to the role of the British Empire in world affairs, by 
British propaganda and by a view of Russia and her society which was at times perceptive 
and at others antiquated. This thesis seeks to evaluate diverse British views of Nicholas 
and Alexandra and to consider the reasons behind the sympathetic, the critical, the naïve 
and the knowledgeable perceptions of the last tsar and empress of Russia.    
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Preface 
 
 
Until February 1918 Russia adhered to the Julian (Old Style) Calendar, which in the 
nineteenth century ran twelve days, and in the twentieth century thirteen days, behind the 
Gregorian (New Style) calendar in use in Western Europe. The dates in this thesis are 
given in the New Style since the sources used are, in the main, British and the perceptions 
under discussion are those of British commentators.  
 
Russian names are spelt in this thesis using a modified version of the Library of Congress 
Transliteration which retains anglicised versions of well known names, including those of 
Russian tsars and empresses. In addition, the towns and cities of the Russian empire are 
referred to by their English names as they were in contemporary correspondence and 
publications.  I have also retained the name of St Petersburg throughout this thesis rather 
than using Petrograd for name of Russia’s imperial capital after August 1914.  
 
Contemporary British sources referred to Nicholas II as both tsar and emperor and to 
Alexandra Fedorovna as both tsarina and empress. In this thesis I have used the terms tsar 
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and empress to refer to Nicholas and Alexandra. 
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Introduction: Sources, Personalities and their World 
Since the demise of imperial Russia a vast library of books has been published on the 
subject of the fall of the Romanov dynasty. In the more serious studies historians have 
naturally concentrated on Russian responses to the last tsar and empress and on their 
attempts to deal with the crises they faced.1  Historians who have made a study of 
Britain’s political relations with Russia during this period, most notably Michael Hughes 
and Keith Neilson, have analysed the workings of the British diplomatic service, the 
variety of British attitudes towards Russia, the means by which these were formed, and 
the role these opinions played in an international context.2  More widely, as we shall 
discuss in Chapter One, Anthony Cross has revealed the web of Russo-British 
commercial, artistic and cultural interaction. 
      The vicissitudes of Russo-British relations and the manifestations of political debate 
within Russia provide key markers and form a framework to our discussion. However, 
this thesis differs significantly from what has been written hitherto since we have sought 
to focus more specifically on British attitudes towards Nicholas and Alexandra as 
ordinary people in extraordinary roles: as autocrat, as a military leader, as husband and 
                                                          
1
 Andrew M. Verner, The Crisis of Russian Autocracy: Nicholas II and the 1905 Revolution (Princeton, 
1990), Richard S. Wortman, Scenarios of Power, From Alexander II to the Abdication of Nicholas II (vol. 
2), (Princeton, 2000),  Dominic Lieven, Nicholas II: Emperor of all the Russias (London, 1993), Lindsey 
Hughes, The Romanovs: Ruling Russia 1613-1917(London, 2008), M.D. Steinberg, and  V.M. Khrustalev,  
(eds.), The Fall of the Romanovs: political dreams and personal struggles in a time of revolution (London, 
1995). 
2
 See, for example, Michael Hughes, Inside the Enigma: British Officials in Russia, 1900-1939 (London, 
1997). Michael Hughes, Diplomacy before the Russian Revolution: Britain, Russia and the Old Diplomacy 
1894-1917(Basingstoke, 2000). Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia 1894-
1917 (Oxford, 1995).  
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wife, as parents, as royal kinsfolk and as heirs to Russia’s past, often viewed through the 
prism of centuries of British impressions of a despotic, Asiatic and exotic regime. In 
addition, for many British commentators the role of monarch in the political and public 
life of the nation, as head of state and as a ‘celebrity’ provided an example against 
commentators could reflect on Nicholas and Alexandra’s roles as tsar and empress.  
    For British observers of Russian affairs Nicholas was simultaneously self-effacing and 
he was stubborn, he was both a reforming tsar and a determined autocratic, he was weak 
and he was all powerful. The tsar was at once a peacemaker and a warmonger. By the 
same token Alexandra was a helpmate and an evil influence, she was of English descent 
and pro-German, she was well educated and narrow minded and she was more autocratic 
than the most absolutist Romanov ruler. It was said that the mass of their subjects loved 
the imperial couple and that the bonds of unity had been broken on Bloody Sunday. 
Journalists and others who met with Nicholas and Alexandra in one palace or another 
reported that the imperial couple lived a simple existence yet others bemoaned the luxury 
and extravagance of the Russian court. 
     For the purpose of analysing those who commented on the imperial couple, and who 
formed British perceptions of the tsar and empress, we have divided them into four 
categories. The first includes members of the British royal family. The attitude of 
individual British monarchs towards the imperial couple as kinsmen, as human-beings 
and as rulers of a rival empire was reflected in the British public’s perceptions of the tsar 
and empress.  
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    The second group whose opinions we consider is formed of British diplomats and 
members of the government who interpreted and reacted to the tsar’s political decisions. 
The perceptions of these men were affected by factors ranging from the views of the 
government they represented to their education and their position in British society.  The 
third group is made up of a variety of authors and journalists whose ranks include popular 
writers, political activists. As we shall discuss their views ranged from the vitriolic to the 
adulatory as some propagandised in the tsar’s favour and others actively campaigned 
against his regime. The fourth group consists of travellers, tourists and expatriates whose 
work and curiosity took them to Russia.  The boundaries between members of group two 
to four are not concrete. They sometimes overlap, so that members of one may have 
features of another.  As Keith Neilson has noted, those whose profession or employment 
took them to Russia such as ‘businessmen, journalists, novelists and financiers […] often 
knew each other’.3  As a result, although they did not necessarily form a homogeneous 
community, the world they inhabited was a relatively small one where insider news, 
gossip and views might play an unseen part in informing perceptions of Nicholas and 
Alexandra.  
    In order to represent a mixture of views we have used a variety of materials published 
and unpublished, public and private.  They include newspapers and periodicals held at the 
British Newspaper Library and in the periodical collections housed in Senate House 
Library and the London Library.  In the chapters concerning Nicholas and Alexandra’s 
wedding, their visit to the Isle of Wight as well as the Dogger Bank Incident we discuss 
                                                          
3
 Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, p. 106.  
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the responses of the local press. In the main however, with some notable exceptions such 
as the Manchester Guardian, we have considered the perceptions of the London based 
press. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, London was the centre of government 
and the capital of the Empire with a large population whose views newspapers and 
journals sought to reflect and to challenge.  Secondly, although during wartime national 
newspapers made ad hoc sharing arrangements thus affording smaller publications the 
prestige of having their ‘own foreign correspondent’, only publications with a substantial 
circulation could afford  to send correspondents to Russia for a long period of time.4 
Thirdly, although there was a thriving provincial press, much of its international coverage 
was simply lifted from the columns of London newspapers.5  In addition to the many 
newspapers we have also made use of a number of periodicals ranging from the Tory 
leaning, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine to the anti-tsarist Anglo Russian Review.6  
     Alongside the many public sources of comment on Nicholas and Alexandra we have 
made use of Foreign Office correspondence, minutes of Cabinet meetings and the diaries 
and letters of members of the diplomatic corps located at the National Archive in Kew; 
material in the Royal Archive Windsor, the Hardinge Papers at Cambridge University 
Library, Sir Nicholas O’Conor’s correspondence in the Churchill Archive at Churchill 
College Cambridge, R.B.D. Morier Papers held by Balliol College Archives, Oxford, material 
in the collections of the Imperial War Museum and the House of Lords archive.  Others 
are recorded in the bibliography.  
                                                          
4
 Lucy Brown, Victorian News and Newspapers (Oxford, 1985), p. 115.  
5
 Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain (1981), vol. 1, p.416. 
6
 John.Plunkett, Queen Victoria: First Media Monarch (Oxford, 2003), p. 20.  
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    Although historians are increasingly making use of national distinctions in discussing 
the peoples of the United Kingdom using ‘British’ as term of reference has enabled us to 
include material written by commentators such as the journalist E.J. Dillon and the 
ambassador Sir Nicholas O’Conor whose Irish birthplace now lies outside the borders of 
the twenty-first century United Kingdom. In addition, this thesis discusses the opinions of 
naturalised British subjects such as Carl Joubert, who wrote in English for a British 
audience, and Jaakof Prelooker whose periodical, Anglo Russian Review, contributed to 
the public debate about the autocracy.  No single person, ideology or event was 
responsible for the formation of the kaleidoscopic perceptions of the last tsar and 
empress. However, British commentators may be said to have been influenced by at least 
three key factors. One of the most significant centred on British understanding of Russia, 
Russian history and Russian society. Accumulated over centuries of Russo-British 
contact; differing reactions to the nature of, and challenges to, Russian despotism; as well 
as widely established images of loyal, if naïve, peasants influenced British views of the 
imperial couple. Together with a variety of political and geographical images which 
presented Russia as both an Asiatic and a European power, these factors contributed to 
British perceptions of the imperial couple.  
   A second influential factor in forming British perceptions of Nicholas and Alexandra 
was a commentator’s absorption of British national myths including those which narrated 
the history of the United Kingdom combined with a frequently positive understanding of 
the characteristics of British society.  As Keith Neilson tells us, one of the most striking 
features of British attitudes towards Russia and her rulers was a feeling of ‘cultural 
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superiority, not to mention hypocrisy’.7  Thus, even commentators who were sympathetic 
to the challenges facing Nicholas and Alexandra, had lived in Russia and were fluent in 
the language inevitably saw the imperial couple through British experiences, with all the 
political and cultural baggage that entailed. As result many commentators viewed the tsar 
and empress in British terms against British standards and the norms of British society.  
  A third factor involved elements of the previous two: an understanding of Russia against 
the backdrop of British society.  Thus, although some commentators compared Russian 
society against that which existed in Britain and found it wanting, others believed that the 
two nations shared a number of positive characteristics. Such commentators identified 
apparently common features including the fact that both were monarchies and ruled over 
a multitude of peoples to whom Russia and Britain could bring the benefits of Christianity 
and trade. The British monarchy provided a template against which both British 
commentators and public could construct their perceptions of Nicholas and Alexandra. 
The regime over which Nicholas presided was an absolutist one but at times such as 
coronations, jubilees, military commemorations and dynastic celebrations, it fulfilled a 
similar role to the British Crown as a focus for popular celebration and national pride. 
During wartime, in Britain and in Russia, the monarch identified with their armed forces 
and the national struggle against a foreign enemy. On occasion, when Britain or Russia 
suffered military defeats, the monarchy could be the focus of antagonism and discontent. 
                                                          
7
 Keith Neilson ‘Only a d…d marionette’? The influence of British ambassadors on British Foreign Policy 
1904-1914’ Michael Dockrill and Brian Kercher, (eds.)  Diplomacy and World Power Studies in British 
Foreign Policy 1890-1950 (Cambridge, 1996), p. 67.  
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(i) The British Royal Family 
The ‘exotic’ nature of the Russian monarchy proved a focus of fascination, but interest in 
the tsar and empress was part of a wider British curiosity about the crowned heads of 
Europe.
8
  Biographies, travelogues and even books of royal speeches were published to 
meet the public appetite.9  In 1871, when the Prince of Wales (the future Edward VII) fell 
gravely ill, reporters flocked to his Norfolk estate eager for news and in 1884 when 
Queen Victoria published extracts from her private diary, the monarch was besieged by 
journalists in the Scottish highlands.10 Not all accounts of royalty were obtained in a 
decorous manner even the death of a monarch could result in an unseemly scramble 
amongst journalists desperate for an ‘exclusive’. At Victoria’s death, in 1901, as many as 
500 reporters and photographers clamoured for the extra bit of news that would make 
their journey to Osborne worthwhile and sell more newspapers.11  Not content with 
reporting the passing of a monarch, reflecting on her long reign or looking forward to that 
of her successor, some reporters invented interviews with her doctor and regaled their 
readers with fictitious accounts of Victoria’s deathbed reconciliation with the Kaiser.12 
Somewhat less sensationally, when George V was crowned in 1911, ‘100,000 people 
                                                          
8
 See for example, C. Lowe, The German Emperor William II (London, 1895). 
A.E.O. Klaussmann (ed.), (trans. L. Elkind) The German Emperor’s Speeches (London, 1904), Poultney 
Bigelow, The Private life of two Emperors: William II of Germany and Francis Joseph of Austria (London, 
1904). 
9
 See for example, Sir Joseph Fayrer, Notes of the visit to India by their Royal Highnesses the Prince of 
Wales and Duke of Edinburgh (London, 1879), James Macaulay (ed.) Speeches and Addresses of H.R.H. 
the Prince of Wales 1863-1888 (London, 1889) 
10
 Brown, Victorian News, p. 162. 
11
 Ronald Pearsall, Edwardian Life and Leisure (London, 1973) p. 15.  
12
 Plunkett, Media Monarch, p. 242.  
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“witnessed” the ceremony in the pages of the illustrated press’.13 Although some press 
coverage of the British monarchy could be intrusive in 1903 a biographer of Edward VII 
reasoned that the interest in the minutiae of court life, far from detracting from, or 
trivialising the role of the monarch, was ‘an argument in itself in favour of monarchy’.14   
     The centrality of the monarch and his family in British life, as a focus for unity and 
national pride, marked by solemn ceremonial and joyful celebration provided 
commentators with a ready interpretation of the function of monarchy in Russia. Most 
British commentators could never hope to see Nicholas and Alexandra in person let alone 
meet them.  Indeed, as is well established, the tsar and empress preferred family intimacy 
to grand court ceremonial, nonetheless, through the medium of film as well as the printed 
word Nicholas publicised aspects of his and his family’s life. A substantial amount of this 
material was available for British readers and cinema goers to enjoy and to perhaps reflect 
upon in the light of their understanding of their own royal family. By these means 
Nicholas sought to influence understanding of his personality, and to project his 
perception of the role of a Russian tsar to a wide audience. However, as we shall discuss, 
he could not control the more scurrilous aspects of the tabloid or anti-tsarist press in the 
United Kingdom.  
    A monarch, an autocrat or one constrained by a constitution, necessarily stood at the 
pinnacle of society but this did not mean they were entirely shielded from the realities of 
                                                          
13
 William M. Kuhn, Democratic Royalism: The Transformation of the British Monarchy, 1861-1914 
(Basingstoke, 1996), p. 107.  
14
T.H.S. Escott, King Edward and his Court (London, 1903), p. 56.  
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life. Queen Victoria became a widow in early middle-age, Edward VII lost his son and 
heir, aged twenty-eight, to a fatal illness and one of George V’s sons was born with 
epilepsy. As Richard Williams has explained, for the public, events such as these in the 
lives of royal personages created a well of sympathy and gave the impression that, 
although rich and powerful, members of a ruling family were human beings, victim to the 
same tribulations of even their poorest compatriots.15  Views such as these facilitated an 
understanding of the tsar and empress. For example, although Alexandra was said by one 
writer to be ‘the mistress of 12 palaces in St Petersburg alone’ wealth and status could not 
provide the empress with a male heir.16 As we shall see in Chapter 4 the empress’s 
desperate need to give birth to a son and her repeated failure to do so attracted much 
sympathy in Britain.  Similarly, when the tsar abdicated for himself and his son, the 
British press discussion of his role as a father on occasion overshadowed analysis of his 
political role.  
       In addition to their understanding of individual monarchs as human beings, the 
British were influenced in their perceptions of Nicholas and Alexandra by the varying 
state of Russo-British relations. These influences were mirrored in the attitude of 
successive British sovereigns’ towards the tsar and empress as representatives of a rival 
imperial power. Nicholas II’s reign coincided with that of three British monarchs: Queen 
Victoria (1837-1901) Edward VII (1901-1910) and George V (1910-1936). They were 
grandmother (Nicholas by marriage) uncle and cousin to the imperial couple. For the 
                                                          
15
 Richard Williams, The Contentious Crown: Public discussion of the British Monarchy in the reign of 
Queen Victoria (Ashgate, 1997), p. 221. 
16
 Arthur H. Beavan, Popular Royalty (London, 1897), p. 158. 
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British public as well as for the Royal Family these ties of kinship played a part in 
constructing multifaceted perceptions of Nicholas and Alexandra. A central issue in 
Russo-British relations was the dispute over Central Asia and India where the two nations 
had long clashed.
17
 Therefore, when the future Nicholas II visited India as part of a tour 
of the region (1890-91), Queen Victoria counselled that ‘the Russian party will have to be 
carefully watched and not left alone’.18 As we shall see in Chapter 1 Victoria separated 
her distrust of Russia as a rival imperial power with her attitude to individual tsars and 
their heirs and on this occasion the queen was anxious that Nicholas enjoy British 
hospitality and be ‘treated with every civility’.19 Although, as we discuss in Chapter 2, she 
did all she could to prevent the match between Nicholas and Alexandra she was 
seemingly gracious in defeat and she enjoyed a warm relationship with the imperial 
couple.  
       In keeping with her ability to separate her perceptions of Russian political ambitions 
with her attitude towards individual monarchs and although she remained wary of 
Russian political ambitions she believed that Nicholas was devoted to England.20 Thus, 
the queen remained mindful of her position as elder statesman and monarch of the British 
Empire and attempted to use her informal ties with Nicholas to influence Russian foreign 
policy in Britain’s favour. While she expected the tsar to adapt Russian foreign policy for 
                                                          
17
 Eveny Sergeev, The Great Game 1856-1907: Russo-British Relations in Central and East Asia 
(Washington and Baltimore, 2013).  
18
 G.E. Buckle (ed.) The Letters of Queen Victoria: A selection from Her Majesties Correspondence 
between the years1886-1890 (London, 1930), vol. I., p. 651.  
19
 Buckle, Letters of Queen Victoria 1886-1890, p. 664. 
20
 Victor Mallett, (ed.), Life with Queen Victoria: Marie Mallett’s letters from Court 1887-1901 (London, 
1968), p. 187.  
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Britain’s convenience, she was not so accommodating in return. Britain’s prestige and 
standing in the world were all important to her therefore, in 1898, when Nicholas called 
for a Peace Conference to discuss international arms reduction, she was adamant that this 
was a good idea as far as France, Germany and Russia were concerned but that Britain 
‘cannot reduce our armies due to our large overseas possessions’.21 However, Victoria 
died less than six years after Nicholas and Alexandra’s wedding and she therefore had 
little time to effect long-term change in Russo-British relations.  
    The queen was succeeded by Edward VII whose reign, specifically in relation to the 
last tsar and empress, is remembered for the Anglo Russian Accord of 1907 and the 
exchange of visits between the ruling houses in 1908 and 1909. Although the extent of 
Edward VII’s influence over Britain’s foreign policy has been diminished by modern 
historians, a number of contemporary observers believed that Edward played a significant 
and positive role in Russo-British relations, not least on account of his relationship with 
the Romanov family.22 Although, as we have noted, the king’s freedom to act in directing 
British foreign policy may have been less than some of his contemporaries claimed, he 
certainly took a ‘hands on’ approach to foreign affairs. Even given an element of 
exaggeration by his contemporaries, Edward was wholehearted in his role as diplomat. 
However, it is his successor, King George V, who is the British monarch most identified 
today with Nicholas and Alexandra. George V’s role in European diplomacy was more 
discreet than his extrovert father but much has been written on the king’s responsibility in 
                                                          
21
 Agatha Ramm, (ed.), Beloved and Darling Child: Last Letters between Queen Victoria and her eldest 
daughter 1886-1901 (Stroud, 1990), p. 220 
22
 Roderick R. Mclean, Royalty and Diplomacy in Europe 1890-1914 (Cambridge, 2001), p. 183.  
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the summer of 1914 as he, the tsar and (another cousin) the German Kaiser corresponded 
in the fraught days before the outbreak of war.23 In addition, the king’s role in the 
possibility of exile in Britain for the imperial family continues to fascinate a wider 
public.24  
     Edward VII was a playboy king with a string of mistresses and a long suffering wife. 
In contrast, George V was happily married and enjoyed the homely pursuit of stamp 
collecting in preference to lavish weekend house parties. For much of the British public 
he was a diligent monarch with a loyal wife and a loving family. While some aspects of 
George’s family life may be open to modern criticism at the time it was widely regarded. 
It was through this prism of a hardworking monarch with a supportive wife at his side 
sharing in the burden of monarchy that many in Britain perceived Nicholas and 
Alexandra.  
     George was first cousin to both the tsar and empress.25  The two men’s physical 
likeness was often remarked upon, much to Nicholas’s irritation.26 The two monarchs 
were similar in other ways: they liked order and routine in their private lives and enjoyed 
the country pursuits typical of their class. In addition they shunned the ornate palaces at 
their disposal and established family homes in relatively small surroundings which they 
decorated in bourgeois style.  More significantly, the two courts over which they presided 
shared another characteristic. Under George V and Queen Mary the monarchy ‘ceased to 
                                                          
23
Marina Soroka, Britain, Russia and the Road to the First World War: The Fateful Embassy of Count 
Aleksandr Benckendorff (1903-1916), (Ashgate, 2011), pp. 252-4. 
24
 Ann Morrow, Cousins Divided: George V and Nicholas II (Stroud, 2006), pp. 174-181.  
25
 George’s aunt Alice was Alexandra’s mother.  Nicholas’s mother was George’s aunt by marriage.  
26
 Maylunas and Mironenko, Lifelong Passion, p. 220. 
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lead the smart-set and fashionable society’ as had been the case with their predecessor.27 
Archbishop Lang was said to have found their royal residence at York Cottage on the 
Sandringham Estate more akin to the home of a curate and his wife than that of a king and 
queen.28 Similarly, Nicholas and Alexandra shunned the social events so beloved of the 
Russian upper classes. As we shall see in the tsar and empress’s case this attracted 
plaudits and criticism in equal measure. 
 
      Nicholas and Alexandra represented an autocratic, exotic and eastern form of 
government but their ties with the British royal family provided a means by which people 
in Britain could perceive them in terms with which they were familiar. In the midst of 
court ceremonials, in their family life and in their political role, including that as arbiters 
between nations, the British of all classes understood the tsar and empress by reference to 
their own Royal Family. In turn the British Royal Family’s attitude towards Nicholas and 
Alexandra played a part in influencing British public opinion towards the imperial couple.  
                                      (ii) British Diplomatic Missions  
British monarchs knew Alexandra very well as she had spent a lot of time in Britain after 
the death of her mother. Nicholas was perhaps less well known but Queen Victoria, 
Edward VII and George V had all spent time with him in informal surroundings in 
London, Windsor and Copenhagen before his accession. Following his coronation in 
                                                          
27
 J. Pearson, The Selling of the Royal Family: The mystique of the British monarchy (New York, 1986), p. 
30. 
28
 Harold Nicholson, George the Fifth, His Life and Reign (London, 1952), p. 143. 
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1896 he and Alexandra visited the British Royal Family in Balmoral. Subsequently there 
were long periods when it was not possible for either the imperial couple to travel abroad 
or for senior members of the British Royal Family to journey to Russia. The two families 
continued to correspond but both must have been conscious when Nicholas became tsar 
that such letters could take on a political hue. In place of face to face contact and 
uninhibited correspondence British monarchs as well as members of the government were 
assisted in their understanding of Nicholas and Alexandra by the diplomatic corps. 
Between 1894 and 1918 Britain sent six ambassadors to Russia. The amount of time each 
served in post varied from nineteen months to ten years: the dates given below refer to 
their tenure in office: Sir Frank Lascelles (1894-95), Sir Nicholas O’Conor (1895-98), Sir 
Charles Scott (1898-1904), Sir Charles Hardinge (1904-1906), Sir Arthur Nicolson 
(1905-1910) and Sir George Buchanan (1910-1918).  Though each diplomat approached 
his role differently from his predecessor depending on his personality their task was never 
less than arduous. As Michael Hughes has noted, the ambassador was ‘central to the 
conduct of the embassy in a way which would be unthinkable to-day’.29 The stress of the 
workload placed immense psychological strain on Buchanan who suffered from frequent 
bouts of exhaustion.   
In 1916 R.H. Bruce Lockhart, who was several years younger than Buchanan and who  
shouldered a lesser overall burden as British Consul in Moscow (1911-1919), fell victim 
                                                          
29
 Hughes, Diplomacy before the Revolution, p. 65.  
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to a severe bout of depression brought on by the strains of work.30   
       European diplomats constituted an exclusive caste, a self assured elite, but as the 
representatives of the most powerful contemporary empire, British diplomats exuded a 
particular confidence.  As Michael Hughes has noted, senior members of the diplomatic 
corps (although un-elected) believed it was their innate right to be the ‘primary agent’ in 
matters of foreign policy.31  In an era when monarchs (including constitutional ones) 
personally and publicly involved themselves in the diplomatic process, contacts with the 
royal court could prove crucial in obtaining prestigious postings.32    However, even 
without the influence of nepotism, the senior branches of the diplomatic corps were 
effectively closed to anyone without access to a private income since the entrance 
examination required years of preparation, many of them spent abroad for the purpose of 
learning French and German.33  The professional and social world inhabited by the 
diplomatic corps was tight knit, sometimes gossipy, snobbish and, on occasion, over 
concerned with deference and perceived slights.    Few in number, these men played an 
important role in forming the perceptions of Nicholas and Alexandra since, as Keith 
Neilson explains, it was they who decided ‘what was important and how it should be 
presented to London’.34   Their perceptions helped formulate British policy towards the 
tsar and empress and contributed to the wider governing elite’s image of the imperial 
                                                          
30
 Hughes, Inside the Enigma, p. 72.  
31
 Hughes, Diplomacy before the Revolution, p. xi. 
32
Thomas G. Otte, ‘Outdoor Relief for the Aristocracy? European Nobility and Diplomacy 1850-1914’, in 
(eds.) Markus Mosslang and Torsten Riotte, The Diplomats World: A Cultural History of Diplomacy, 1815-
1914 (Oxford, 2008), p. 46.    
33
 Zara S. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1898-1914 (Cambridge, 1969), p. 17. 
34
 Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, p. 4.  
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couple.   In addition, within this relatively small clique, diplomats spoke officially and 
“off the record” to friends, colleagues and family members 
    Historians who have studied the pre-revolutionary British diplomatic mission to Russia 
are divided as to the perceived status of a posting to St Petersburg. For example, it has 
been said by Michael Hughes that before 1914 St Petersburg ranked fourth in importance 
behind Berlin, Paris and Vienna.35 In contrast Keith Neilson has asserted that, whilst 
‘Paris was the plum’ the embassies in Berlin and St Petersburg vied for second place.36 A 
letter written by Anthony St John Brodrick (the Secretary of State for India) in December 
1904 implies that a posting to St Petersburg was an ordeal to be endured in the hope that 
it might lead to a more attractive post.  In a letter to the third secretary, Broderick opined 
that: ‘I dare say you are feeling bored to death at present having to stay there under such 
unpleasant social conditions but I expect you are gaining an amount of experience which 
is not to be had at any other capital at present. Apparently one cannot get on in the army 
these days without running about to whatever small expedition is going on at the moment. 
In the same way, diplomatically I am sure you want to be in all the nasty places’.37  
     Whether or not St Petersburg was merely a rung on a career ladder to be endured until 
a more glittering posting could be obtained, the Russian style of government, the 
extremes of weather, the high cost of living as well as potential language difficulties 
could make a posting to the Russian capital a daunting prospect for even the most ardent 
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Russophile.  In addition, the British embassy was at times dilapidated and overcrowded.  
Housed in a mansion which the British government leased from the Saltykov family, 
situated on the bank of the River Neva, it was a short walk from the Winter Palace. As 
well as being a place of work, the building was also the ambassador’s official residence. 
However, in spite of its impressive location, a 1901 British government report on the state 
of the building provides an image of the squalid conditions in which the ambassador lived 
and worked. In particular the report noted the building’s unsanitary plumbing, which was 
said to have caused diphtheria and typhoid amongst the embassy staff, dangerously 
installed electrical wiring which was liable to fail, and unpleasant smells which wafted 
through the windows in warm weather from the stables located across the courtyard.38   
     By December 1904, when Lord Onslow travelled to St Petersburg, the living 
conditions in the embassy seem to have improved, although this may in part have been 
due to the fact that at the height of the Russian winter the windows were kept tightly shut. 
The defective wiring at least had been remedied and the furnishings were more in keeping 
with Britain’s standing in the world. In notes he made of his visit Onslow recorded that: 
‘Sir Charles Hardinge has given us the most gorgeous suite of rooms [..] all very warm 
and lighted with more powerful electric lights than we have in London’.39 However, the 
variable living and working conditions were not the only difficulties with which a British 
ambassador and his colleagues had to contend.  
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     During the reign of the last tsar diplomatic life in St Petersburg was made difficult by 
the fact that, although Nicholas was the pinnacle of power, he preferred a quiet family life 
away from the capital and the traditional backdrop of courtly society. The tsar granted 
occasional audiences but, however amiable Nicholas might appear, he ‘disliked 
diplomats’, a fact not always reported to London or even recognised by the ambassador 
concerned.40   The infrequency of audiences and the inability of some senior staff to speak 
Russian and the confines of their social circle led successive diplomats to rely for many 
of their despatches on what sometimes amounted to little more than rumour and gossip 
based on Romanov family intrigues or information about the tsar’s intent obtained from 
government ministers.41 In contrast, in Britain, the relationship between senior members 
of the diplomatic corps and the reigning monarch could be relatively informal. For 
example, the Russian ambassador, Count Aleksandr Benckendorff, proved to be a 
favourite of Edward VII and was often invited to spend the weekend with the ‘easily 
bored’ monarch.42 
        Britain’s ambassador to St Petersburg at the time of Nicholas and Alexandra’s 
marriage in November 1894 was Sir Frank Cavendish Lascelles. His family background, 
his education and his friendships with other senior officials (notably Charles Hardinge) as 
well as with European royalty were, as Michael Hughes has identified, typical features of 
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the pre-1914 ‘old diplomacy’.43 Before being appointed to Russia, Lascelles had served in 
Paris, Berlin, Sofia, Rome, Washington and Copenhagen. In August 1886, whilst 
stationed in Sofia, he came to the foreign secretary Lord Salisbury’s favourable attention 
when Prince Alexander of Battenberg was kidnapped as part of a Russian plot to 
overthrow him.44  
    Salisbury may have been impressed by Lascelles but his conduct in Bulgaria had not 
endeared him to Russia and to Russian Pan-Slavists in particular. He nonetheless came to 
St Petersburg ‘determined to establish a close rapport with his hosts’ but he was not long 
in post when Tsar Alexander III died.45  One of Lascelles’ immediate reactions was to 
caution Whitehall not to expect Nicholas to undertake policies which might be seen ‘as a 
reproach’ to his late father.46 However, Lascelles period of service in St Petersburg was a 
relatively short one. Although Alexander III’s reign had been characterised by political 
conservatism, and despite Lascelles impression, some British commentators remained 
optimistic that the regime might be successfully liberalised under Nicholas II.  
    In 1895 Lascelles was posted to Berlin and his vacated post was filled by Sir Nicholas 
O’Conor. Born in Ireland, where his family were large landowners, he was educated at 
Stonyhurst and at the Catholic University of Louvain. Nicknamed Feargus after the 
eponymous Chartist leader, he had married into the British establishment, his wife being a 
granddaughter of the fourteenth duke of Norfolk, one of the British aristocracy’s leading 
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Catholic peers.47 
       O’Conor is interesting, not only on account of his background, which was different 
from many of his contemporaries in the diplomatic corps, but because he attended 
Nicholas II’s coronation and went to Khodynka Field only hours after a number of people 
had been crushed to death.  The true number of casualties at the site of the coronation 
festival has never been independently verified. However, rumours at the time spoke of the 
total number of victims as being as being as high as 4,000. Since the revolution, in works 
such as Helen Baker’s analysis of the tragedy and its aftermath, it has been commonplace 
to look back on this event as a sign of the divorce between the lives of the tsar and his 
people.48 However, as we shall discuss in Chapter Two, this impression was not 
necessarily a feature of O’Conor’s or other contemporary reports on the disaster.    
      When O’Conor, left St Petersburg in 1898 for a new posting in Constantinople he was 
succeeded by Sir Charles Scott who had served in St Petersburg as secretary and head of 
chancellery (1874 and 1877). In spite of his experience in Russia he appeared something 
of a surprise appointment having previously been passed over for promotion. However, as 
we have noted, professional and family connections played a significant role in 
facilitating diplomatic careers.  When Lord Salisbury appointed Scott he did so in the 
knowledge that he enjoyed support from within the highest circles of the Russian court. 
By birth the dowager empress of Russia was a Danish princess and after her marriage she 
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continued to holiday with her family in her native Denmark. It was in Copenhagen that 
the dowager empress came to know Scott whilst he was stationed at the British Embassy 
(1862-1865).49   
       Of all the ambassadors from whom we quote, Sir Charles Scott appears to have been 
amongst the most sociable, equally at ease lunching with junior members of his staff and 
at receptions held by the St Petersburg elite. However, the ambassador’s character, 
although important in a milieu where sociability was highly prized, also had its 
drawbacks from a professional point of view. He was said to be rather ‘garrulous to the 
point of indiscretion’.50 His other failing, although he was not alone in this, was that he 
relied on conversations with the capital’s high society to form his understanding of 
opposition to the regime. As a result, as Michael Hughes has noted, this led him to be less 
than perceptive and to blame any outbreak of social unrest on professional agitators 
‘rather than [arising from] genuine grievances’.51  
    After six years service in Russia, Scott was replaced by his erstwhile subordinate, Sir 
Charles Hardinge whose maternal grandfather, Earl Lucan, had fought in the Crimea and 
whose paternal grandfather had been governor general of India. His uncle, Sir Arthur 
Hardinge, had been part of the British entourage which accompanied Nicholas during his 
tour of India.  Scott’s departure was in no small part due to the persistent efforts of 
Hardinge and his cousin Lord Francis Bertie (Britain’s ambassador to Paris 1905-1918). 
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Together the pair undermined Scott in the eyes of senior foreign office officials and, more 
importantly, in the eyes of the king.52 In particular, while he was Scott’s junior, Hardinge 
contradicted his ambassador’s interpretations of Russian intentions in Manchuria.53 
Hardinge undoubtedly possessed a steely ambition and his career was an example par 
excellence of the role in which patronage and family connections played in Edwardian 
diplomacy.  Hardinge was friends with the king’s private secretary, Sir Francis Knollys, 
who later helped facilitate his appointment as permanent under-secretary to the Foreign 
Office (1906) and Viceroy of India (1910).54  In addition, the fact that his wife, Winifred, 
was a lady-in-waiting to Queen Alexandra hardly hindered his career. As the British 
Embassy Secretary, Sir Cecil Spring Rice remarked: Hardinge’s wife had ‘the queen in 
one pocket and the king in another’.55   
     In 1903, the year before he took up the ambassadorial post in St Petersburg, Hardinge 
accompanied Edward VII on a state visit to Portugal and an impromptu diplomatic 
mission to France. Furthermore, as Roderick Mclean tells us, when Hardinge was 
appointed to St Petersburg Edward VII met with the Russian Foreign Minister and, 
knowing the dowager empress was his patron, made it clear ‘that Hardinge’s appointment 
was to establish cordial relations between the two countries’.56  These signs of the king’s 
favour may have enabled the ambassador to cultivate a more intimate relationship with 
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Nicholas than might have been possible for other diplomats. Hardinge himself believed 
this to have been the case.57  The fact that Hardinge also spoke Russian would have also 
endeared him to the tsar who placed great emphasis on Russian language and culture.   
    Hardinge’s time as ambassador in St Petersburg were difficult years both for Russia 
and for British-Russian relations but although he was evidently a popular and successful 
ambassador it was with Edward VII’s approval that Hardinge left Russia for  a senior role 
in the Foreign Office. However, Russia remained the focus of much of his career and he 
worked hard to achieve the Accord of 1907 which sought to resolve Russia and Britain’s 
concerns over Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet.  In 1908 he accompanied Edward VII to 
Reval for the king’s official meeting with the tsar. Furthermore, in the spring of 1917, 
Hardinge was party to the confidential discussions concerning the possibility of allowing 
Nicholas and Alexandra exile in Britain.58  
      Hardinge was succeeded in his post at St Petersburg by Sir Arthur Nicolson who had 
served in the diplomatic corps since 1874. In 1875 he first met Sir Donald Mackenzie 
Wallace, then making a name for himself as a Russian expert. Mackenzie Wallace later 
convinced Nicolson to ‘put his faith in gradual reform’ in the Russian empire.59   
Specifically in regards to Russo-British relations, fearful that Russia presented ‘a 
powerful challenge to the British in India’ Nicolson worked with Hardinge to achieve a 
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political understanding with Russia.60  It was during Nicolson’s time in St Petersburg that 
Britain and Russia began to enjoy the fruits of this entente; an Anglo-Russian Accord was 
signed in 1907 and in 1908 Edward VII paid a state visit to Russia. The following year 
members of the Duma visited England and Scotland and Nicholas and Alexandra 
travelled to the Isle of Wight.61 
    Of all Britain’s ambassadors to Russia between 1894 and 1918, the best known today is 
Sir George Buchanan. A descendant of the earls of Caithness, Buchanan had been 
employed in the diplomatic service for over thirty years when he was posted to St 
Petersburg. He served during the difficult years of the First World War and was a witness 
to the enthusiastic reception of the tsar and his consort in the Kremlin in August 1914 as 
well to the February and October 1917 revolutions.62  After the revolution Sir Bernard 
Pares remembered the ambassador as   ‘a man of singular and luminous simplicity’.63  In 
retrospect this does not necessarily sound like a compliment and it has been said of 
Buchanan that whilst he was a competent administrator he ‘lacked the instinctive 
understanding of the Russian mind’ which had been the hallmark of some of his 
predecessors.64 Buchanan spoke French, German and Italian but, despite his many years in 
Russia, he never felt it necessary to learn even basic Russian. His linguistic limitations, 
together with the vagaries of Russian internal politics, may have reduced the usefulness of 
some of his reports since he relied for information from friends drawn from a narrow 
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social circle. The result was, as Michael Hughes has noted, that his reports were 
sometimes based on little more than ‘rumour and speculation’.65  
   Buchanan’s celebrity is due in no small measure to his memoirs. Published in 1923 My 
Mission to Russia and other Diplomatic Memories recalled how, during his time as 
British chargé d’affaires in Hesse Darmstadt, he was invited to tennis parties attended by 
Nicholas and Alexandra.66  Buchanan had a great deal of regard for his position as 
Britain’s senior representative in St Petersburg. As a result he expected the Russian court 
to show him considerable deference.  On one occasion, early on in his posting, he was 
invited to lunch at Tsarskoe Selo. Assuming that he was to be a guest of the tsar and 
empress he was horrified to discover that he was to eat with the Household and made it 
quite clear to the Grand Marshal of the Court that this was not to happen again.
67
 During 
the his period of service in St Petersburg his self-confidence, his fixation with his position 
as Britain’s ambassador and his mis-reading of Nicolas’s attitude towards diplomats, led 
Buchanan to see evidence of conspiracies by a pro-German clique where none existed.68  
    In addition to the embassy in St Petersburg, as part of Britain’s diplomatic presence in 
Russia she had a network of consulates across the tsarist empire. The most important of 
these was based in Moscow, Russia’s second capital. Because of the tumultuous years in 
which he served at the Moscow consulate (1911-1919) and his role as Britain’s senior 
diplomatic representative after the revolution R.H. Bruce Lockhart continues to be well 
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known even today.69  Although the consulate service was not as highly regarded within 
the Foreign Office as other branches of the diplomatic corps Bruce Lockhart was fluent in 
Russian which gave him access to a wider spectrum of public opinion than his colleagues 
in St Petersburg.70   
   In addition to the civilian diplomatic corps Britain’s representatives in St Petersburg 
also included a number of military attachés who remained under a military chain of 
command and therefore tended to bypass the embassy when submitting reports to 
Whitehall.71  We have considered the perceptions of three of them. The dates given 
indicate their time of service in Russia. They are: Major- General Sir Alfred Knox (1912-
1920), Major-General Sir John Hanbury Williams (1914-1917) and Rear-Admiral Sir 
Richard Phillimore R.N. (1915-1917). Their background, their sense of themselves as part 
wider European elite and their position as the ‘public face’ of the Russo-British alliance 
facilitated their ability to identify with the anxieties and values of the tsar and empress. In 
order to better understand the lens through which they perceived Nicholas and Alexandra 
we have provided brief biographical details below.  
     Alfred Knox was born in Ulster in 1870 and before 1914 he saw action on the North-
West Frontier in British India. During the First World War he travelled widely along the 
eastern front speaking to soldiers and commanders alike. By this means Knox was able to 
gauge the rank and file opinion as to progression of the war, towards court politics and to 
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Nicholas’s role as head of the army. In 1921 Knox published an account of his wartime 
service in imperial Russia entitled With the Russian Army 1914-1917 which contained 
extracts from his diary detailing his experiences on the frontline.72 On occasion, in the 
course of Chapter Six, we make reference to Knox’s observations which he published 
after the revolution but we also consider the reports he wrote from Russia during the First 
World War.  
    Of all the attachés whose views we consider Knox had the skills necessary to fulfil his 
role as an observer of the Russian forces, not least because he spoke Russian. It was a 
skill which many of his colleagues lacked although the extent of his fluency is open to 
doubt. Bernard Pares later claimed that as a result of his limited Russian Knox had barked 
out his speeches to the troops in ‘short, soldierly sentences, using as many nominatives as 
possible’.73  However, given his forceful personality it is perhaps doubtful if Pares would 
have acknowledged many of his compatriots as his linguistic equal. Whatever the truth of 
Knox’s shortcomings in this regard, he was highly thought of in military matters by 
Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Wilson. The Lieutenant General formed part of Lord 
Milner’s allied mission which met at Tsarskoe Selo in January 1917. In a report to the 
Cabinet on the eve of the revolution Wilson asserted: ‘I attach more weight to [Alfred] 
Knox’s opinion on any matter affecting the Russian army than I do to the opinion of any 
other man in Russia’.74   However, Knox was not the head of the British military mission 
to Russia.  Knox’s lack of a title (he was not made a K.C.B until after the revolution) 
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would have added to impressions of his lack of social status. As Michael Hughes reminds 
us the decision not to appoint Knox as Head of the military mission was largely dictated 
by social considerations.75 Sir John Hanbury Williams, who was appointed to this 
important post, spoke no Russian and at the time of his appointment, by his own 
admission, knew ‘practically nothing’ about Russia.76 However, he had the sort of 
pedigree and social credentials which were admired, both in the Foreign Office, and at the 
Russian court.  
       Born in 1878, John Hanbury Williams was a descendant of Sir Charles Hanbury 
Williams who had been British ambassador to Russia at the court of Empress Elizabeth 
between 1755 -56. After obtaining a commission in the army he saw action in Egypt and 
South Africa. Between 1897 and 1904 he served as secretary to a number of influential 
men including William Broderick (Secretary of State for War) and Earl Grey (Governor 
General of Canada).  The way in which he first learnt of his appointment to the Russian 
post seems representative of the well-meaning, but slightly amateurish, atmosphere at 
Russian imperial headquarters. At the outbreak of war with Germany, he was walking 
along South Audley Street in London’s Mayfair when he bumped into General “Jimmy” 
Grierson (an aide-de-camp to George V) whose first words were ‘Hanbury -- you’re for 
Russia’.77 Not surprisingly, given the circumstances of his appointment, he and Knox 
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enjoyed strained relations.78 Lulled by the atmosphere at imperial headquarters Hanbury 
Williams believed Knox tended to be overly pessimistic in his assessment of the military 
situation and, more significantly, to lack a courtier’s deference in his dealings with the 
tsar.79   In 1922 Hanbury Williams published an account of his service in Russia and a 
sympathetic portrait of the tsar entitled The Emperor Nicholas II as I knew Him.80  
However, it is his wartime diary, in addition to his official reports, which form the basis 
of our analysis and his impressions of the tsar.81 
        In October 1915 Hanbury Williams was joined at imperial headquarters (Stavka) in 
the town of Mogilev by Rear-Admiral (later Admiral Sir) Richard Phillimore. 
Phillimore’s career with the Royal Navy began in 1878 and he subsequently saw action in 
the Mediterranean, the West Indies, in the Far East, the Falklands and at Cape Helles as 
part of the Dardanelles campaign in April 1915.82 Like Hanbury Williams he spoke no 
Russian and spent much of his time in the company of the tsar and his sometimes self-
absorbed entourage. However, with his extensive service record Phillimore seems to have 
impressed Nicholas. According to Hanbury Williams, he was ‘an excellent choice for the 
job’ because he was very much ‘liked by the tsar’.83 Although Phillimore’s tenure in 
Russia was relatively brief, his perceptions of Alexandra are especially interesting 
because he met her in relatively informal surroundings at a critical time in her husband’s 
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reign.84  
     Britain’s official representatives had varying skills for their role: they were socialites 
and linguists, men driven by their desire to rise in their careers and men conscious of their 
family heritage and their position as representative of the British crown. As we have 
noted the quality of some of their reports have since been criticised for having been based 
on little more than gossip. Moreover, as Keith Neilson tells us, because many of their 
despatches were forwarded to the British monarch embassy staff felt inhibited and often 
maintained ‘a discreet silence’ with regard to Nicholas himself preferring to apportion 
blame for any crisis on factors outside of the tsar’s control.85 A number of journalists, 
writers and political activists contributed to debate about the imperial couple and, unlike 
the diplomatic reports, their accounts were intended for a much wider audience.  
(iii) Journalists, Academics, Authors and political activists 
For journalists, academics and political activists the tsar and empress meant different 
things: the benign religious and political leaders of their people, a loyal ally, the 
representatives of a brutal autocracy, and the loving parents of a close-knit family. British 
concepts of the tsar and empress in newspapers, magazines and other media fluctuated 
between being laudatory, sympathetic, defensive, critical, and scornful. Claims that the 
tsar was a despot and a bloodthirsty tyrant were juxtaposed with stories of the imperial 
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family’s simple, bourgeois lifestyle and Nicholas’s devotion to the welfare of his people.86  
      In an era when the majority of people accessed daily information on the world around 
them from newspapers and magazines the press could be extremely influential. As 
Stephen Koss has noted ‘the printed word was accepted [by the public] as an article of 
faith’.87 However, although newspapers both formed and reflected public opinion, articles 
were not always based on fact. One contemporary journalist revealed, when reports of 
‘nihilists or assassinations of high personages’ were scarce, a journalist might be asked to 
‘manufacture articles from “our own correspondent” in Vienna or Berlin or to concoct an 
report, which although written in Fleet Street, was published as coming out of St 
Petersburg’.88 Furthermore, even before the advent of wartime censorship in 1914, the 
government controlled aspects of what was reported in regard to foreign affairs. As we 
shall discuss further below, the Foreign Office took a largely patrician attitude towards 
foreign affairs considering it perfectly normal that a relatively small clique might direct 
the foreign policy of the Empire without recourse to parliament, let alone the public. 
Therefore, editors and correspondents who wished to draw on official sources about 
events abroad were required to submit written requests at the Foreign Office. An hour 
later an official would ‘send down any items of intelligence’ thought suitable for 
presentation in the public domain.89   
     At this time it was not common practice for editors or their journalists to ascribe their 
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name to an article. However, we do know that the journalists and academics E.J.  Dillon 
and Bernard Pares wrote for the Daily Telegraph as well as monthly periodicals including 
the Nineteenth Century and After, the Quarterly Review, the Fortnightly Review, Cornhill 
Magazine and the Contemporary Review.90    In the course of Chapter Three we consider 
articles and memoirs written by men who travelled to Manchuria specifically to cover 
Russia’s war with Japan. They included Maurice Baring who was employed by the 
Morning Post and who is discussed further below, Lionel James, G.B. Bennett and 
Colonel Sir Charles À Court Repington who wrote for The Times, Lord Brooke who filed 
for Reuters, Daniel James the Daily Telegraph’s correspondent and Thomas Cowen who 
was war correspondent for the Daily Chronicle. Other journalists who reported from 
Manchuria included Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett who spent time with the Japanese Army and 
Sir Ian Hamilton who kept a diary of his experiences which was later published in volume 
form. In addition, Captain Douglas Story was one of a total of nine journalists (including 
the author Jack London) who were despatched to cover the Russo-Japanese war by the 
Daily Express.91    
    A number of newspapers during this period were edited by ambitious men whose 
opinions might influence politicians and the public.  The most widely read Liberal 
newspaper of its day, the Daily News, was edited during the 1914-18 war by the 
ambitious radical A.G. Gardiner.92 The populist Daily Mail and London Evening News as 
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well The Times were owned by the press baron, Lord Northcliffe.93 Interestingly, Nicholas 
once observed that he had ‘taken The Times as long has he could remember’.94 We also 
quote from the populist Daily Mirror which had begun life as a women’s newspaper and 
which, from 1914, was controlled by Lord Rothermere. 95 The broadsheet Observer was 
edited by the radical Tory J.L. Garvin and the self-confident John St Loe Strachey96 was 
owner-editor of the Spectator for which the Independent Labour Party member, H.N. 
Brailsford, contributed many articles.97 In addition we note that W.J. Fisher edited the 
Liberal supporting Daily Chronicle and (Charles Frederic) Moberley Bell was an 
influential editor of The Times.98  
       Newspapers, whether broadsheet or tabloid, began life with a focus in mind intended 
to mark it out from potential rivals. In 1900 in its first editorial the Daily Express 
proclaimed its policy of ‘patriotism and independence from any political party or social 
clique’.99 For its part the Morning Post, was characterised by it promotion of the 
economic and social causes dear to the hearts of the prosperous upper middle classes.100 
During Sir George Buchanan’s tenure as Britain’s ambassador in St Petersburg the pro-
Russian Morning Post was owned by his sister-in-law Lady Bathurst.101  The Illustrated 
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London News eschewed an alliance with a political party and declared itself to be 
‘earnestly domestic’.102 The Daily Telegraph has been described as the newspaper of ‘the 
clerk and the shopkeeper and The Times that of the City merchant’.103 However, for all the 
intentions of their editors and proprietors, the readership of a given newspaper might be 
more varied than its founder intended.  For example, the Manchester Guardian was read 
by business men who eschewed its radical editorial stance but valued it transatlantic 
commercial reports.104  
      In addition to a variety of mainstream publications a number of specifically anti-
tsarist periodicals were also published in Britain during this period. They were: Darkest 
Russia (1891-1893 and 1912-1914), Anglo Russian Review, Free Russia (1890-1914) 
and, founded in 1905, the Russian Correspondence which appears to have been short 
lived as few copies survive in the archives.  Edited by Lucien Wolf, Darkest Russia 105 
was supported by prominent members the Anglo-Jewish community and took an especial 
interest in Russian anti-Semitism.106 The son of exiled central European Jews, Wolf was 
educated in Brussels and Paris. In the course of his working life he cultivated a network 
of acquaintances in the Chancelleries of Europe and for twenty-five years was employed 
as foreign affairs observer for the populist Daily Graphic and the widely read Fortnightly 
Review magazine. As Max Beloff tells us, Wolf was ‘one of the leading critics of Sir 
                                                          
102
 Plunkett, Media Monarch, p. 99.  
103
 Brown, Victorian News (Oxford, 1985), p. 246. 
104
 Koss, Rise and Fall, vol. 1.  p.22.  
105
 The title may have been an allusion to William Booth’s: In Darkest England and the way out (London, 
1890).  
106
 SSEES Archive, WOL, Lucien Wolf Collection 1911-1928.   
41 
 
 
 
 
 
Edward Grey’s foreign policy’ and the pages of Darkest Russia provided a forum which 
allowed him to be ‘more combative’ than was possible in the more mainstream 
publications with which he had hitherto been associated.107   However, at the start of the 
1914-18 war Wolf was convinced that the need to show unity with Russia outweighed 
any political squeamishness and he ceased publication of Darkest Russia. Ironically, 
despite this act of patriotism and show of public support for an ally he had spent a career 
berating, he was accused of being a German spy and never recovered the respect he had 
once had.108  
    A second anti-tsarist magazine, which also ceased publication in 1914, was the Anglo 
Russian Review. Edited by Russian Jewish émigré Jaakof Prelooker (who claimed a 
circulation of many thousands) the Anglo Russian Review was one of two publications 
(the other being Free Russia) which were supported by the British ‘Society of Friends of 
Russian Freedom’.109    The society had been founded in 1890 by the radical journalist 
George Herbert Perris (foreign editor of the Tribune 1906-08)
110
 and Robert Spence (a 
Newcastle solicitor and president of the National Liberal Federation 1890-1902).   It 
succeeded in attracting membership from many of the leading British intellectuals and 
politicians of the day including William Morris, Sidney Webb and Keir Hardie. Together 
they funded an ‘exile escape fund’ and sought to challenge those it viewed as apologists 
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for the tsarist regime such as Maurice Baring and Sir Bernard Pares.111 The subscribers to 
Free Russia included the social reformer Joshua Rowntree and the writer Sarah Smith 
whose books (published under the pseudonym of Hesba Stretton) dealt with social issues 
such as child poverty. Other supporters of the Anglo Russian Review included the Liberal 
politician the Right Honourable Arthur Herbert Dyke Ackland, thirteenth Baronet, the 
Countess of Carlisle, the suffragist Isabella O. Ford and the Reverend Augustus Stopford 
Brooke one time chaplain to both Queen Victoria and her daughter, the Empress 
Frederick of Germany.112  
          The subject of the struggle for Russian freedom against the despotism of the tsar’s 
also found a ready market amongst readers of popular novels. In the late nineteenth 
century in particular there was ‘a veritable flood’ of so-called “nihilistic novels” which 
purported to relate the daring exploits of Russians who were working for the revolution. 
Their titles alone: A Nihilist Princess and In the Hands of the Tsar reinforced popular 
images of a tyrannical monarch.113 However, the British were not only interested in the 
more brutal side of the imperial regime but were avid readers of “cosy” descriptions of 
life behind the palace walls.  A particularly popular example of this genre was written by 
Margaret Eager: a former governess to the imperial children who published an account of 
her time in the imperial household. The book which was illustrated with photographs of 
the imperial children proved extremely popular. It ran to at least two editions and extracts 
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were also published in Leisure Hour, a mass circulation family magazine.114  
    Eager claimed to have been encouraged to write her memoirs by the empress as a 
counter to the untruthful accounts of life at the imperial court then in circulation. She 
described in some detail the tsar and empress’s private quarters, the empress’s bedroom 
with her collection of ‘holy images’ and Nicholas’s study which, Eager said, was ‘the 
most used room in the palace [where] the tsar spends hours each day working hard for the 
advancement of the great empire committed to his charge’.115 In 1905, a year before Eager 
published her account of life at Tsarskoe Selo the Daily Express had reported that a major 
in the Russian army tasted the imperial family’s food before they dinned in a sealed, 
bomb proof room made entirely of cast iron.116 There was no such room in the palace at 
Tsarskoe Selo but the article revived memories of the attempted assassination of Tsar 
Alexander II with a bomb hidden beneath the dining room of the Winter Palace. In her 
introduction Eager appeared to reject stereotypical images such as those presented in the 
Daily Express of a tsar dogged by revolutionaries. Thus, Eager asserted ‘it would be easy 
for me to pile on the agony [and] to speak of plots and counterplots; to speak of hidden 
bombs and life made horrible by fear; but no such things have occurred in my six years at 
the Russian court’.117 However, in spite of her protestations to the contrary, she devoted 
an entire chapter to what she called ‘attacks on the tsar’ including an attempt to poison the 
                                                          
114
 Margaret Eager, Six Years at the Russian Court (London, 1906).  
115
 Eager, Six Years, p. 9.  
116
 McMillan, The Way we were, p. 170. 
117
 Eager, Six Years, p. viii.  
44 
 
 
 
 
 
water supply at Livadia by a revolutionary disguised as a priest.118 Even more dramatic 
was her story of a parcel ‘posted in Suez’, addressed to Nicholas that was found to 
contain a piece of cloth contaminated with plague germs.119  
      Nicholas was an extremely private person and he may not have approved of Eager’s 
book-nonetheless, he did promote aspects of his life in photographs and in film as well as 
in newspapers, periodicals and books. In 1905, reflecting on the events of Bloody Sunday 
when the workers had marched to the Winter Palace despite the tsar’s absence, the 
empress’s brother suggested Nicholas institute a court circular in order that in future the 
people would know his location on any given day. Perhaps realising that the tsar would be 
doubtful as the benefits of such a scheme the grand duke advised that the people only 
‘hear only about your official work but they want to know how their emperor lives, his 
family life and his dear wife’.120  In the wake of the 1905 revolution security reasons 
probably precluded publication of as detailed a schedule as was commonplace in other 
monarchies but, in 1914, the tsar permitted publication of an English translation of a book 
first published in Russia to mark the Romanov tercentenary. Readers of The Tsar and his 
People were informed that the tsar ‘never sits down to rest during the day time [..] the 
ruler of the Russian Empire devotes never less than ten and frequently as many as twelve 
hours to work’.121 The book was well received by the Daily Express which asserted that 
the book proved ‘once and for all that monarchs work harder than most of their subjects 
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[since] all the tables and sofas ‘of the tsar’s working room are ‘perpetually covered with 
papers yet the work is never behind’.122 Furthermore, adding a note of frugality which 
contrasted with popular images of Romanov wealth, the newspaper observed that the tsar 
is ‘sparing in his use of writing materials and hands over the stumps to the tsarevich’.123 
   The coronation procession in 1896 was the first historic occasion of its kind to be 
filmed for distribution to the public but after 1912, with imperial sanction, Gaumont 
produced over 100 films showing the tsar and his family.124 British cinema goers were 
able to see moving images of Nicholas entitled, for example, The Czar at the Front 
(1915) and The Czar of Russia and his Armies (1916). British Pathé news also showed a 
number of films of the tsar including, in 1912, the Czar Attends the Centenary of the 
Battle of Borodino and The Czar and Grand Duke Nicholas Inspect the Army in the Field, 
made at the height of the war in 1915. One of the last films showing Nicholas, entitled A 
Royal Prisoner (1917), was made on the eve the tsar’s return to Tsarskoe Selo following 
his abdication at Pskov.  These films enabled a wide British audience outside of the elites 
the opportunity to ‘see’ Nicholas and, sometimes, Alexandra for themselves.125 Such 
vignettes, served to emphasise the human qualities of the imperial couple beneath the 
more traditional images of Russian rulers, their unlimited wealth and their uncaring 
hauteur.   
        Nicholas’s political and personal views were also promoted to the British public by 
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means of interviews with sympathetic British journalists including Sir Donald Mackenzie 
Wallace and W.T. Stead. These two men in particular were very different characters but 
they both had a genuine and long standing interest in Russia, Russian affairs and the 
Russian monarchy. According to his obituary in The Times Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace 
devoted his life to his ‘passionate love of study’ which included spending time at 
universities in Scotland, Germany and France.126  He spoke several languages, including 
Russian, and in 1870 he made his first visit to Russia where he spent the following six 
years criss-crossing the Russian empire. His manuscript entitled Russia was at first turned 
down by London publishers on the grounds that no one in Britain would be interested in 
the subject.127  It was not until the Bosnian Risings (1875) and the Bulgarian Atrocities 
(1876) that the so-called Eastern Question became the focus of British attention and it 
became evident that a book on Russia might fill a gap in public knowledge.128 Eventually 
running to five editions, it remained for many years, the definitive work for anyone 
seeking a considered insight into Russia.129   
      Mackenzie Wallace first met Nicholas in 1890 having been proposed by Sir Robert 
Morier, the then British ambassador to St Petersburg, to accompany the future tsar on tour 
of India.
130
  Wallace subsequently submitted a report on the visit to Morier, it provides an 
interesting insight into Nicholas’s character a few short years before his accession. The 
portrait of the future autocrat is not very flattering, he is depicted as an immature, 
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lethargic young man whose education in regards to the responsibilities of royalty appears 
to be somewhat lacking.  In particular Wallace found he had the ‘abrupt manner of the 
Romanovs’ and, as a result, often gave offence ‘having no idea of the great importance 
ordinary mortals attribute to the insignificant words and acts of personage in his 
position’.131 By his own admission Wallace hesitated to predict what sort of ruler Nicholas 
might make but he noted that although he was ‘well-intentioned [he lacked] enthusiasm 
of any kind’.132 As a result he believed history would regard him as Nicholas ‘the good 
and worthy’ rather than ‘Nicholas the Great’.133 Clearly Wallace was far from impressed 
by the tsarevich but his time with Nicholas may have stood him in good stead since he 
later obtained regular audiences with the tsar ‘who spoke to him surprisingly openly’ 
about the problems facing Russia.134  At the urging of Edward VII Mackenzie Wallace 
travelled to Russia in the wake of Bloody Sunday. As is discussed in Chapter 4 
Mackenzie Wallace’s relatively phlegmatic response to Bloody Sunday contrasted with 
some other firsthand accounts.135 Mackenzie Wallace was evidently respected by the tsar, he 
was twice sent to St Petersburg by the British government to sound Nicholas out about 
the possibility of an Anglo-Russian Accord.136 
     Amongst the British commentators whom we consider who were granted audiences 
with Nicholas and whose perceptions we consider, W.T. Stead was the most unusual. 
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Stead began his journalistic career in 1871 on a provincial newspaper, the Northern Echo 
based in Darlington. He continued to work for the Northern Echo until 1880 but a wider 
public knew him during his tenure as a journalist and editor of the London based Pall 
Mall Gazette which, under his stewardship, crusaded on a number of radical topics. His 
articles tackled some of the most controversial subjects of the day including Irish Home 
Rule, white slavery and juvenile prostitution.137 Stead was also the author of a number of 
books which focused on his range of eclectic interests including spiritualism and Russian 
politics.138  Following his exposé in the Pall Mall Gazette of British child prostitution he 
was charged with peddling pornography and in 1885 he was sentenced to three months 
imprisonment. One critic has since unflatteringly described Stead as ‘lacking balance, 
judgement and self-discipline [..] a journalistic Toad of Toad Hall forever puffed up with 
some new conceit, a quack cure for cancer, a miraculous fertiliser, Esperanto and spirit 
photography or a process for distilling gold out of sea water’.139   However, his mercurial 
character and his notoriety did not harm his writing career and in 1888 he achieved 
something of a journalistic coup when he secured interviews with both Lev Tolstoi and 
Tsar Alexander III.  
     Stead’s interview with Alexander III was the beginning of a long association with the 
imperial family and his public defence of “their causes”. For example, in towns and cities 
across Europe, Stead enthusiastically publicised Nicholas’ call for a Peace Conference at 
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The Hague.140 In November 1898 Stead interviewed the tsar at Livadia, a meeting which 
seems to have left him in a state of elation. In a subsequent letter to Queen Victoria, Stead 
declared that he felt ‘grateful to God that such a man sits upon the Russian throne’.141 In 
the coming years Stead’s enthusiasm for Nicholas remained undimmed and, following the 
establishment of the Duma, he was granted another interview with the tsar.  Unable to 
gain access to Nicholas at this time of change the tsar’s invitation to Stead rankled with 
the British diplomatic corps.142 Stead is an especially interesting character since he 
believed in both liberal reform and his ability to assist the tsar. He did so with a 
deferential, yet at times extremely familiar, attitude towards Nicholas and Alexandra.143  
However, Stead did not live to witness the final crisis of imperial Russia having been a 
passenger onboard the Titanic in 1912.  
    Of all those who wrote about Russia during this period, perhaps the best known today 
is Sir Bernard Pares, mainly because of the accounts he wrote of his experiences in Russia 
and his analysis of the demise of the imperial regime. In particular, his readable account 
The Fall of the Russian Monarchy in which he recalled ‘a time when it was still thought 
possible to regard a sixth of the world’s surface as a personal estate and govern a hundred 
and seventy millions of humanity from a lady’s drawing room’.144 However, we have 
given priority to Pares’ perceptions of Nicholas and Alexandra contained in his 
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confidential government reports, newspaper columns and letters to the press.  
   Pares’ interest in Russia can be dated from 1898 when he toured Napoleon’s 
battlefields. Although he enjoyed independent means, he began an academic career as a 
lecturer at Cambridge. In 1907 he established the first school of Russian studies at the 
University of Liverpool where he invited several Russianists of the day, including the 
theologian William Birkbeck and the Tolstoyan Aylmer Maude, to lecture.145 Pares later 
became director of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies which was founded 
in 1915.   
       After the 1905 revolution and the introduction of constitutional reforms Pares became 
an enthusiastic supporter of evolutionary liberalisation in Russia. In 1907 he published a 
study of the subject entitled Russia and Reform and became a keen secretary of the 
Anglo-Russian Friendship Society.146  In later years he was remembered by his secretary 
Dorothy Galton as ‘a benevolent autocrat’ who could get on with anyone ‘so long as they 
deferred to him’.147 Although Pares may have been overbearing it was largely as a result 
of his stamina and enthusiasm for the reform movement that the Duma was able to 
undertake a successful visit to Britain in 1909.148     
     His interpretations of Russian affairs were valued by Whitehall and as early as 1906 he 
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provided the Cabinet with an analysis of debates in the Duma.149  In August 1914 the 
Foreign Office sent him to Russia and he spent the next nine months touring the eastern 
front by bicycle. His mission was to counter the German propaganda stories of Cossack 
outrages and he duly published a sympathetic account of the Russian Army. Amongst the 
images he described was of an army corps which marched resolutely to the Front singing 
as they went. One line of the song included the refrain: ‘Be not moody Russian tsar, 
Russian tsar! Russia will never yield’.150  This book, which highlighted the patriotism of 
the Russian Army, was well received in Russia. However, as Keith Neilson has noted, 
Pares was not popular with everyone at the British Embassy. Perhaps because of his 
domineering character Sir Charles Hardinge for example, found him ‘a bit of a bore’.151 
During the war Buchanan had little time for Pares’ official reports and as a result he was 
effectively sacked from Foreign Office work although he continued to write for the 
press.152  
      Pares met the tsar on two occasions, the first in 1912, when he led a parliamentary 
delegation to Russia and the second in 1916 when he was awarded the Cross of St George 
(Fourth Class) to mark the publication of his book on the Russian Army. However, 
because of Pares’ very public association with the Duma, he seems not to have been 
invited to interview the tsar.  
       Dr Emile Joseph Dillon was born in Dublin and first visited Russia in 1877.  His first 
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wife, whom he married in 1881, was a Russian and he enjoyed a long association with the 
country.153 A talented linguist, in addition to Arabic and Sanskrit, Dillon was also fluent in 
Latin, Greek, French, German and Russian. He studied at St Petersburg University and 
was subsequently appointed professor of comparative philology, Sanskrit and ancient 
Armenian at Khar’kov University. Uniquely amongst his British contemporaries from 
whom we quote, Dillon was also employed as foreign correspondent for Odesskie Vestnik 
and later as editor of Odesskie Novosti. In 1887 he was recruited as the Russia 
correspondent for the London Daily Telegraph and in the coming years he also wrote for 
the Fortnightly Review.154    
     Dillon was friends with a number of the political and diplomatic elite of St Petersburg. 
His talks with Russia’s first Prime Minister Sergei Witte influenced his reports to the 
British embassy, particularly during the revolutionary crisis of 1905.155  He advised the 
British embassy secretary Sir Cecil Spring Rice about the Russian revolutionary 
movement and the Russian secret police.156  However, amongst his compatriots, opinion 
about Dillon was divided. W.T. Stead described him as ‘far and away the ablest, most 
cultured and most adventurous newspaperman’ he had ever met.157 Lord Onslow was also 
impressed and thought Dillon ‘knew more about Russia than anyone he had met’.158 In 
contrast to his many admirers, Charles Hardinge came to believe that Dillon was ‘a most 
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unreliable scoundrel’.159   
   Like the diplomatic corps, the journalists whose perceptions we consider had a variety 
of skills. A number were linguists, few were immune from self-promotion and several 
wrote for publications with a specific political or social outlook which they themselves 
sometimes shared.  They are a useful foil for this thesis providing as they do a rich variety 
of texts with sometimes uninhibited views about the tsar and empress which generally 
contrast to the more restrained language of British diplomatic reports.  
      As we have noted, the readership of a particular newspaper or magazine might include 
readers who did not share the publications political outlook. However, human nature 
suggests that people tend to by newspapers and to read articles which reflect their own 
views.  As a result what these journalists wrote may give us some sense of what their 
‘ordinary’ British readers might have thought of Nicholas and Alexandra.   
(iv)Travellers and Residents 
In addition to those in Britain who constructed their perceptions of the tsar and empress 
based on articles whose authors we have considered above there were a number who were 
able to travel to Russia and who therefore felt able to comment on the imperial couple.  
Since Richard Chancellor had first come to Muscovy in the sixteenth century there had 
been no lack of British citizens with a sense of adventure willing to endure hardships in 
order to trade with Russia and to explore the vast land.   The advent of the railways in the 
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nineteenth century facilitated travel to Russia and the century saw a plethora of 
guidebooks to meet the needs of travellers.160  These temporary visitors could be divided 
into tourists who spent a relatively brief time in Russia rarely venturing beyond the two 
capitals and others, often fluent Russian speakers, who were more intrepid and might 
spend many months in Russia and her easternmost provinces.  
   Of those who fall into the latter category, Maurice Baring and Stephen Graham were 
amongst the most prolific.   Maurice Baring was born in 1874, a scion of the banking 
dynasty which had extensive business dealings in Russia. It was Baring’s Bank which 
underwrote the British loan to Persia which formed part of the Anglo-Russian Accord of 
1907.161  In 1898 Baring passed the diplomatic examinations with ‘outstanding French’ 
and the following year he was posted to Copenhagen.162 While in Denmark he met Count 
Aleksander Benckendorff. The two men became firm friends and spent time together in 
Russia and in London where the count was posted as Russia’s Ambassador. Although he 
came to be perceived as something of an expert on Russian affairs, Baring admitted that 
before going to Russia he had been influenced by popular British descriptions of the 
country.  As a result, he said, he had imagined it as a sort of ‘Rhineland covered with 
snow [where] princesses carried about dynamite in their cigarette cases and wore bombs 
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in their tiaras’.163   
   In 1904, with Count Benckendorff’s assistance, Baring travelled to the Manchurian 
Front.164 He subsequently published accounts of his experiences with the Russian 
Army165and in Moscow during the 1905 revolution.166   In 1912, with rather more mature 
perceptions of the country, Baring was part of an official British delegation to the Russian 
Duma. His ties to the extended Benkendorff family continued after the fall of the regime. 
Aleksander’s brother Paul was with the imperial family during the period they spent 
under house arrest at Tsarskoe Selo. Baring later translated into English his account of the 
months he spent with the tsar and empress before they were sent to Siberia.167    
     Baring’s family background, his education, his ambition to serve in the diplomatic 
corps as well as his close friendship with members of the Russian aristocracy placed him 
firmly within the mindset of a member of the European elite.   He was friends with Prince 
P.D. Sviatopolk-Mirsky, the liberal minister of the interior (1904-05), and the Russian 
socialite Countess “Betsy” Shuvaloff.168   Perhaps he never shrugged off his initial 
romantic views about Russia and this may have led him to reject “western” political 
solutions to the crises of the last reign.  For example, in Russian People published in 
1911, Baring railed against the intelligentsia and what he scathingly called their ‘second 
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hand socialism’.169  In 1914, in his book The Mainspring of Russia, Baring reflected on 
the creation of the Duma, preferring to see it in terms of a renewal of the medieval 
Council of Boyars rather than a break with Russia’s past.170   
     Stephen Graham was born in Edinburgh in 1884 whilst a snow storm raged outside. 
He later joked that the weather that day may have subliminally influenced his interest in 
Russia.171  Having given up his job in a government office he forged a successful writing 
career authoring articles in the English Review, The Times and the Daily Mail as well as 
the London evening newspapers.172 He became well connected amongst “Russianists” and 
counted amongst his friends Sir Bernard Pares and members of the Anglican and Eastern 
Churches Association including the Reverend Fynes Clinton, Canon Douglas and 
Archbishop Lang.173 Another member of the Eastern Churches Association, G.B.H. 
Bishop, Vicar of Cardington in Shropshire, praised what he said was Graham’s insight 
into the Russian peasant. In particular the vicar bemoaned the many light weight and 
‘supercilious’ accounts of Russian life which were avidly read by the British public and 
he contrasted them unfavourably with Graham’s writings.174  As Michael Hughes explains, 
Graham sought in particular to promote the idea of “Holy Russia”.  Everyday life in 
Russia, Graham told the British public was ‘saturated by a sense of the presence of 
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God’.175  This theme of innate piety in the Russian peasant was taken up by Graham in his 
book entitled With the Russian Pilgrims to Jerusalem which he published during the 
Romanov Tercentenary year and which relates his experiences with the Russians who 
made the Easter pilgrimage to Jerusalem.176 At the height of the First World War he 
published The Way of Martha and the Way of Mary which more fully discussed religious 
life in Russia.177  During the 1914-18 war his views were sought by Lloyd George and the 
British cabinet but, in retrospect, his views appear tinged with a little romanticism.  In 
spite of his years of study of Russia and because of his belief in the natural spirituality of 
the mass of the Russian people, Graham later admitted that he had not expected the 
revolution.178 
   The Coronation year of 1896 provided a particular focus for a variety of travellers. In 
order to meet this demand the well-known package tour operators Thomas Cook and 
Henry Lunn offered excursions to coincide with the festivities. In the course of this thesis 
we consider the impressions of Arthur Sykes, a journalist and translator of works by 
Gogol and Chekhov,179 and the Reverend Augustus Thursby-Pelham, vicar of the 
Shropshire parish of Cound. The two men travelled to Russia as part of a Co-operative 
Educational tour organised by (later Sir) Henry Lunn180 and John Thomas Woolrych 
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Perowne.181 Perowne expressed the hope that the tours would ‘improve the minds of the 
clergy’.182  On this occasion at least, the clerical contingent was a strong one since, 
according to Thursby-Pelham, there were two vicars and a canon in addition to himself 
aboard the vessel which sailed for Russia.183 Sykes was in the Kremlin’s cathedral square 
as the tsar processed to the Red Staircase and Thursby-Pelham witnessed Nicholas and 
Alexandra’s official entry into Moscow. Another British tourist who was in Moscow at 
this time and whose perceptions we consider was one Mary Hickley. Her sister’s position 
as companion to princess Galitzin gave Hickley entrée to the coronation cathedral.184  The 
narratives left by these visitors provide us with entertaining, frequently positive, if 
contrasting perceptions of the imperial couple during the coronation year of 1896.  
     Amongst the many British visitors and residents in Moscow during the late spring of 
1896 a number were British delegates, representing the Crown and the Anglican Church. 
They included the Duke of Connaught who wrote to Queen Victoria about the disaster at 
Khodynka Field, his aide-de-camp, Field Marshall Lord Francis Grenfell, who published 
an account of the festivities in the Kremlin, and the bishop of Peterborough Mandell 
Creighton who attended the coronation as representative of the Church of England. 
Creighton is of particular interest because he was one of a number of Anglicans at this 
time, including William Birkbeck and Athelstan Riley, who aspired to unity between the 
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Church of England and the Russian Orthodox Church.185   Taken aback by the sights and 
sounds of Moscow, Creighton was influenced in his understanding of the relationship 
between tsar and the Russian people by the displays of religious devotion which he 
witnessed. However, although Creighton professed an interest in Russian Church matters, 
he seems to have lacked an awareness of the tsar himself. Perhaps influenced by typically 
more negative British images of despotic Russian rulers,  Creighton noted with an 
element of surprise that, having met Nicholas, he had found the young tsar to be ‘a 
charming man of great culture’.186    
     Broadly, the impressions of the tsar and empress by those who travelled to Russia for 
the coronation as tourists or as official visitors were positive but their stay was a 
relatively short one. This did not necessarily allow them to develop mature impressions of 
either Russia or Nicholas and Alexandra.   
    In addition to the many temporary visitors to Russia, there was a thriving British 
community whose ties to the country went back many centuries.187 In St Petersburg and 
Moscow families such as the Johnstones, the Maxwells, the Wylies, the Andersons, the 
Merryweathers and the Cazalets were engaged in shipping, commerce, engineering and 
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the manufacture of glass.188 The Russo-Scottish department store of Muir and Mirrielees 
was a centre of British life in Russia.189  Between 1883 and 1890 Aylmer Maude, who had 
studied at the Moscow Lyceum, was employed as the manager of the store’s carpet 
department: he was also a vocal critic of the imperial regime.  
      In 1895 Maude met the Russian philosopher and writer Lev Tolstoi and the two men 
became firm friends. Tolstoi’s philosophy deeply influenced Maude’s thinking and 
Maude later wrote his authorised biography.190 Influenced by Tolstoi and his own Quaker 
beliefs Maude published an account the of the coronation festivities under the nom de 
plume ‘De Monte Alto’ claiming that to do otherwise would risk the wrath of the tsarist 
secret police.191   In contrast to the many positive views we consider, Maude berated the 
cost of the ceremony and countered images of Nicholas as an extraordinary human being, 
worthy of especial reverence. Many of the British visitors in Moscow and much of the 
British press focused their sympathy for the disaster at Khodynka Field on Nicholas and 
Alexandra rather than the many victims of the tragedy.  In keeping with his lack of 
subservience and antipathy to the tsarist regime Maude was a great deal harsher towards 
the imperial couple and dismissed as illogical the sympathy shown towards the tsar and 
empress.192 Maude was not the only British resident who commented on the tsarist regime. 
As we shall discuss the views of Walter Philip, a senior employee of Muir and Mirielees, 
were rather more those of the ‘Establishment’ than those of Maude.  
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    Members of the British Royal Family, diplomats, journalists, travellers to Russia and 
longer term residents all contributed to the variety of British perceptions of Nicholas and 
Alexandra. They provided a particularly British focus to their analysis of the tsar and 
empress. Commentators perceived the imperial couple through the lens of their 
understanding of the British monarchy as a focus for nationhood and as a ‘celebrity’. In 
addition, factors such as class, and a commentators political outlook contributed to the 
development of attitudes towards the tsar and empress.  These notably ‘British influences’ 
were mirrored by a commentator’s understanding of Russian history, the relationship 
between Russia’s rulers and their subjects as well as a view of opposition to the regime. 
In the following chapter we consider these ‘Russian influences’ which were established 
over centuries of Russo-British interaction and suggest ways in which, sometimes 
centuries old ideas, may have contributed to British perceptions of Nicholas and 
Alexandra.  
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Chapter  1:  Brit ish interaction  with  Russia  and images of  Russia ,  
tsars ,  empresses  and consorts  between1553 -1894  
 
The relationship between the tsar and his people is unique and beyond all parallel, totally 
different from that existing in the previous history of nations. Not even the Pope in the 
most amazing of epochs of power, not even the Tartars in their devastating deluge of 
torturing executioners, not even the most savage of barbaric hordes of Vandalism ever 
presented to the world a spectacle of a people so adoring so submissive and so warlike at 
the nod of a supreme ruler. 193 
As the quote at the start of this epigraph indicates, British commentators were fascinated 
by Russia’s tsars and empresses; their power, their wealth and the nature of their 
relationship with the mass of the Russian people.194 The British public believed that 
Russia was ‘different’ she aspired to be a European power but was ‘of the east’. Russia’s 
social and political structures, her religious practices, her language, her geography and 
scale, even her climate were strikingly different from that which existed in Britain. British 
understanding of Nicholas and Alexandra was influenced by a number of sometimes 
conflicting factors. One of the most significant of these was British images of past tsars 
and empresses, the despotic as well as the more liberal.  In addition, British understanding 
of Nicholas and Alexandra was formed as a result of either admiration or distaste for 
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Russian religious as well as both fear of an imperial rival and the necessity of Russo-
British alliances against a common enemy. Influenced by an accumulation of centuries of 
British perceptions of Russia and her rulers, during the final years of the regime British 
responses to the question what was ‘true’ face of Russia and her tsar reflected that of 
earlier generations. Was Nicholas II committed to reform or was he a reactionary? Were 
the mass of its inhabitants inherently uncivilised and discontent or were they happy to live 
their lives under the paternalistic authority of the autocracy? What was the role of an 
empress? Was she foremost a mother, a loving guide to the heir, a helpmate for her 
husband or could she be a political force in her own right? As for Russian culture, was it 
characteristic of eastern barbarism or high art? Was Russian society deeply and sincerely 
spiritual or was its apparent receptiveness to superstition a key factor which enabled 
Rasputin to flourish? Intertwined with references from specifically Russian motifs, 
British attitudes towards Nicholas and Alexandra were also influenced by specifically 
British factors. In particular, notions of the superiority of British culture, the British 
political system as well as the class, education and political leanings of those who 
commented upon the imperial couple all formed a framework against which Nicholas and 
Alexandra were judged.  
 
(i) The Nature of a Russian Tsar  
The pinnacle of power in Russia resided in the absolute monarch whose personality set 
the tone for his or her reign. In addition, they considered the personal characteristics 
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deemed necessary for a successful tsar or empress. By the time of Nicholas II’s accession 
there were any number of “Russian studies” by travellers, diplomats, clerics, academics 
and merchants. A Russian tsar was typically said to have a striking build, a dominating 
personality and a willingness to use violence, against both his own subjects and foreign 
enemies, in order to defend the autocracy and the empire. A Russian ruler’s relationship 
with their subjects was perceived to be at once authoritarian and benevolent.  
    The extent to which it was appropriate for an autocrat to act with violence in defence of 
the status quo fascinated a number of British commentators. Tsar Ivan IV (1553-84) was 
viewed as the most notoriously autocratic ruler. In his 1854 survey of Russian history, the 
translator and folklorist Walter K. Kelly195 declared that Ivan had enforced his tyrannical 
rule by ‘everyday inventing new punishments’.196 The Anglo-American writer, Edmund 
Noble offered an equally blood curdling characterisation in 1900. According to this 
account Ivan had ruled his subjects ‘with a rod of terror-his animal spirits transported him 
beyond all bounds of moderation while his anger degraded him into a furious beast’.197  
As a member of the ‘Society Friends of Russian Freedom’ Noble was unlikely to play 
down the despotism of the tsars but other commentators offered understanding of a tsar’s 
violent actions in the place of Noble’s condemnation.  Paul I (1796-1801) had a 
reputation during his lifetime for arbitrariness and a love of rigid military drill. Yet, in 
retrospect, his actions were not necessarily seen as the capricious acts of a tyrant.  In 1838 
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Thomas Raikes defended Paul against his critics. Employed in the City of London, Raikes 
was a regency dandy, a friend of (George) Beau Brummell and a profligate gambler.198 
However, his dissolute lifestyle does not appear to have precluded a love of social order 
and he insisted that Paul’s ‘acts of severity were justified by necessity and [were] the 
wholesome exercise of authority rather than the act of a despot’.199  
    The contrasting features of restraint and combativeness identified in Nicholas II’s 
character were sometimes seen as evidence of duplicity. However, earlier commentators 
had not always perceived such characteristics as mutually exclusive traits in a Russian 
ruler. The writer, traveller and mercenary, Charles Henningsen200 described Alexander I 
(1801-1825) in contradictory terms, seemingly without a hint of irony.  According to 
Henningsen, Alexander was ‘mild and liberal minded’ yet, he also claimed, ‘the methods 
he used to suppress dissent were more ‘cruel than those used by Ivan the Terrible’.201  
    To his contemporaries, of all his forebears, Nicholas II, with his love of family and the 
outdoor life, appeared most like Mary Pelleur Smith’s 1859 description of Tsar Aleksei 
Mikhailovich (r.1645-76). According to Pelleur Smith, Aleksei had liked to ‘admire the 
beauties of nature’ and to watch his ‘son at play’.202 It was an image which Nicholas II 
much admired.  However, in reality, Aleksei could be rather less passive than this 
description of him suggests. As Lindsey Hughes has noted, Aleksei was said by the 
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Austrian ambassador to have dragged his father-in-law around the room by his beard. In 
addition, during his reign, rebels were burned at the stake, buried alive and starved to 
death.203  
   Although Nicholas II suppressed social and political unrest, he was perceived to lack 
the ability to inculcate fear as his ancestors had done. Perhaps this was because he did not 
resort to the extreme methods of suppression employed by earlier tsars but it was also on 
account of his slight build which he had inherited from his petite mother. For example, 
Bernard Pares thought that the tsar was charming but had ‘an almost feminine 
delicacy’.204 He recalled that the sight of him produced a feeling ‘of pity [..] one felt his 
weakness’.205 Several of Nicholas’s ancestors’ commanding presence had been 
accentuated by their height.  Peter the Great (r.1682-1725) for example, had stood well 
over 6 feet tall. It was a striking image which, even a century after his death, reinforced 
established British perceptions of ‘a colossal [tsar with a] vigour of body and mind’.206   
Peter was extraordinarily tall by the standards of his day but more recent tsars were also 
noted for their height. A Church of England clergyman, the Rev. Robert Bateman Paul 
spent some time in Russia when he found himself ‘between appointments’.207 In a later 
account of his travels he noted that the future Nicholas I (1825-1855) stood ‘at least 6 feet 
two inches’ tall.208 According to Charles Henningsen when Nicholas I gave ‘the word of 
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command’ he did so ‘in a deep and sonorous voice’ which could be heard over the vast 
plain of Krasnoe Selo.209  
    Although Nicholas II lacked the striking physical presence of some earlier tsars, his 
personality had more in common with later Russian rulers than with semi-fictitious 
images of the Muscovite tsars.  For example, his avoidance of foreign diplomats and court 
life, which was much commented on by his contemporaries, sometimes gave the 
impression that previous tsars had been scrupulous in engaging with Russian and foreign 
elites. However, much of what was said about Nicholas  was also observed by a British 
contemporary of Alexander I who, he noted, liked to ‘escape to Tsarskoe Selo’, had 
granted only ‘three or four audiences a year to foreign ambassadors, [avoided court life 
and was] almost invisible to everyone but his own family’.210 Nicholas’s social isolation 
and his willingness to take advice from a narrow clique and his tendency to be swayed by 
a more authoritative personality was frequently criticised by British commentators. 
However, these too were allegations which were frequently levelled at his ancestors. In 
1856, for example, Lord Granville, Britain’s representative at the coronation of Alexander 
II, offered a critical assessment of the new tsar which differed little from some later 
diplomatic perceptions of Nicholas II. Granville asserted that Alexander II was ‘guided 
by the person who speaks to him last [and, furthermore,] he does not surround himself 
with able men’.211  
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    Nicholas II’s father, Tsar Alexander III (r.1881-1894), provided Nicholas’s 
contemporaries with the most recent image of a Russian ruler. However, contemporary 
descriptions of Alexander III were more varied than is sometimes acknowledged. For 
example, following his accession in1881, the British ambassador reported that the new 
tsar was ‘shy’.212 The radical writer G.H. Perris’s later description of him as ‘obstinate and 
prey to mystical exhortations’ could equally have applied to his son.213 When Alexander 
III died, an obituary in the Penny Illustrated Paper and Illustrated Times claimed that 
Alexander had revelled in his family life and had frequently joined in his children’s 
games. Although regarded as behaviour untypical of a Russian tsar, it was a trait which he 
shared with his eldest son who loved to spend time in the company of his children, albeit 
that Alexander played the part of a fierce ‘growling bear’ in his romps in the nursery, a 
part which best mirrored his role as an autocrat.214   
     For all these similarities between father and son, it was descriptions of Alexander as 
‘strong, well built [..] over six feet in height with a broad chest and a look of great 
strength’,  which predominated, and cast as shadow over perceptions of Nicholas.215 The 
last tsar adopted Alexander III’s Russophile costume and sported a beard as his father had 
done but he could not replicate images in the public mind of his father’s height, his build 
or his extraordinary strength with which he was popularly reputed to break ‘horseshoes, 
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roubles, iron pokers and pewter tankards’.216    
(ii) The role of a Russian Empress 
      In the centuries preceding Nicholas II’s accession, only a handful of empresses had 
ruled in their own right. As a result the notion of an ‘ideal’ empress was not as well-
defined amongst British commentators as that of an ‘ideal’ tsar. On account of her 
achievements, and through popular literature, Catherine the Great (r.1762-1796) was the 
empress best known to the British public.  During her reign James Harris, Britain’s Envoy 
Extraordinary to Russia, recorded his impression of the two sides to Catherine’s nature, 
hospitable and yet determined. Thus, according to Harris, the empress had ‘a talent of 
putting people at ease’, but would brook no opposition and was always ‘rigidly 
obeyed’.217 These images of Catherine’s force of personality passed down the centuries 
and provided a theme for Fred Wishaw’s 1893 novel Out of Doors in Tsarland.  
Wishaw’s description of Catherine’s despotism provides a colourful illustration of 
popular understanding of the eighteenth century empress and her autocratic power. 
According to Wishaw, such was her freedom to act that Catherine had been able to treat 
‘her empire like a pack of cards which would be the better for a good shuffling’.218  
     Authors such as Harris and Wishaw commented on aspects of Catherine’s rulership, 
others chose to describe her feminine attributes. For example, the scholar and author 
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William Richardson described her as: ‘very comely and gracefully formed [but] inclined 
to grow corpulent’.219 Her role as a mother also attracted comment. Thomas Raikes 
accused her of having brought up her heir (Paul I) ‘with unnatural harshness and never 
having deigned to treat him like a son’.220 The importance of maternal tenderness, even in 
a ruling empress, was underlined by Raikes who blamed its absence for having ‘alienated 
[Paul’s] reason’ causing him to act in an unpredictable and violent fashion.221  
 As had been the case with earlier empresses, the last empress’s physical looks, the state 
of her health and her family life attracted much British comment.   In this regard 
Alexandra’s namesake, the first Empress Alexandra Fedorovna (1798-1860), also 
attracted some attention. Married to Nicholas I, Alexandra had given birth to ten children, 
two of them still born, all of which had naturally taken its toll on her physical and mental 
well being. During 1840-41 Sir Roderick Impey Murchison travelled across the Russian 
Empire from the White Sea to the Sea of Azov. A renowned geologist of his day he was 
received at court and subsequently given the orders of St Anne and St Stanislaus by the 
tsar in recognition of his work classifying Russian geology.222 From his observation at an 
imperial reception, Murchison recorded that, although Alexandra was ‘every inch 
imperial, she was worn and thin and seemed in [a state of] perpetual nervousness’.223 In 
another description of the same empress the Reverend R.B. Paul admitted that Alexandra 
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had, in earlier years, ‘probably been handsome’ but that ‘ill-health had now deprived her 
of all pretensions to beauty’.224  Somewhat more kindly, but unexpectedly given his own 
rather hedonistic lifestyle, Thomas Raikes did not dwell on the empress’s fading beauty 
but rather emphasised that she lived life away from what he called the ‘Eastern 
magnificence’ of the court. 225  Such a description conjured up negative images in British 
minds of Asiatic barbarity, despotism and unfettered wealth which, according to Raikes, 
the empress shunned. It was Raikes’ contention that in contrast to the fripperies, 
gaudiness and extravagance of the Russian court, the empress’s life was as ‘pure and 
domestic as an exemplary private family in England’.226  Clearly Raikes considered 
domesticity an admirable, indeed essential, attribute in both ruling empresses and in 
female consorts. As we shall discuss, attitudes towards the last empress were less clear 
cut. A number of commentators praised for her potential political interest, others 
bemoaned her interference in matters of state while yet others were exasperated in her 
focus on her family life.  
(iii) Customs and Society 
     During Nicholas II’s reign mainstream British understanding of the relationship 
between the tsars and their subjects influenced British attitudes towards Russian demands 
for a reduction in the tsar’s autocratic powers and informed perceptions of his reception at 
national celebrations. Fear of the uneducated masses ‘let loose’ was a concern which 
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preoccupied elites in Britain as much as it did in Russia. It was as much a feature of 
discussion during the reigns of Nicholas’s predecessors as it was in the years immediately 
before the 1917 revolution. For example, although William Richardson’s biographer has 
stated that he recognised the inequities of serfdom, he did not call for its immediate end.227 
In 1784 he argued that change should be implemented slowly ‘over several generations’ 
arguing that to do otherwise would risk ‘giving liberty to 20 million robbers and 
spoilers’.228  In 1836 the Reverend R.B. Paul took a similarly cautious view when he 
compared the Russian peasantry to those of their French counterparts before the 
overthrow of the monarchy and the ensuing Terror. Describing the Russian people as ‘a 
lion’, Paul warned that if it were to be ‘unchained’ a similar ‘tragedy [to that which had 
occurred in France] might befall Russia’.229  
      Some observers who supported the status quo believed that the peasants understood 
the advantages of the authoritarian rule, and contrasted their lives with those of their 
counterparts in Britain. As he had on other aspects of Russian society, Thomas Raikes 
had much to say about serfdom. He insisted that rather than chaffing for their freedom 
‘the Russian hugs his slavery and rejects the air boon of liberty [since] he lives without 
care for the present or anxiety for the future,  the whole responsibility of his existence 
rests with his Lord’.230  Furthermore, Raikes argued, while an Englishman ‘may boast of 
his liberty he suffered unemployment and poverty’, neither of which, he insisted, were 
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features of a Russian peasants life on account of the benevolence of his master.231 In 1846, 
Charles Henningsen developed this theme of paternalistic despotism and explained that 
the ‘Muscovite peasant looks upon [the tsar] as their God upon earth’.232 In 1859, Mary 
Ann Pelleur Smith (erroneously attributing the creation of serfdom to Tsar Boris 
Godunov) hailed it as a ‘wise and kind provision’.233 Although she admitted that the 
system was open to abuse, she insisted that: ‘the Russian serf is neither cowed nor abject 
in appearance’.234  Some writers went even further in their descriptions of this supposed 
peasant idyll, rejecting notions that Russian society was victim of an arbitrary and 
autocratic government. For example, in 1874 The Times celebrated Alexander II’s visit to 
London with an article extolling the virtues of Russian local government. The newspaper 
declared that, contrary to popular opinion, ‘Russia has very much more of a constitution 
than the English give her credit for’ and that the local administration in Russia had greater 
power than English counties.235  
    In developing these themes of popular democracy in Russia some Briton’s promoted 
the notion that ordinary Russians could appeal to the tsar over the heads of his 
bureaucrats and nobles. According to British observers the possibility of petitioning the 
tsars stretched back at least as far as the reign of Michael, the first Romanov tsar (r.1613-
45). For example, Robert Nisbet Bain236 wrote that during Michael’s reign: ‘the 
downtrodden and overburdened Russian people looked to the throne alone for relief and 
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justice and did not look in vain’.237 Bain’s 1905 description provided an image of a 
benevolent, if paternalistic, tsar central to the life and well-being of the nation. However, 
to all but the most optimistic observer, the mass of Russians lived very hard lives. In view 
of this fact, accepting that the tsar had the good of his people at heart, British 
commentators asked: how was it that so many Russians found it difficult to make a living.  
By way of an answer to this conundrum a number of commentators suggested that 
unscrupulous nobles and even members of the imperial family conspired to prevent the 
tsar from implementing “good laws” which might have relieved the peasants’ burden. A 
1716 account by a naval engineer, John Perry, is an early example of this perception. 
According to Perry, before Peter the Great had come to throne, ‘common persons’ were 
prevented from approaching the tsar by the ‘old boyars’ who wished to ‘keep the 
government [..] entirely in their own hands’.238 It was Perry’s inference that Peter the 
Great had been the first tsar who, having overcome the power of the nobles was free to 
rule for the good of his people.  
    Perry had had been invited to work in Russia by Peter so his continued good fortune 
may well have depended on his vindication of his employer. However, Perry was not 
alone in his positive depiction of Peter’s relationship with his subjects and the myth 
perpetuated down the centuries.  In 1859 Mary Ann Pelleur Smith recalled having been 
shown an iron box which, it was said, had belonged to Peter the Great. The person who 
showed her the relic explained that during Peter’s reign his subjects had left their petitions 
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in the box and each morning the tsar had diligently ‘replied to its contents in his own 
hand’.239  The nature of Peter’s relationship with the mass of his subjects was 
romanticised by accounts such as these since, for example, in reality, peasants were 
subject to punitive poll tax and army service. Laws prohibiting the selling of serfs outside 
of their family group were never implemented. Nor was another that threatened to 
confiscate the estates of cruel landlords. 240   
    By Nicholas I’s reign at least one British observer believed that the nobles had regained 
their former authority. Roderick Murchison argued that since the death of Peter the Great 
the elites had conspired to defend their privilege’s’ and now routinely put obstacles in the 
way of imperial plans for reform.241 Matters seemed to have little changed by the start of 
Alexander III’s reign since the Prince of Wales (later Edward VII) believed Alexander 
was unable to find advisors who shared his political vision. Thus, Edward told the Prime 
Minister Gladstone, that although the tsar ‘intends to be a liberal Sovereign in every sense 
of the word he is unable to find counsellors whom he can trust’.242 These perceptions of a 
tsar who wanted to do the best for his people but was prevented from doing so by 
nefarious officials enjoyed considerable longevity. During Nicholas II’s reign 
commentators frequently asserted that he was prevented from acting as would have liked 
in spite of the fact that he was an autocrat. Such claims were used during the last reign to 
defend the tsar’s actions occasions including when Russia went to war with Japan and on 
Bloody Sunday.  
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      During Nicholas’s reign the prominence given to church ceremonies combined with 
tales of the ‘the monk’ Rasputin emphasised the central role of religion in the life of the 
tsar and his consort. It was a feature which sometimes seemed at odds with the modern 
world and the lives of the Petersburg elite. However, as with so many perceptions of 
Nicholas and Alexandra, British understanding of the tsar and empress’s spiritual lives 
was informed by centuries of accumulated comment on the Russian church and 
observations of religious practices in Russia and Russian culture in general.  
    As we have noted, Stephen Graham and Mandell Creighton were deeply impressed by 
what they perceived to be the centrality of religious faith at all levels of society. Many 
more in Britain assumed that Russian religious observances indicated that, beneath a 
veneer of European culture, Russia remained deeply uncivilised and superstitious. For 
example, in 1839, Robert Brenner described his exasperation with the widely held belief 
‘in the lucky and unlucky days for setting out on a journey or for commencing any 
undertaking, the evil consequences of meeting certain kinds of people, of having thirteen 
at dinner or of upsetting the salt’.243 British frustration with what was perceived to be 
Russian irrationality extended to Russian religious practices which many regarded with, 
at best, ridicule and at worst bewilderment.  From descriptions of historic cathedrals to 
accounts of pilgrimages and public devotions, often in terms of ‘idolatry and 
superstition’, British commentators noted the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the 
life of the tsars.244   
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        In 1826, Charlotte Disbrowe, the daughter of Edward Cromwell Disbrowe, the 
British Minister Plenipotentiary to the Russian Court, observed the traditional Easter 
Greetings in the Winter Palace. Either from ignorance or disdain for its religious 
significance she described having seen Tsar ‘Nicholas I slobber some hundreds of old and 
young, tall and short, thin and thick, ugly and handsome dutiful subjects’.245   In 1830 
Captain Colville Frankland, described a visit to the Moscow Kremlin in similarly 
dismissive terms. In horror he reported that the Cathedral of the Annunciation contained: 
‘a number of musty and disgusting relics, which the deluded and absurd people were 
kissing with great veneration’.246  
 
(iv) Entrepreneurs, Artisans, Soldiers and Sailors 
These images which we have discussed above, painted a picture of a society unseen in 
Britain for hundreds of years. Yet, for all these examples of criticism, and in spite of 
political, religious and cultural differences, since the earliest days of their contact with the 
tsars, people from Britain had sought to establish communities in Russia. By Nicholas II’s 
reign British enclaves flourished across Russia from the northern port of Archangel to the 
Ural city of Yekaterinburg and beyond into Siberia.  Anthony Cross has made a number 
of studies of the British in Russia which reveal the extraordinary variety and influence of 
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this expatriate community.247 From his researches we learn that architects, physicians, 
engineers, mill owners and merchants were employed by Russian rulers. In the eighteenth 
century, such were the numbers of skilled artisans leaving to work in Russia, that one 
British Ambassador in St Petersburg warned of the ‘ill consequences’ to the British 
economy should this continue.248 His advice failed to stem the tide and people from 
Britain continued to flock to Russia in search of fame and fortune.  Although he did not 
travel to Russia Josiah Wedgwood was one of the most famous British craftsman 
employed by Catherine the Great. In 1773 the empress commissioned Wedgewood to 
create a dinner service. The finished product was magnificent consisting of nearly 1,000 
pieces decorated with views of British parks, landscapes, ruins and country estates. 
Unfortunately although Wedgwood hoped that the commission would ‘enable [him] to 
penetrate the Russian market on a large scale’ he failed to do so.249 Others amongst his 
compatriots were more successful in forging careers in Russia.250 
         One notably successful emigrant to Russia was the architect Charles Cameron, who 
first arrived in the country in 1779. Cameron created the designs for the Arabesque, 
Lyons, and Chinese Halls the Green Dining Room and the Imperial Bedchamber in the 
Catherine Palace at Tsarskoe Selo. In 1781 he began work on a palace at Pavlovsk for 
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Catherine the Great’s heir, Paul. 251 This imperial relationship with British (more 
specifically Scottish) architects was continued by Catherine’s grandson. Alexander I 
approved a design by William Hastie for the reconstruction of Moscow following the 
1812 fire which had destroyed much of the city.252 Hasties’s design was never 
implemented, partly due to the cost involved, but this was not the end of British 
involvement in Russian town planning. In 1826 Adam Menelaws was asked by Nicholas I 
to design townscapes for the Ukrainian city of Yekatarinoslav and the Siberian city of 
Tomsk. Menelaws was also responsible for the gothic Chapelle and Arsenal Pavilion at 
Tsarskoe Selo and the Cottage Palace at Peterhof.253  In 1879 Alexander II commissioned 
John Elder and Co., a ship building firm on the Clyde, to construct an imperial yacht. The 
ship was christened Livadia, and decorations for its interior were executed by the arts and 
craft designer William de Morgan.254 Unfortunately, after it was launched, the ship, whose 
design was based on a turbot, was found to be unstable and was consequently never used 
by the imperial family. 
    In addition to the many peaceable activities in which British expatriates were engaged, 
a number also fought in the Russian army and navy. In this respect the links between 
Russia’s armed forces and Scotland were especially strong such that between ‘1650 and 
1709 no less than fifteen men of Scottish birth or origins held a general’s rank in the 
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Muscovite forces’.255  A particularly notable example of a Scotsman, who made an 
illustrious career in the Russian army, was Patrick Gordon. In 1661 he entered the service 
of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich and later served under Peter the Great whom he helped to 
overthrow the regent Sophia in 1689 and to suppress the revolt of the streltsy in 1698.256 
In 1770, during the reign of Catherine the Great, another Scotsman, Admiral Samuel 
Greig and his compatriot Captain John Elphinstone fought for Russia at the Battle of 
Chesme.257  
    The many opportunities for Russo-British co-operation did not prevent occasions of 
conflict and at such times negative, stereotypical images of Russia and her supposed 
primitiveness were likely to come to the fore.  For example, during the Crimean War 
(1853-56) the British Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Clarendon, described the allied cause 
as no less than ‘the battle of civilisation against barbarism’.258  However, even at times of 
crisis, the British public’s response to individual tsars could be rather more positive.  
During the Crimean War The Times carried a report which indicated a separation in the 
public mind between a Russian monarch and the Russian state, a not infrequent 
occurrence during the last years of imperial Russia. On this occasion on 24 June 1854, in 
an article which was starkly in contrast with Clarendon’s vitriol, The Times reported the 
arrival home from Russia of several British Naval engineers. According to the article the 
engineers seemed sorry to have had to leave: their employment a testimony to the 
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longstanding and valued relationship between British technical experts and Russian 
rulers.259  Equally, according to this same account, the tsar seems to have shown no ill-
will to his erstwhile employees in spite of the circumstances which had forced their 
departure.  Thus, the newspaper reported that one of the men by the name of John Young, 
an engineer on the tsar’s yacht, had been given a number of gold and diamond encrusted 
farewell gifts from his grateful employer.260   
(v) Imperial Visits and Family Ties 
 Nicholas and Alexandra visited the United Kingdom only twice after their marriage. The 
first of these was in the nature of a family visit to the royal at retreat Balmoral, although 
the queen and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, took the opportunity to discuss with 
Nicholas his attitude towards India. 261 The second in 1909 was more overtly political, 
coming as it did in the wake of Bloody Sunday and the 1905 Revolution. Both visits 
differed in that earlier tsars had travelled around Britain and had been seen by a greater 
number of ordinary people.  In 1896 and especially in 1909 the imperial itinerary was 
constrained by security concerns. However, in other ways, Nicholas and Alexandra’s 
visits had much in common with those of their predecessors. Many people in Britain 
received their imperial guests from Peter the Great to Nicholas II with a mixture of 
curiosity and enthusiasm. The warm feelings of some sections of the British public were 
counterbalanced by others who preferred to highlight the despotic aspects of the imperial 
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regime and the danger Russian ambition posed to Britain’s Indian Empire.       The most 
famous visit to Britain by a Russian tsar was that undertaken by Peter the Great in 1698 
during the reign of William and Mary. In subsequent centuries official Russo-British 
relations would be marked by years of imperial rivalry. On this occasion however, the 
British author of a ‘Congratulatory Poem’ seemed unconcerned by Russian expansionism. 
On the contrary he hoped that Peter would out do ‘Roman conquests’.262 Peter’s visit was 
the first by a Russian ruler and as a result it attracted considerable attention. Indeed, such 
was the eagerness of some courtiers to see him that a number of them disguised 
themselves as servants arraigned to wait on the tsar.263  Interest in Peter was not limited to 
the elites and in London and Oxford he was irritated by members of the public who 
gathered to gawp at him.264   In the aftermath of his visit public interest in the tsar 
gathered apace and a number of English histories of his life and reign of were written 
albeit, as Anthony Cross explains, by ‘people who had no knowledge of Russia or its 
language’.265  
    During the nineteenth century the tsars and their heirs paid several visits to Britain. In 
1815 Tsar Alexander I was welcomed in Britain as Europe’s Liberator and awarded a 
doctorate of law at the University of Oxford and the Freedom of the City of Oxford. 
Recalling the part which the tsar had played in defeating Napoleon, the Poet Laureate, 
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Robert Southey (1774-1843), wrote a congratulatory ode, one line of which welcomed 
Alexander as the ‘friend of human kind’. 266   In 1816, the future Nicholas I was feted by 
Edinburgh Town Council during which the Lord Provost praised the then tsar, Alexander 
I and including Russia in the community of enlightened nations from which British 
imagery more typically excluded her. The Lord Provost recalled: ‘the noble conduct of 
[Nicholas’s] august brother [who together with] the patriotism and selfless devotion of the 
people of Russia, gave resistance to an unprincipled aggressor [Napoleon] that threatened 
to subvert the liberties of the civilised world’.267  
     Imperial visits generally followed a similar pattern to those we have noted above: a 
series of banquets, speeches and awards hosted by the elites. For example, in 1839, Grand 
Duke Alexander Nikolayevich (Nicholas I’s son and heir) was given an honorary degree 
by the University of Oxford where he was met with ‘shouts and applause which continued 
for several minutes’.268   It was not only the elites who enthusiastically received the tsars 
and their heirs. In 1844 during Nicholas I’s visit to Britain the public was evidently as 
keen to catch a glimpse of him as their forebears had been of Peter the Great. After 
reviewing a number of British army regiments in Windsor Home Park, the tsar returned to 
the Castle via the Long Walk where he was greeted by thousands of well-wishers.269   
   When Nicholas and Alexandra’s engagement was announced much was made of their 
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ties to the British royal family. In particular, the fact that Alexandra was a granddaughter 
of Queen Victoria proved a focus for hope of a Russo-British entente. However, this was 
not the first marriage between Queen Victoria’s family and a member of the Russian 
ruling house. In 1874, the queen’s second son, Prince Alfred, married Grand Duchess 
Mariia Aleksandrovna.  The grand duchess first met Alfred in 1868 in the duchy of 
Hesse-Darmstadt. By co-incidence it was here that the last empress of Russia later spent 
much of her childhood. Interestingly the queen, who did not favour the match between 
her son and a Russian grand duchess, blamed her daughter, Princess Alice (the mother of 
the last empress) for encouraging the romance.270   
    The prospect of a marriage between her son and a member of the Russian imperial 
family brought all of Victoria’s royal hauteur and Russophobia to the fore.  In a bid to 
prevent the matrimonial union, Victoria launched a campaign of writing to Princess Alice, 
to the Empress Augusta of Germany and to Britain’s ambassador in Russia. In particular, 
asserting that she was the ‘Doyenne’ of Sovereigns, Victoria complained that the 
Romanov family had ‘Asiatic ideas of the Rank [and frequently] disregarded the feelings 
of everyone but their own’.271  However, for all her opposition to the match, when 
negotiations were put “on hold”, Queen Victoria’s pride was injured. In a letter to her 
eldest daughter she bemoaned the fact that her son had been put in the position of ‘a 
humble suitor [..] to be left dangling while [Mariia] condescends to have him or not’.272  In 
spite of the queen’s opposition, Mariia and Alfred married in St Petersburg in January 
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1874.  Nonetheless, as a sign of her continued disquiet over the marriage, the Queen 
continued to refuse to permit the bride’s precedence (as the daughter of an emperor) over 
the Princess of Wales.273 However, although Victoria had reservations, public reaction to 
the marriage was mostly positive.  When Alfred and Mariia arrived in Gravesend they 
were met by hundreds of well wishers and The Times enthusiastically interpreted the 
warmth of the greeting as a sign ‘of national satisfaction at a domestic alliance between 
England and Russia’.274 In keeping with this spirit of good will when the newlyweds 
arrived in Windsor the streets were decorated with declarations of welcome.275 
 
   Amidst these scenes of rejoicing there was at least one dissenting voice. As John Plunkett tells 
us, Reynolds Weekly Newspaper frequently criticised the frivolous and inconsequential 
weight of attention which royalty received from much of the press.276 It was with this 
focus in mind that the newspaper provided a conduit for opposition to the marriage. One 
correspondent wrote to Reynolds complaining about the obsequiousness of the public 
response to the nuptials. Painting the groom as a gold-digger the writer insisted that the 
marriage was not a love match but a cynical ploy by the Russians who hoped that ‘the 
English people will be dazzled and delighted with the marriage so proud of having an 
imperial princess with an enormous fortune that no thought or heed will be taken of the 
insidious advances of Russia on our Eastern possessions’.277   British concern about 
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Russian intentions in Central Asia were no less a feature of Russo-British relations during 
the last reign, particularly during the Dogger Bank crisis when the spectre of a Russian 
invasion of India was felt to be a real possibility in some quarters.  
   In May 1874, Alexander II visited Britain, true to form Reynolds Weekly Newspaper 
bemoaned the money Britain had ‘lavished on [the visiting] despots’ 278 However, the 
popular mood seems to have still been one of welcome and interest in the imperial visitor. 
For example, the Daily News noted that, in order to mark the occasion, the Polytechnic 
Institution in London offered a series of lectures on themes of Russia and the tsar.279 They 
proved so popular that the programme was extended and the lectures were repeated every 
day throughout May and June 1874.280   This public warmth towards Russia was reflected 
in official circles and was in contrast to the views espoused by Lord Clarendon over 
twenty years earlier when he had cast Russia and her rulers in the role of barbarian. 
Following a reception in Alexander’s honour W.E. Gladstone (then recently out of office) 
recorded in his diary that the tsar had been extremely cordial. 281  Recalling the tsar’s 
decision to end serfdom in 1861, Gladstone responded with genuine warmth to 
Alexander. He told the tsar that he had watched his reign with ‘profound interest [and had 
noted especially] the great benefits which he had conferred on his people’.282   
  When Gladstone responded positively to Alexander II three hundred years had passed 
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since Britain had first ‘discovered’ Russia. In the intervening years, British attitudes 
towards Russia and her rulers had undergone a variety of changes. British commentators 
had only twenty-four years in which to discuss Nicholas and Alexandra but their 
perceptions were no less varied. Reports of tyrannical Russian rulers, anecdotes about the 
relationship between tsar and subjects, descriptions of the ‘Asiatic’ aspects of the tsarist 
regime and reactions to the Russian Church all influenced British perceptions of the last 
tsar and empress. In the following chapter, we consider British responses to Nicholas and 
Alexandra’s engagement, marriage and coronation partly based on their interpretations of 
Russia’s past.  
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Chapter 2: Engagement, Marriage and Coronation 1894-1896 
An impression has gone through all the western peoples in favour of the Princess Alix. 
Her influence will be great and will be good. 283 
The Catastrophe at Moscow [...] seems to me to mark the entrance of Russia into the 
common lot of vast nations, a taking up of the burden of all great peoples, with all its 
dangers and suffering. Her strength is her peasant hordes; her weakness is her inability 
to control them.284 
The years between 1894 and 1896 marked Britain’s introduction to Nicholas and 
Alexandra as husband and wife, as tsar and empress. The British perceived them 
romantically as an attractive, young married couple committed to the ideal of domesticity 
which they associated with their own monarchy. As result of their youth and their 
connections with the German and British royal houses some believed that Nicholas and 
Alexandra were receptive to ‘liberal’ ideas of government. At times the impressions 
formed during those years were unfeasibly optimistic, they were joyful and sad and they 
were tinged with realism and exasperation. They were influenced by a perception of 
Russian customs and of Russian history as well as an understanding of the imperial 
couple as part of a network of European royal families. This latter factor was especially 
evident on 20 April 1894, in the small German town of Coburg when their engagement 
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was announced.  Nicholas and Alexandra had been in Coburg to celebrate the wedding of 
Alexandra’s brother, Ernst to Princess Victoria Melita the daughter of Grand Duchess 
Mariia Aleksandrovna and Prince Alfred (Duke of Edinburgh and installed as Duke of 
Saxe Coburg in 1893). The wedding guests included Queen Victoria, Kaiser Wilhelm II, 
the dowager empress of Germany and the Prince of Wales. 
     Nicholas and Alexandra’s first recorded meeting took place in 1884 at the wedding of 
Alexandra’s sister Elizabeth to Nicholas’s uncle, Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich. 
During the winter of 1889 Alexandra came again to St Petersburg where she enjoyed 
skating parties with Nicholas and his family. The future tsar was smitten but he faced 
opposition to the match from his parents and Queen Victoria (who had already “lost” one 
Hessian granddaughter to a Russian grand duke, Sergei Aleksandrovich) and who insisted 
she would allow no Russian match for Alexandra.285   Victoria’s relationship with 
Russia’s rulers and her attitude towards Russia itself complex, she was wary to say the 
least of Russia and the Russian court despite her own “Russian” connection which 
extended over many years. Tsar Alexander I was one of her godfathers and she was 
baptised Alexandrine in his honour.  
       The queen’s sometimes-contradictory perception of Russia and Russian tsars 
reflected that of many of her subjects. She chaffed at their political ambitions and was 
horrified by the loose morals of their court but in regards to individual tsars, like much of 
the British public, she sometimes fell under their spell. She admired their good looks, 
exemplary manners and apparent modesty. Indeed, in 1839, she confided in her diary that 
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she had been a little in love with Alexander II, then heir to the Russian throne.
286
  In 
1844, during Nicholas I’s stay at Windsor, the queen was similarly struck by his physical 
good looks.287  In a letter to her uncle (the King of the Belgians) the young queen wrote 
gushingly that the tsar, whose subjects were said to regard him as a demi-god, had very 
human attributes.  Thus, she wrote of Nicholas I: ‘he is certainly a very striking man; and 
still very handsome; his profile is beautiful, and his manners most dignified and graceful; 
extremely civil quite alarmingly so, full of attentions and politesse. [..] He is easy to get 
along with really it seems like a dream that we breakfast and walk with this greatest of all 
earthly potentates’.288  However, Victoria’s warm feelings towards Nicholas I did not 
override political considerations.  Indeed, throughout her reign she staunchly defended 
British interests and remained convinced that ‘the Russians are totally antagonistic to 
England’.289  On one occasion when her children Alfred and Alice appeared to look at the 
world from a Romanov perspective she peevishly complained that they had become 
completely ‘Russified’.290  
     In 1854, tensions over the future of the Ottoman Empire caused Britain and Russia to 
go to war. However, Victoria’s kindly feelings toward Nicholas I as person rather than as 
the rule of a rival empire came to the fore when he died as the conflict raged. Although, 
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for obvious reasons, she was unable to correspond directly with the imperial family the 
favourable memories of 1844 had remained with her and she asked Princess Augusta of 
Prussia to pass on her condolences declaring that: ‘although the poor emperor died our 
enemy I have not forgotten happier times’.291   
    In March 1881 Tsar Alexander II was assassinated as he drove through the streets of St 
Petersburg. Victoria recorded her reaction, confiding in her journal that the death of ‘the 
poor dear emperor’ had left her feeling ‘quite shaken and stunned’.292  The violent death 
of a fellow monarch was, not unexpectedly, a cause for concern; the queen herself had 
been the subject of a number of assassination attempts but Alexander II’s murder stuck a 
deeper chord. Albeit within the privacy of her journal, Victoria revealed her concerns and, 
a common British perception, that Russia’s rulers, although despotic, invariably had good 
intentions.  Thus, the queen recorded that the tsar had been ‘a kind and amiable man [who 
had] been a good ruler, wishing to do the best for his country’.293   
   The queen was distressed at Nicholas I and Alexander II’s early passing but, although 
her responses to them in death, as in life, could appear soft and feminine, as a wife and 
mother she was horrified at the lax morals prevalent at the Russian court. She was 
particularly critical of Alexander II’s relationship with Princess Ekaterina Dolgorukaia 
with whom he had several children.294  When Alexander III was tsarevich, the queen had 
found him extremely ‘good natured and kind’ and she found his family life and his 
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fidelity to his wife in marked contrast to that of his father. However, after Alexander III 
acceded to the Russian throne Victoria’s attitude towards him was somewhat frosty.295 
Perhaps Alexander had taken his sister Mariia’s side in a quarrel with her mother-in-law, 
perhaps the queen had been irked at the Russian authorities’ implied accusation that those 
responsible for Alexander II’s assassination had taken refuge in Britain or perhaps she 
now regarded Alexander III more critically because he was the monarch of a rival 
imperial power.296 Whatever the reason, in 1885, she imperiously refused to send 
greetings to the tsar claiming that: ‘she cannot have any personal communication with a 
sovereign whom she does not look upon as a gentleman’.297  
     The queen’s dislike of the immorality of the Russian court influenced her attitude 
towards Russian marriages for her Hessian granddaughters’ Elizabeth and Alexandra.  
She was extremely relieved in August 1883 when Elizabeth refused Grand Duke Sergei 
Aleksandrovich’s proposal of marriage. However, she was imperiously scathing of the 
response to the news of her daughter-in-law, Grand Duchess Mariia Aleksandrovna. 
Arguments over precedence had clouded her relationship with the grand duchess, the fact 
that the Romanov dynasty stretched back nearly three hundred years influenced Queen 
Victoria not one jot. As we have noted in Chapter I she regarded as absurd the suggestion 
that a daughter of the imperial family might take precedence over a member of her own 
family. The queen’s irritation is clear from a letter she wrote to Victoria (Elizabeth’s 
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sister) in which she declared the ‘Russian family thinks it such an honour to marry 
anyone of them that a refusal appears to them so impossible’.298 In response to Sergei’s 
persistence in pursuing Elizabeth the queen wrote a further letter in a furious torrent 
outlining her many objections to the match. In particular she noted ‘the very bad state of 
society and its total want of principle from the grand dukes down’.299 However, in spite of 
the queen’s objections, Elizabeth and Sergei married in 1884 and together the couple 
schemed to bring about a match between Nicholas and Alexandra.300 
    The queen had hoped that Alexandra would marry Albert Victor, the eldest son of the 
Prince of Wales. Evidently aware of  Nicholas and Alexandra’s blossoming romance, and 
knowing of Alexandra’s reluctance to marry Albert Victor, the queen admonished 
Alexandra’s  eldest sister to make her ‘her reflect seriously on the folly of throwing away 
the chance of a very good husband, kind, affectionate and steady [and] a very good 
position which is second to none’.301  Victoria perceived the position of a future British 
queen to be far superior to that of a Russian empress. Yet, in spite of her reluctance to 
marry Albert Victor, Alexandra was no less implacable that she could not marry 
Nicholas. A devout Lutheran, Alexandra believed it would be a sin to renounce her faith 
and convert to Orthodoxy (as she would be required to do in order to marry the Russian 
heir.) 
     The reasons why, in spite of her sincerely held religious beliefs and the opposition of 
her formidable grandmother, Alexandra finally gave in have never been made known. 
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Over the years it has been suggested that Alexandra dreaded the thought of life as a 
spinster in her sister-in-law’s household. If her sister Victoria is to be believed it was the 
German Kaiser who finally convinced Alexandra that it was her duty to marry Nicholas in 
order to ensure the peace of Europe.302  Whatever the reason, Queen Victoria having 
fought so hard against the match, was despondent, not least because as future empress her 
granddaughter had to convert to Russian Orthodoxy. The extent of her angst in this regard 
can be gleaned from a letter in which the queen wrote: ‘to think that she is learning 
Russian and in all probability will have to talk to a Priest my whole nature shudders 
against it’.303   
     While the queen’s immediate reaction to the engagement centred on her negative 
attitude towards the Russian Orthodox Church, the British public discussion of her 
Alexandra’s future focused on two main themes: the German born Alexandra’s ties of 
kinship with British royal family and what were said to be her liberal inclinations. In the 
latter years of Nicholas’s reign and, after the fall of imperial Russia, Alexandra was 
portrayed as a reactionary whose political interference cost her husband his throne. In 
1917 her German heritage was seen as a liability, as indeed were the British royal 
family’s own links with Hohenzollerns.  However, at the time of her engagement British 
perceptions about Germany were quite different.  In the late nineteenth century large 
German communities could be found across Britain. Employed as bankers, shopkeepers, 
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musicians and waiters, they founded German churches, newspapers, clubs and societies.304 
After the Irish they made up the largest immigrant community in Britain. However, 
whereas the Irish were often despised, the German community was widely respected. In 
part this stemmed from the fact that many people, including most notably Thomas 
Carlyle, Cecil Rhodes, and Winston Churchill believed that the British and Germans 
shared a common racial heritage.305
 
 The belief that the two peoples were descended from 
the same “racially superior stock”, imbued with a love of freedom and a civilisation based 
on the supremacy of laws, was given scholarly support as early as 1849.306 Germany itself 
was sometimes seen as a regimented and a less liberal country than Britain but, 
nonetheless, the British found much to admire in contemporary German life.307    
  Noting in particular the controversy over a parliamentary allowance for PrinceAlbert, 
Karina Urbach has argued that the German roots of the British Royal Family ‘had long 
been a point of criticism’.308 However, Queen Victoria’s ties with Germany could be 
noted with approval. For example, in 1876, the British Foreign Secretary observed that 
‘the royal family, being half English and half German, think of the two countries as being 
inseparably connected’.309   It was against this background of British empathy with 
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Germany and an understanding of the links with Britain’s royal family that Alexandra’s 
engagement and her entry into Russian life was narrated. For example, the Daily News 
reported that the Head of the British Legation in Coburg had heard the news of the 
forthcoming nuptials from the Kaiser who, in typically ebullient fashion, ‘slapped him [on 
the back] and cordially shook his hands’.310 The town of Coburg, where Nicholas and 
Alexandra’s engagement had been announced, held special significance for the British 
Royal Family since it had been the Prince Consort’s place of birth and childhood home. 
This fact was recalled by The Times which enthusiastically informed its readers that the 
rooms of the palace were crammed ‘full of memorials of the Royal House of Great 
Britain [….] pictures and busts of members of Her Majesty’s family’.311   
     As we have seen, it was said that the Kaiser had asserted that the marriage was 
imperative for the peace of Europe. Whether or not this was the case some commentators 
believed that Alexandra’s position within an Anglo-German family might play an 
important part in enabling the future peaceful course of Russian, German and British 
foreign policy.  An article in The Times, respectfully entitled ‘Royal Personages at 
Coburg’, asserted that: ‘the fact that the Russian Heir Apparent proposes to marry a 
German Princess closely related to the Queen of England and to the Emperor of Germany 
is not an incident which should [only] be chronicled in the Court Circular. The peace of 
the World depends in no small degree on the relations between England, Russia and 
Germany and anything which tends to increase the cordiality of these relations cannot fail 
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to have [a] beneficent influence on European politics. For that reason the proposed 
matrimonial alliance announced from Coburg must be hailed with lively satisfaction in 
this country’.312 
    The Spectator also examined the political implications of the match, contending that 
the political equilibrium in Europe, which was thought to have been disturbed by the 
recently established Franco-Russian alliance, had been restored.  In particular the 
Spectator argued that since the ‘wives [of Russian emperors] are seldom a nonentity and 
are sometimes very powerful [and] as the bride is a German princess she is very unlikely 
to urge an invasion of her Fatherland and as she is also English she is unlikely to regard 
Great Britain as a bitter enemy’.313   It was not only the newspapers and journals of the 
educated elites which concluded that Alexandra’s position within the German, British and 
now Russian royal houses would enable her to influence European affairs for the better. 
The middlebrow Illustrated Daily Graphic believed that Alexandra would succeed where 
professional diplomats and politicians had failed. Thus, the newspaper asserted, the future 
empress would be sure to bring ‘her national and family affinities to bear in order to solve 
the misunderstandings with which relations of Britain, Germany and Russia [have been] 
frequently troubled’.314  
(i) Death and marriage of a Tsar 
In spite of all the discussion with regard to Alexandra’s political influence, at the time 
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of her engagement the day when she would be crowned empress seemed a long way off. 
However, Alexander III was suffering from kidney disease and on 1 November 1894 he 
died-aged only forty-nine. Although it had been known for some time within the family 
at least that the tsar was seriously ill, the most recent medical bulletins from the Russian 
Court had given hope that he might recover.  The news of his death was therefore all the 
more unexpected.  This shock was reflected in the British press whose reporters 
described their impression of Russian reaction to the news.  One of the most dramatic 
articles appeared in The Times on the eve of the departure of the funeral train carrying 
Alexander’s body from Sevastopol to St Petersburg, via Moscow.  The newspaper 
predicted that as a result of the shock which was felt across the nation ‘along the entire 
route [..] the bereaved land of Russia will show its poignant grief’.315 The tsar’s death 
was of such significance that even provincial newspapers covered the story.  The 
Birmingham Daily Post, for example, told its readers that news of the tsar’s death had 
caused women in St Petersburg to ‘sob in the streets’.316 Although there may well have 
been evidence of grief in Russia at the death of the ruler tinged with concern about the 
future under his young son these images also played to British stereotypes of the 
relationship between ordinary Russians and their tsars. Even taking into account some 
sentimentalising of Russian reaction to Alexander III’s death, the responsibilities which 
Nicholas and Alexandra were called upon to assume were immense. 
    Even before the tsar was dead there were rumours that Nicholas planned to renounce 
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his rights to the throne as his ancestor, Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich, had done.317 
On 20 October, Queen Victoria, knowing that Alexander’s life was drawing to an end, 
telegraphed Alexandra’s brother insisting that ‘no decision should be taken as to 
[Alexandra’s] future without my first being told’.318  On 23 October, rumours reached 
the queen that because the ‘tsarevich wishes to renounce the throne his marriage [was] 
being hastened’. 319  On 27 October the Spectator repeated claims that Nicholas was 
‘disinclined to accept the throne’.320  In reality, whatever his personal inclinations, 
Nicholas accepted his accession as a God-given burden.   
     Nicholas’s lack of preparedness for his new role has been well documented by 
memoirists and historians.321  As Dominic Lieven has noted, Nicholas enjoyed a 
relatively solitary education and lack of contact with other boys his age outside of the 
palace milieu.322 Even his army service was a family affair as his uncle, Grand Duke 
Sergei Aleksandrovich, was commander of the regiment in which Nicholas served.323 At 
the point he inherited the throne Nicholas had grown into a polite, if slightly immature, 
young man who still enjoyed childish practical jokes. The Daily Graphic intended its 
report that Nicholas had all the ‘high spirits of the Romanovs’ as a compliment but it 
provides an intimation of his character which did not necessarily accord with the more 
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serious prerequisites of high office.324  
  During the ceremonies surrounding Alexander III’s funeral, the Prince of Wales 
equerry, Major General Arthur Ellis, noted that ‘every attention [was] now 
microscopically centred on the smallest act of the young emperor’.325  This intense 
public analysis resulted in one particular act on Nicholas’s part, which involved his 
‘English’ family, taking on significance far beyond its intended meaning. The Prince 
and Princess of Wales, who had travelled to Russia to comfort Alexander’s widow, 
were amongst the funeral party which travelled to St Petersburg. En route in Moscow, 
Nicholas invited the Prince of Wales (the future Edward VII) to walk alongside him as 
the coffin entered the Kremlin. In the published programme Nicholas was to have 
walked alone. As a result of this alteration The Times believed that, knowing the eyes of 
the world were upon him, the tsar had chosen to very publicly signal his wish for 
friendlier relations with Britain.326 The perception that the tsar’s relationship with the 
future king as a conduit for amicable Russo-British relations was to prove a popular, if 
not an always accurate, motif until the king’s death in 1910.  
      Nicholas had hoped to marry Alexandra privately in Livadia almost immediately after 
his father’s death but accepted advice from his Romanov uncles to marry in a more public 
ceremony in St Petersburg. The date selected was 26 November, the widowed empress 
Maria Fedorovna’s birthday. In Britain Victorian mourning etiquette typically ensured 
                                                          
324
 Daily Graphic, 21 Apr. 1894, p. 7.  
325
 RA, VIC/2499/145, Letter from Major General Sir Arthur Edward Augustus Ellis (equerry to the Prince 
of Wales) to Queen Victoria, 23 Nov. 1894.  
326
 The Times, 6 Nov. 1894, p. 5.  
101 
 
 
 
 
 
that weddings were often postponed especially if a close relative of the groom had died.327 
If weddings went ahead they were quite, private affairs with only immediate family 
members in attendance.328  In the light of these social strictures, when it was announced 
that Nicholas and Alexandra’s wedding would take place within days of Alexander III’s 
funeral, eyebrows were raised in some quarters.  
      Such was the unexpected nature of the timing of the tsar and empress’s wedding that 
the Belfast News Letter felt moved to offer its own admonishment.  Founded in 1737, the 
newspaper was politically and socially conservative with a readership amongst the 
Protestant landowning and commercial classes throughout Ireland. Reflecting the strait-
laced image of its readership, the newspaper was horrified by what it perceived as the 
impropriety of holding a wedding at this time. Its correspondent was certain that his 
readers would share in the ‘shock [of] the countries of Europe who had so 
sympathetically mourned with Russia [and who now found] the court of the bereaved 
family all absorbed in preparations for a grand wedding ceremony’.329 In addition to its 
bewilderment at the choice of date for the nuptials, the newspaper also took issue with 
Alexandra’s wedding dress.  The dress, made of white silk, covered in silver brocade and 
artificial pearls followed regulations for court dress that had been set down in the reign of 
Tsar Alexander I (1801-1825).330 To those unaware of its origins the style appeared 
distinctly old fashioned. Perhaps wishing to assert its metropolitan credentials the Belfast 
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News Letter opined that ‘whilst [even] European peasantry were casting off their 
traditional dress in favour of modern British and American fashions, the bride of the 
richest sovereign in the world [was to wear a] dress designed a hundred years ago’.331  
     Alexandra’s marriage and her husband’s sudden accession to the Russian throne had 
all the attributes necessary to enthral the general public: the sudden death of a Russian 
autocrat and the marriage of a shy, Anglo-German princess to his handsome but 
politically untried successor. However, not everyone was impressed by Alexandra’s rise 
in social status.  In a letter to her sister Charlotte Knollys (lady-in-waiting to the Princess 
of Wales) made rather mean-spirited and snobbish references to Alexandra’s formerly 
relatively (at least in royal terms) lowly status. Thus she wrote in some astonishment that 
Alexandra: ‘wore two crowns on her head, her neck [was] covered with the most 
enormous diamonds and a long mantle of gold stuff borne by four officers of state. What 
a change! A little scrubby Hessian princess-not even a Royal Highness and now the 
empress of the largest empire in Europe!’332   
   In public commentators responded rather more graciously, if in sentimental terms. For 
example, the Penny Illustrated Paper gushingly congratulated the tsar on his ‘union with 
one of the most charming and intelligent of Princesses, our queen’s own granddaughter, 
the handsome Princess Alix of Hesse, sweet daughter of England’s Princess Alice’.333 
Other newspapers focused on the relationship between the Russian rulers and their 
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subjects. For The Times, such scenes illustrated the loyal ‘hold that the imperial family 
has upon the affection of the Russian masses’.334 Similarly, the Daily Telegraph described 
how crowds filled the streets desperate to obtain sight of the tsar and empress while 
‘many hundreds more stood on the roofs of houses, on the walls of the quay, on 
lampposts, on chairs and on stools [and] cheered the newlyweds as they drove by’.335   
       A good deal of the positive coverage of Nicholas and Alexandra’s wedding was 
undoubtedly genuine. Some articles may have been a symptom of the flattery to which 
even foreign royalty is perhaps susceptible in the British press on account of perceptions 
of its glamour or simply the youth of some royals whose lives may seem constrained by 
protocol and tradition and in Nicholas’s case-fate.  Journalists may have been influenced 
by images of a young man come suddenly and unwillingly to the throne. They may have 
really hoped that a reluctant monarch might be more likely to be a liberal one, or it may 
be their reports fitted better with the soft-focus image of Nicholas, which the press had 
created.  The following examples suggest it as a possibility. The first, in The Times, 
without offering any firm evidence beyond the level of hopeful speculation, declared that 
new reign would be ‘softer and less autocratic’ than that of Alexander III.336  Two weeks 
later the Daily Telegraph informed its readers that the new tsar was definitely ‘more 
European than his late father’ and went even further, solemnly intoning that under his rule 
‘universal peace [will] prevail on land and sea’.337 The Penny Illustrated Paper was taken 
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up with this idea and waxed lyrical that the new tsar’s very name ‘spells peace’.338 In a 
similar vein in a biography of Nicholas’s father, published in the year of the coronation, 
Charles Lowe looked forward with confidence to the day when the young tsar would 
‘implement reforms on a scale not seen since the Emancipation of the Serfs in 1861’.339  
    Nicholas’s first major foray into the political arena appeared to quash these hopes when 
he responded to a petition from the Tver zemstvo. The zemstvos, which Alexander II had 
instituted in 1864, provided a basic system of local government.  Historians have been 
almost unanimous in asserting that Nicholas ‘infuriated public opinion’ when he rebuffed 
the Tver delegation.340 The men from Tver had asked that the zemstvos be given a greater 
role in the life of the nation and in particular that they be permitted ‘to tell the 
government of the people’s needs and thoughts’.341  The British ambassador blamed the 
negative tone of the tsar’s response on the advice of the Grand Duke Sergei 
Aleksandrovich who, he asserted, had the reputation of ‘being extremely retrograde and 
devoid of all political sense’.342  The negative reaction to the imperial rebuff by Free 
Russia was only to be expected as the magazine declared: ‘Before being fairly settled on 
the throne, without waiting for the development of events, without casting a look around 
him, Nicholas II utters the fatal words which dispel like smoke that kind and trusting 
feeling inspired by his youth’.343 However, other contemporary responses were rather 
more varied. The Times, for example, appeared to lay the blame for the dispute on the 
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men from Tver. The newspaper acknowledged that Nicholas’s ‘declaration [had] 
annihilated all hope of parliamentary development’.344 However, the article appeared to 
side with the tsar when it asserted that ‘unfortunately vague and inappropriate aspirations 
have found expression in the [local] assemblies with an impulsive haste and want of 
tact’.345 Furthermore, as we have noted, in earlier centuries, some British commentators 
were convinced that the autocracy was the best form of government for Russia and so it 
was on this occasion. As The Times explained, ‘the absolute rule of the tsar seems to suit 
Russia very well [and] it is not for foreigners to affirm that something else would suit her 
better’.346  
      A note of specifically Russo-British politics was injected into the wedding discourse 
by the Daily Graphic and The Times. As a personal token of her esteem, Queen Victoria 
awarded Nicholas an honorary Colonelcy in the British Army.  The Daily Graphic gave 
its front page over to the news including an imagined drawing of Nicholas in the dress 
uniform of ‘his’ regiment, the Scots Greys.  The paper’s accompanying headline ‘The 
New Colonel of the Greys’ gave the news an air of intimacy, as if the newspaper were 
announcing the promotion of a British army officer.347  At first sight the choice of the 
Scots Greys appeared less than tactful since the regiment had not only fought in the 
Crimean War, but had obtained battle honours at Balaclava.  Nevertheless, The Times 
argued that far from reminding Nicholas of past quarrels, his appointment was Queen 
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Victoria’s and Britain’s way of signalling to Russia and to the young ruler their wish to 
‘let bygones be bygones’.348  
     Alexandra’s potential role in Russian foreign affairs had been much discussed at her 
engagement and marriage. Her husband’s coronation provided an opportunity for a 
renewed focus on the empress and the liberal attributes she had supposedly inherited from 
her mother, Princess Alice, as Grand Duchess of Hesse-Darmstadt, had taken a keen 
interest in the education, employment and the health of women. She died in 1878 but her 
nephew, Lord Mountbatten of Burma, was of the opinion that Alice would have made a 
great impact on ‘liberal history’ had she lived longer.349 Mountbatten was born in 1900, 
many years after his aunt’s death and almost certainly overstated her qualities.350 
However, some contemporary British observers, such as the Penny Illustrated Press, 
asserted that Alexandra had indeed inherited princess Alice’s ‘liberal leanings’ and, as a 
result, she would bring to the Russian court ‘an atmosphere of freedom’ which it was 
currently lacking.351   
    In the midst of sometimes unfounded and even pompous claims about the empress 
there was one unintentionally light-hearted article in the Manchester Times. In an article 
headlined ‘Gossip about Interesting People’ the paper declared itself startled to learn that 
Alexandra had once worked in a coal pit. Of course a reading of the article did not reveal 
that the future empress had earned her living hewing coal.  Rather, the story centred on 
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the fact that in 1889 she had accompanied Queen Victoria on a brief visit to the Ruabon 
Colliery. Having descended into the mine she was said to have brought down whole 
blocks of coal with a specially crafted hammer. Having handed back the hammer to a 
waiting druid (according to the Manchester Times) she had had then ‘made off’ with a 
piece of the coal she had herself had hewn as a memento of the occasion.352 The anecdote 
appeared to show that, not only was she skilled in the art of international and domestic 
politics as had been highlighted by other newspapers, but that she was also capable of 
manual labour.   
(ii) The Coronation in May 1896 
The accession of a new tsar was an opportunity to look to the future and consider what 
the new reign might achieve. A number of commentators responded optimistically, albeit 
that their supposition was sometimes based on the flimsiest of evidence. As we shall 
discuss below Aylmer Maude was a notable exception to this general enthusiasm for the 
imperial couple. In describing the coronation ceremonies Maude was exasperated with 
religious and other formal aspects surrounding the occasion. Maude lived and worked in 
Moscow but many hundreds of people came from Britain to Moscow during coronation 
months of May and June 1896 specifically to witness the festivities.   The Times carried 
advertisements for luxurious ‘Coronation Cruises’ costing as much as £100 whilst those 
on a more limited budget were offered the ‘economical’ ‘Twenty Guinea’ Whitsuntide 
Cruise to Russia. Even at this ‘budget’ price one would needed some disposable income, 
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not to mention the spare time necessary to travel by ship to Russia and thence, overland to 
Moscow. For the independent traveller hotel rooms were at a premium and private 
accommodation could cost between £400 and £800 for the period of the festivities.353 An 
indication of the number of people from Britain who travelled to Russia for the 
coronation can be seen from an article in the Daily Telegraph. On the eve of the 
coronation the newspaper, rather shamefacedly, noted that the city had been ‘literally 
invaded by [people from Britain] who overrun the restaurants, fill the churches and crowd 
the Kremlin and empty the shops of their silver and gold ware’.354  So numerous were the 
British visitors who later wrote accounts of their time in Moscow during the festivities 
that at least one of them felt the need to apologise for adding to the ‘amount of stuff’ 
written on the subject.355 
     The coronation provided an opportunity not only for British commentators to marvel 
at the sumptuousness of the celebrations but to consider Nicholas and Alexandra as 
individuals and to discuss their roles in an absolutist state. Rather unexpectedly, given its 
avowed opposition to the tsarist regime, Free Russia appeared to hold out hope that the 
regime might be successfully reformed rather than overthrown. In this regard Free Russia 
believed that the empress might exert beneficial influence over her husband, particularly 
in the field of education. The magazine asserted that, in order to mark his coronation, 
Nicholas would be sure to announce a series of educational reforms on the basis of advice 
from his wife who, according to the article, was a ‘very well educated lady who took a 
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hearty interest in popular education’.356   
   Richard Wortman tells us that the foreigners who saw the multinational representatives 
of the empire who accompanied the tsar and empress during their official entry into 
Moscow believed that they had witnessed firm evidence the subject people’s ‘devotion to 
the Russian throne’.357  At the time of Nicholas’s coronation the Penny Illustrated Paper 
rejected the Russian style of Empire which it described as ‘the assimilation of native 
elements’ and trumpeted instead the British way of ruling its subject peoples standing 
‘apart, just, strong and wise’.358  Another contemporary commentator noted the 
similarities between the two empires and lauded Russia’s ‘civilising influence’ amongst 
people, many of whom had now converted to Christianity but who had previously ‘lived a 
life very little removed from brute beasts’.359   Identified only by the initials E.H.P., the 
writer congratulated Russia for having pacified ‘the wretched Khanates of Bokhara and 
Khiva’ and crushing the ‘hotbeds of Mahometan fanaticism’.360  Russian civilisation, he 
concluded, was ‘doing as much for Asia as [was] English civilisation’.361   
In 1890-91 Nicholas had seen for himself Britain’s Asian possessions when he toured 
India and Ceylon. His tour was described by the Penny Illustrated Paper as ‘the best 
education in the world’.362   This was a common feeling in Britain and, as a result, a 
number of commentators anticipated Nicholas might implement reforms, based on the 
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excellent “British models” he had witnessed during his time in the Indian sub-continent. 
An authorised account of this journey entitled: Travels in the east with Nicholas II, 
Emperor of Russia when Cesarevitch 1890-1891 was published in English in the 
coronation year.363 A review in The Times declared, with evident pride, that Nicholas had 
been able to observe ‘British brains and discipline’ in India.364  In reality, much of the 
visit had been plagued by squabbles over etiquette such as when the imperial party, in an 
argument over the style of reception proposed for them, threatened to cancel part of their 
visit or travel to Calcutta incognito.
365
 Fearing a diplomatic incident, the British sought to 
accommodate the Russians and they continued with the planned programme.366 During his 
Indian visit Nicholas also showed an early disinclination to be interested in political 
affairs. Although he frequently suggested to Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace that they set 
aside time to discuss ‘the past history’ of India, according to Wallace the twenty-two year 
old tsarevich was more interested in playing practical jokes with his cousin Prince George 
of Greece than discussing the workings of the British Empire.367 
     While there was a good deal of self-congratulation about much of the press coverage, 
this sense of the superiority of British institutions over those of other nations was not 
universal. Charles Lowe, for example, worried that, far from impressing the tsar, his 
experiences of British democracy might well have alienated him from the idea of 
devolved government. Lowe explained that in 1893 Nicholas, then tsarevich, had visited 
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London for the Duke of York’s (the future George V’s) wedding. During his stay 
Nicholas took the opportunity to visit the House of Commons where he had listened to a 
debate from the public gallery. The House of Commons, then as now, could be a noisy, 
boisterous place where the honourable members sometimes seem more bent on party-
political point scoring than reasoned debate.  Charles Lowe fretted that if the future tsar 
had witnessed such rowdy scenes he might well have been left with ‘a justifiable hatred 
and distrust of parliamentary institutions’.368  
    In the days before the coronation the tsar and empress spent much of their time fasting 
and in prayer at the Petrovsky Palace on the outskirts of Moscow. The ceremonies, beliefs 
and rites of the Russian Orthodox church were an important part of Nicholas and 
Alexandra’s lives and coloured their understanding of their relationship with their 
subjects which they perceived in terms of an ‘invisible spiritual bond’.369  These 
manifestations of religiosity also informed British perceptions of the imperial couple. As 
we have noted, British attitudes towards the Russian Orthodox Church were divided 
between those who viewed it with disgust and those who admired its role in the life of the 
nation.  Most recently Free Russia had bemoaned Alexandra’s conversion to Russian 
Orthodoxy as ‘distinctly repulsive’.370  On a more positive note William Birkbeck, a 
leading member of the Anglican and Eastern Association, was rumoured to have been 
responsible for easing  Alexandra’s conversion to Russian Orthodoxy after she read an 
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article by him entitled: ‘Reunion with the Russian Church’.371   
     It was against a background of his personal interest in unity between the Russian and 
Anglican Churches that the Bishop of Peterborough, Mandell Creighton attended the 
coronation in 1896. Although eminently qualified on account of his enthusiasm for 
Orthodoxy, he travelled to Russia only because the Bishop of Winchester was too ill to 
make the trip.372 As Creighton himself admitted, his first response on hearing that he was 
to be sent to Moscow was that it was a great ‘inconvenience’.373  Even in Moscow his 
immediate reaction was no more positive than it had been when he first learnt that he was 
to be the official Anglican representative at the coronation.  In particular he was frustrated 
by his lack of Russian and the fact that the British ambassador, who he had assumed 
would be available to help him, was not only a Catholic (and therefore thought to be 
unsympathetic to Anglican-Orthodox rapprochement) but was also far too busy with 
embassy matters to ease his stay. In a letter to his wife he expressed his frustration 
declaring that ‘the whole thing seems more and more ridiculous and I keep asking myself 
what am I doing’ here.374 However, after these initial problems, Creighton fell under 
Moscow’s spell and took the presence of numerous churches, monasteries, shrines and the 
reverence of the Orthodox congregations as evidence of deep Christian faith. He preached 
a sermon in St Andrew’s Anglican Church in the centre of Moscow during which, in light 
of what he had witnessed across the capital, he noted with admiration that Russia was ‘a 
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nation which so evidently puts the worship of God, whether in the streets, or in their 
houses, or in their churches before everything else’.375   
     Before coming to Russia Creighton had sought advice from Athelstan Riley, a layman 
who also advocated closer links between the Church of England and the Russian 
Orthodox Church.  Riley warned Creighton not to dance at any coronation balls since the 
sight of a bishop on the dance floor would be sure to shock his hosts! It would be more 
appropriate, Riley suggested, if Creighton accompanied the imperial party on the 
traditional coronation pilgrimage to the Trinity St Sergius Monastery.376 Riley explained 
that the monastery, founded in the fourteenth century, held great historical significance as 
the focus of national resistance to what he called ‘the Romano-Polish attempt to subjugate 
the Russian state and church’.377  Creighton’s visit was judged a success by the Church 
Times which devoted many column inches to the fact that an Anglican bishop had been 
present at the Russian coronation. The newspaper, which had been founded in 1863 to 
foster Anglo-Catholic theology, delightedly echoed Creighton’s joy at discovering a 
common link between Britain and Russia. According to the newspaper during what it 
called ‘their ancient ceremonial of crowning their sovereigns [Russians] have retained the 
use of chrism to anoint the ruler’.378   
     Not everyone in Britain shared either Creighton’s receptiveness or that of the Church 
Times to the virtues of Russia’s national church. William Birkbeck, who also travelled to 
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Moscow for the coronation, noted that it was the fashion in Britain to speak of the 
Russian Orthodox Church as a ‘corrupt body, ignorant, and fossilised, without life, 
without engorge, in fact a church which has long been perfectly useless’.379  This was 
evidently the opinion of Aylmer Maude whose years in Russia had done little to soften 
his view of the national Church.  On the eve of their crowning Nicholas and Alexandra 
prayed at the tombs of the medieval rulers and Russian patriarchs. Maude scathingly 
described the ceremony, which was a genuine act of piety on the part of the imperial 
couple, as the veneration of ‘some dried up bits of corpses’.380 Similarly, when Nicholas 
and Alexandra were welcomed by metropolitan Sergei at the door of the Assumption 
Cathedral in a flowery and effusive manner, Maude spluttered his contempt. In particular 
he poured scorn on the metropolitan and his ilk who, he said, thought this a suitable way 
to speak to ‘a young man of twenty-eight, who differed from his peasant subjects, only in 
that he had been cut off from the actual business of life the task of ringing from nature 
food, clothes and shelter’. 381 
(iii) Witnesses to a Coronation 
The Coronation took place in the Moscow Kremlin’s fifteenth-century cathedral of the 
Dormition. In addition to the many guests of exalted rank, twenty journalists, half of 
whom were from abroad, were allowed into the cathedral to witness the ritual. The 
remainder were accommodated in specially built stands in the square outside and 
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provided with telegraph lines to file stories home and a press pass giving them access to 
Moscow and the Kremlin. According to one British newspaper the mere sight of these 
passes caused even the fiercest of Russian policemen to ‘recoil in smiles’.382  
    The journalists’ accounts and those of other spectators are a mixture of the richly 
descriptive, the reverently over awed, the realistic and the fiercely critical. For example, 
Charles Listed noted what he perceived to be the incongruity of a combination of ‘the 
almost awfully solemn and impressive picture and the small, slight young man in the 
centre of such dazzling glory’.383 Similarly, as Alexandra processed to the Kremlin, Mary 
Hickley observed that she appeared much more confident than her husband.384  In contrast 
from her vantage point she noted that although he was ‘power personified [the tsar] was 
as white as a sheet’. 385 The Queen: The Lady’s Magazine also identified Alexandra as the 
rather more assured of the imperial pair.  In photographs taken to mark her engagement 
and others taken during her teenage years Alexandra frequently appears quite timid and 
shy.386 Now, however, it was the magazine’s perception, that she had ‘left the shyness of 
her childhood behind her in Darmstadt’ and with her ‘every glance and gesture 
proclaimed that she was in fact as in name the helpmate of the most magnificent 
representative of the European powers’.387  
       In the Daily Telegraph, Edwin Arnold alluded to British perceptions of Russia’s 
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eastern heritage in his description of the guests processing into the Kremlin. Thus, he 
reported seeing a number of ‘glittering Oriental magnates [in] gorgeous garb such as 
Tamerlane in his utmost grandeur never musted’. 388 Another eyewitness account, 
published in The Times, included descriptions of great richness such as was popularly 
associated with the Orient. The tsar, the newspaper noted, processed from the Cathedral 
beneath a ‘gorgeous golden canopy with its rich draperies of ermine [surrounded by] 
heralds resplendent in golden uniforms’.389 A third eye-witness described almost mouth-
watering scenes of fantastical ‘golden domes, fairy lights [of] ruby, sapphire, emerald and 
amethyst’ [and an] imperial canopy of orange, white and black-the Russian colours, 
emblematic of gold, glitter and gloom’.390  
   The nearest which Britain had most recently come to such pomp and pageantry had 
been the celebrations of mark Queen Victoria’s Golden Jubilee in 1887. However, the 
queen had refused to wear the crown or robes of state, preferring to wear a mourning 
dress with a simple bonnet. Therefore, although she was escorted by her Indian Cavalry 
as she drove the short distance from Buckingham Palace to Westminster Abbey, it was 
somewhat lacklustre in comparison Nicholas and Alexandra’s magnificent official entry 
into Moscow.  During the coronation ceremony, which lasted four hours, one Briton 
observed the imperial thrones, which also contrasted with the ancient and rather 
workaday throne of British monarchs. One was made of ‘ivory and gold and studied with 
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sapphires, rubies, emeralds and turquoises’.391  The ambassador, Sir Nicholas O’Conor, 
reported his impressions of the ceremony to Queen Victoria. In particular, he recalled 
how the tsar had ‘long and deliberately’ kissed the empress as he placed the crown on her 
head. It was, declared O’Conor, ‘apparent to the most casual observer that their majesties 
felt at that moment the heavy responsibility upon them as Sovereigns’.392 
     David Cannadine tells us that British royal ceremonial during much of the nineteenth 
century was noted for its unintended informality and tendency to disarray.393 In this 
respect the grand ceremonial in Moscow shared at least one common feature. As Arthur 
Sykes reported that, as the imperial family entered the Kremlin, ‘a hundred bands played 
God Save the tsar at the same time although ‘not simultaneously [while] a dog of 
uncertain breed sat down in front of the tsar with sublime unconcern during a pause in the 
procession’.394  Although from such accounts the ceremony did indeed appear ill 
rehearsed, perhaps on account of its recent creation, Creighton asserted that the 
coronation was neither a modern invention nor a random series of events. On the 
contrary, he wrote, it was ‘a ceremony of great antiquity [which] expresses the sentiments 
of the Russian people’.395 The upper middle-class Lady magazine took a similar view 
describing the ceremony in reverent tones  as a ‘most unspeakably magnificent and 
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thrilling ceremonial a sacred sacrament of allegiance between Their Imperial Majesties 
and the vast peoples over whom they have been called to reign’.396  
     A number of popular magazines provided their readers with very rudimentary sketches 
of the crowning ceremony and attendant festivities.  One of the largest appeared in the 
Penny Illustrated Paper. In a sequence of four sketches the newspaper showed Nicholas 
and Alexandra’s reception in the Kremlin before the ceremony the tsar crowning himself 
before the kneeling clergy and lastly a depiction of Nicholas crowning Alexandra. The 
newspaper also drew attention to what it identified as the important difference between 
the coronation of a Russian tsar and a British monarch. In Britain the king or queen was 
crowned by the archbishop of Canterbury. In Russia the tsar placed the crown on his own 
head. In Britain (with the notable exceptions of William III and Mary II who ruled 
jointly) the spouse of a monarch was confined to the position of Consort. In Russia 
however, when Nicholas briefly held the imperial crown against Alexandra’s forehead 
and then placed a small diadem on her head, according to the Penny Illustrated Paper, in 
doing so ‘he signified her central role’ as empress.397    
     The Daily Graphic was the first illustrated newspaper in England. Its founder, William 
Luson Thomas, believed that ‘illustrations had the power to influence public opinion on 
public issues’.398 Interestingly it was one to which the imperial family itself subscribed.399 
The newspaper sent an artist to Moscow to record the new tsar’s ceremonial entry into the 
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capital and his coronation.  A drawing in the Graphic showed Nicholas saluting the 
crowds and looking confidently ahead as he passed the British Embassy. As he made his 
official entry into the Kremlin Nicholas rode some way ahead of his entourage.400 In an 
unfortunate, if prescient analogy, the Reverend Thursby-Pelham compared this scene with 
Christ’s triumphal entrance into Jerusalem on Palm Sunday in the week before his 
crucifixion.401   
     Although, there was undoubtedly much popular acclamation of the tsar along the 
processional route and later in the Kremlin, his assassination was a real possibility. In the 
years since 1881, when a bomb in St Petersburg had killed Alexander II, the authorities 
had implemented strict security measures around the imperial family. For the Coronation 
the streets around the Kremlin were lined with a double row of soldiers, police and 
detectives. Mary Hickley was in no doubt that the numbers were more than justified. Her 
argument seems almost gleaned from the pages of a popular novel since she declared that 
Russia was ‘a hot bed of anarchists and nihilists who, because they cannot be kings, are 
determined that no one else shall be’.402 In 1888 the train in which Alexander III and his 
family were travelling was derailed near Borki in southern Russia. It was said that the 
cause of the accident had been a terrorist bomb and on this basis Mary Hickley claimed 
that the railway line between St Petersburg and Moscow had been guarded by hundreds of 
soldiers because Russians were ‘addicted to blowing up imperial trains’.403   However, 
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within the walls of the Kremlin, the situation appears to have been more lax, at least if 
Arthur Sykes is to be believed. According to Sykes, Russian officials were so impressed 
by a fellow tourist ‘Mrs Gass’s mere visiting card that they obtained good positions near 
the door of the [Assumption] Cathedral’.404   
 
    Russia had been a favoured destination of British travellers for generations but visits to 
the country were often undertaken with some degree of trepidation. An anecdote, related 
by Field Marshal Lord Francis Grenfell, an aide-de-camp to Queen Victoria, indicated 
what might happen to anyone who fell foul of the Russian authorities. Grenfell claimed to 
have witnessed an ‘English tourist’ lunge at the imperial couple during the coronation 
ceremony. As he recalled in his memoirs: ‘a curious incident took place at the moment of 
the coronation when a man, dressed like an English tourist, almost got to the foot of the 
throne before the police seized him’.405 His fate, Grenfell was sure, would be immediate 
imprisonment in Siberia.
406
 Grenfell’s story does not appear in the London Times account 
of the day and that despite the fact that their correspondent had a prime view of the 
ceremony. Nor, so far as we have been able to ascertain, does such an event appear in any 
other account of the events that day. It may therefore be that he invented it, embellishing 
for his readers a frisson of danger thus reinforcing a popular vein of belief in Britain that 
Russia was full of would be regicides who, if they were apprehended, were incarcerated 
without a judicial hearing.  
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    Grenfell’s tale would have found a ready British audience, for whom Russia was a land 
of despotism and arbitrary rules which banned activities which were freely undertaken in 
more liberal countries. As Arthur Sykes explained before travelling to Moscow his more 
nervous, stay-at-home, compatriots had cautioned him that sketching, let alone 
photography, was strictly forbidden in Russia. According to these nervy individuals, any 
transgression of police rules would mean instant transportation to Siberia. Happily, said 
Sykes, such fears proved groundless, as he noted in one verse of a poem he wrote to 
celebrate his visit.  Entitled ‘A Little Moscow Raid’ he ridiculed his compatriots whose 
knowledge of Russia smacked more of adventure novels than reality. Thus, he wrote:  
 If we photo’d or sketched ‘twas said we’d be fetched by gendarmes and removed 
to Siberia while scribbling was banned by the law of the land-all these warnings 
were simply hysteria. We Kodak’d the tsar and suite so bizarre and felt not a 
qualm or a Trembling. Quite free of all charge we wandered o’er the place I must 
spell as the Krembling.407 
    In Britain the cost of the monarchy to the public purse and the extent of the Crown’s 
private fortune were frequently the subject of controversy. During Victoria’s reign the 
allowances paid to her husband, her children and her grandchildren were much 
scrutinised by the public and by the Treasury. As William M. Kuhn tells us, even as 
Queen Victoria recovered much of her popularity following her long widowhood, the 
subject of the Crown’s finances ‘could still breed resentment’.408 It was against this 
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background of British disquiet about royal extravagances, coupled with knowledge of the 
poverty of many ordinary Russians, that the cost of Nicholas and Alexandra’s coronation 
was discussed.  Some commentators reacted with disdain believing the ceremonies to 
have been nothing less than ‘a parade of empty vain-gloriousness’.409 Critics of the regime 
such as Free Russia condemned the coronation ritual as nothing less than ‘a trick to blind 
and overawe’ the people of the Russian empire. In 1893, a few short years before the 
coronation, the Salvation Army had denounced the ‘sickening scenes of want, starvation 
and utter misery’ in the Russian countryside as famine stalked the land.410  Mindful of 
these images Free Russia berated the imperial regime for lavishing money on such 
ceremonials when much of the countryside had been so recently devastated. It was, said 
the periodical, a ‘ghastly paradox [that] the only European country which can now afford 
[such] gorgeous pageantry is the only country which has not succeeded in preventing 
famines’ amongst its own people.411 Similarly, the Spectator was uneasy with the cost of 
the coronation which it estimated to have been 5 million pounds. The periodical did not 
give a source for its claim but solemnly declared that ‘it was difficult for a cultivated 
Englishman to study accounts of the preparations for the Russian coronation without a 
feeling of disquiet’.412   
      In the celebrations to mark Nicholas and Alexandra’s coronation the elites of the 
Russian Empire played a significant role.  However, village elders and other “ordinary” 
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Russians were also invited to join the festivities in the Kremlin including a banquet in the 
medieval Terem Palace. There, in the apartments of Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich, Nicholas 
and Alexandra could believe themselves to be in harmony with their subjects such as they 
imagined had been common in the days of the first Romanov tsars.    Richard Wortman 
has argued that Nicholas and Alexandra’s coronation was specifically designed to impress 
upon foreign observers the image of ‘a monarchy with mass democratic support’.
413  If 
that is the case then the tsar and empress were only partially successful. British reaction to 
these banquets for the lower classes reflected their confusion at Nicholas and Alexandra’s 
relationship with the common people (the narod). The Penny Illustrated News viewed 
these encounters with condescension as ‘magnificent ceremonials for the subjects of the 
White Tsar’.414  Similarly the Daily Telegraph’s correspondent observed with 
bewilderment the ‘shaggy, unkempt, swarthy and rustic’ guests of the tsar.415 After the 
same event, unaware of the imperial couple’s understanding of their relationship with 
their humblest subjects, Francis Grenfell was amazed to see ‘a bevy of very old and dirty 
women who drank up the dregs of the wine and filled their aprons with the remains of 
bread and fruit’.416 
(iv) Khodynka Field 
  During Nicholas and Alexandra’s reign British commentators mostly regarded the 
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imperial couple’s encounters with their subjects at national festivities in positive terms.417 
However, one there is one particular event organised for the ‘common people’ in June 
1896 that is remembered above all the others. The tragedy, which occurred on Khodynka 
Field just outside Moscow, retains a certain infamy in the chronicle of the last years of 
imperial Russia. Since the end of Imperial Russia writers and historians have viewed the 
events at Khodynka Field in terms of ‘a sinister portent’, 418 a ‘Feast for the Slain’419 and 
of a tsar not in control of his own destiny a ‘monarch unable to control or discipline his 
own relatives’420 and  a symbol of ‘the divide between the court and society’.421  
    An open-air feast to celebrate the coronation of a Russian monarch had taken place on 
the same site at least since the time of Peter the Great. However, it was not the first time 
that disorder had broken out.  In 1856, when Alexander II was crowned, army regiments 
prepared the food two days in advance of the festivities. Not surprisingly, the food, which 
lay rotting under canvas, attracted the attention of packs of stray dogs. On the actual day 
of the feast to mark Alexander II’s coronation, crowds of peasants flattened trees on the 
field in their haste to drink from fountains flowing with Crimean wine.422  In 1883, when 
Alexander III was crowned, large numbers of police and soldiers patrolled the field in 
order to prevent possible terrorist outrages or a repeat of the scenes of disorder which had 
occurred twenty-seven years earlier. On the occasion of Nicholas II’s coronation 
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however, security measures were relatively low key. Only one Cossack regiment was 
employed to keep order amongst the thousands who gathered in Khodynka Field which 
had previously been used for army manoeuvres and which was criss-crossed with a series 
of trenches.423  
     British contemporary interpretations of the tragic events during the 1896 coronation 
were more complex than later negative impressions might allow. For example, Queen 
Victoria was later sent some of the cups and other pieces of Carlton ware which the 
authorities had been planned to distribute.424  Seemingly, in the immediate aftermath of 
the disaster, the souvenirs did not provide the mute testimony of the terrible tragedy with 
which they have been identified in later years.  
     The authorities overseeing the feast in 1896 planned to distribute the gifts of food and 
enamel cups emblazoned with the imperial seal as well as hundreds of barrels of free beer 
at 10 o’clock in the morning. However, at dawn, the crowds of peasants who had walked 
overnight from central Moscow surged across the field, demanding food.  Early reports 
from the British Embassy suggested that, in the ensuing crush, there were 700 dead and 
500 injured. The embassy subsequently revised these figures upwards to ‘little short of 
3,000 persons’.425 An eyewitness account in the London Evening News, reported having 
seen ‘hundreds of peasants trip and fall into the ditches while many more were trampled 
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underfoot’.426 The Duke of Connaught telegraphed Queen Victoria assuring her that 
Nicholas and Alexandra were unharmed, adding that, although the incident ‘was very 
deplorable’ it was ‘entirely the fault of the people themselves’.427   Such a reaction was 
perhaps to be expected from a member of a royal caste whose impressions were formed 
by information provided by the imperial court. However, support for this view came from 
a rather more unexpected source. According to the Manchester Guardian, the Russian 
peasants who had died on Khodynka Field were ‘poor stupid people’ who had acted on 
‘an impulse of the moment’.428   
      In spite of the many injuries and substantial loss of life, Nicholas and Alexandra 
visited the Field as part of the scheduled celebratory events. According to the Daily 
Graphic the festivities ‘proceeded as merrily as if nothing had happened’.429    Sir Henry 
Lepel Griffin, was contemptuous of the autocrat who stood at the pinnacle of power in 
Russia but who had not been able to override his ‘obsequious’ courtiers who had seen fit 
to supervise the playing Glinka’s Life for the Tsar within sight of [..] the corpses of his 
subjects, poor dumb animals slain by the carelessness, cowardice and imbecility of [these 
same] officials’.430 Griffin was a senior member of the Indian Civil service, had served in 
Afghanistan, and was Chair of the East India Company. He was known for his outspoken 
views.431 His argumentative nature combined with this professional focus on India 
influenced his negative views of the Russian monarchy. However, on this occasion he 
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was not alone. Adding to his earlier criticism of the coronation the fiercely anti-tsarist 
Aylmer Maude rebutted those who expressed sympathy for the tsar and empress. In  
exasperation he compared such reactions to ‘when a house falls in, killing and maiming 
several members of a family, one’s first thought is not to feel pity for the landlord’.432 
Maude’s bile knew no limits, as he raged on claiming that the very packages for which 
the peasants had died had ‘contained bad sausages, nasty sweets and rotten nuts’.433 Full 
of righteous indignation Maude declared that the whole event suggested that the ‘evil 
spirits of greed, deception and selfishness, which had caused the coronation to be planned 
and carried out, had become incarnate and wrought their work of destruction visibly 
before the eyes of men’.434 Charles Listed was rather less aggressive in his response to the 
events at Khodynka Field. However, even he believed that the disaster had revealed 
Nicholas’s utter fallibility and that the deaths of thousands of his subjects had served to 
remind this ‘small, slight young man at the centre of [such] dazzling glory that he was but 
a man’.435  
      At least four people from Britain went to Khodynka Field on the afternoon of the 
disaster Bishop Mandell Creighton, Sir Nicholas O’Conor and the Duke and Duchess of 
Connaught. The bishop reported that the crowd gave an enthusiastic welcome to the tsar 
that ‘the National Anthem was sung over and over again and hats were thrown heedlessly 
into the air which was thick with dust’ from the movement of the vast crowd. 436  Queen 
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Victoria had been concerned about Nicholas and Alexandra’s safety having heard reports 
of ‘a very angry feeling having been aroused amongst the people of Moscow’.437  
However, the British Ambassador reassured her that on the contrary ‘it is difficult to find 
in history any stronger instance of unbounded fealty than was shown by the thousands of 
Russian subjects who, in the midst of the dead and dying, lost all consciousness but that 
of loyal devotion to their young sovereigns’.438  In the light of his observations he 
concluded that the main concern of the peasantry was not to apportion blame or even to 
mourn but ‘how news of the tragedy could be kept from their tsar and empress’.439 The 
London Evening News believed that this hope had been in vain.  According to the paper’s 
correspondent, Nicholas and Alexandra came face to face with the full horror of the 
tragedy. As the imperial party drove back to Moscow it passed a cart carrying an 
improvised hearse. In the article, which was melodramatically headlined “The Tsar’s 
Tears”, the Evening News recounted how Nicholas alighted from his carriage and lifted 
the tarpaulin, which covered a corpse. As he stared at it, said the newspaper, ‘one could 
distinctly see the big tears rolling down his pale cheeks [and when someone in the crowd 
shouted] “Hurrah” he shook his head sadly [and Alexandra] covered her face with a 
handkerchief’.440      
      In the aftermath of the disaster there was much discussion as to why Nicholas and 
Alexandra reacted as they did and continued with the coronation celebrations. A reading 
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of the tsar’s diary reveals a characteristically laconic response to his visit noting ‘there 
was not much going on there: we looked out of a pavilion onto a huge crowd while the 
band played the national anthem’.441  Modern historians assert that public opinion was 
outraged when, despite the tragedy, the coronation banquets, balls and concerts went 
ahead.442    However, although some contemporary commentators were indeed critical of 
the imperial couple there were others who “excused” their reaction in specifically Russian 
terms.  For example, Mary Hickley’s claimed that the festivities had not been cancelled 
because Russia was a ‘barbarous country [where] human life seems of little account and 
the relatives of the deceased would have taken comfort from knowing that their loved 
ones had ‘met their deaths in the very excess of loyalty’ to the tsar and empress.443    In the 
opinion of the Illustrated London News, the imperial couple were ‘terribly upset’ but 
willingly agreed to continue with the pre-arranged programme.444 The magazine explained 
that although to British sensibilities their decision might appear unfeeling it was not to be 
judged by western mores and that the tsar and empress had suppressed their personal 
unhappiness ‘for the sake of the survivors and in the interest of public order’.445   
     Mandell Creighton  took a similar view, arguing that the imperial couple responded to 
the disaster as they did because they were ‘prisoners of etiquette, tradition and the 
expectations of the people’ which dictated that they ‘lay aside personal feelings in order 
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to show themselves to their people’.446  The British ambassador also admitted that, while 
‘it seemed brutal dancing while thousands are weeping over the killed and wounded, the 
tsar and empress [felt] the importance of self-control’.447 Lady Marie Mallett, Queen 
Victoria’s maid of honour, also declared that to ‘civilised’ i.e. British ears, accounts of 
‘rejoicing and revelry’ in the wake of the disaster sounded very bad but, as she explained 
to her mother, the couple had dared not put off the festivities for political reasons. 448   
        British discussion of Nicholas and Alexandra’s engagement centred them firmly as 
part of the western, European elite. In contrast, British reaction to their coronation 
focused on the peculiarly Russian aspects of the events: the opulence, the eastern 
character of the empire, their relationship with their humblest subjects and, what they 
interpreted as the tsar and empresses specifically Russian reaction to the disaster at 
Khodynka Field. In 1904, when Russia went to war with Japan, British commentators 
reacted to Nicholas and Alexandra through the prism of what they already ‘knew’ about 
the imperial couple ranging from the tsar’s protestations of peaceful intent which he had 
made in the first years of his reign to the  empress’s desire for a son.  In addition British 
observers of Russian affairs considered the importance of the birth of Alexandra’s son to 
the empress but also to Russia and the war with Japan.  In addition, as we discuss in the 
following chapter, based on centuries of Russo-British interaction, commentators drew on 
a sort of British ‘folk-memory’ of Russia’s tsars and empress’s as they sought to 
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understand and to explain Nicholas and Alexandra during 1904. In particular, using these 
themes, British observers of Russian affairs considered the imperial couple’s relationship 
with their subjects and the extent of the tsar’s influence on the course of the war with 
Japan.     
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Chapter 3: 1904, the Russo-Japanese War 
The Tsar himself has, from the first, been in more active sympathy [.. ]with the process of 
accumulation by which  to establish Russia in a predominant position on the shores of the 
North Pacific.449 
The Woman of the hour: The Empress of Russia. Now that her oft-repeated prayers have 
been answered she will be a prouder mother than ever and Russia can no longer say a 
spell is upon her. 450  
 
As the quotes at the start of this chapter show, the year 1904 provided an opportunity for 
renewed British focus on the tsar and empress. During 1904 British commentators 
discussed the tsar’s refusal to withdraw his troops from Manchuria, the ensuing war with 
Japan, the birth of his son and heir and the Dogger Bank Incident.  A feature of British 
perceptions during these years was the understanding given to Nicholas, even when 
Britain and Russia came close to war.  Similarly, much of British discussion of Alexandra 
during this time was sympathetic. As had been the case at her engagement, her ties with 
the British royal family and her supposed liberalism and pro-British outlook were 
highlighted in the press and in official correspondence   
     
   At the start of the war with Japan commentators analysed the response of the Russian 
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public to the conflict by drawing on an established British understandings of the Russian 
people’s quasi-religious and feudal relationship with their rulers. When Russian troops 
failed to achieve the decisive victory many had assumed would be easily won, some 
British observers of Russian affairs were influenced in their analysis of events by their 
perception that historically a Russian ruler’s officials sought to keep ‘the truth’ from their 
tsars. Commentators who hoped for the downfall of the regime considered the role of 
revolutionaries in fashioning events. In doing so they highlighted what they claimed were 
Nicholas’s shortcomings as a man and as a tsar. Even those who were more 
understanding of the imperial regime were perplexed by the tsar’s seeming belligerence in 
the light of his call at the start of his reign for international disarmament.451   
     The war with Japan, which centered on Russian occupation of Port Arthur and Russo-
Japanese territorial rivalry in the Far East, was not the only significant ‘Russian’ event, 
which caught British attention during 1904.452 The first of these, the birth of a male heir in 
August 1904, was greeted with much enthusiasm in terms which echoed British responses 
to Alexandra’s engagement in 1894. In contrast, a few months later in October 1904, the 
Dogger Bank Incident was met with anger in the press and amongst much of the public. 
However, a good deal of the anger was directed at the tsar’s officials rather than Nicholas 
himself and, as we shall discuss, in private a number of British officials were willing to 
play down the importance of the incident and significance of the belligerent tone of the 
press. 
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(i) January 1904: War or Peace? 
In Britain, at the start of 1904, the image of Nicholas as an international statesman was 
largely a positive one, at the very least he was not generally regarded as war monger. In 
large measure this was because the tsar had instigated the 1899 Hague Peace Conference. 
Nicholas’s stated aim in calling this conference had been to ‘to put an end to these 
incessant armaments and to seek the means of warding off the calamities which are 
threatening the whole world’.453  Although the suggestion, that all great empires might 
reduce their armed forces and military hardware was rejected by Queen Victoria. As she 
explained in a letter to her eldest daughter, while a reduction in Russian, German and 
French armaments was ‘a good thing’ Britain could not act in a similar vein because of 
the necessity of defending her overseas territories.454 Other British commentators, 
however, enthusiastically hailed what the Daily News described has Nicholas’s ‘noble 
idea’.455  It was with the Hague Peace Conference relatively fresh in people’s mind that 
observers reflected on the tsar’s refusal to withdraw his troops from Manchuria. One 
suggestion contended that personal financial considerations, rather than the defence of 
Russia’s wider national interests, lay at the root of the tsar’s belligerence. The British 
ambassador, Sir Charles Scott, reported that ‘a large amount of imperial money’ had been 
invested on the Yalu River in Manchuria.456  
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    Scott did not divulge the source of his information but such claims were not limited to 
the private counsels of British diplomatic circles. Using anonymous Russian sources, the 
Quarterly Review claimed that the tsar had invested ‘millions’ in lucrative lumber 
concessions in the region.457 Even more damaging to the hitherto positive images of 
Nicholas, the Review brushed off suggestions of ‘the tsar’s love of peace’ as imaginative 
‘eulogies’ and the propaganda of ‘flatterers, who, when His Majesty sleeps, quote 
profound passages from his snoring’.458  Unsurprisingly, the anti-tsarist Anglo Russian 
Review also promoted the theory that the need to defend his monetary investments lay 
behind Nicholas’s intransigence. In an article headlined ‘Insatiable Autocracy: a few hard 
facts’, the magazine used everyday terms of pounds, shillings and pence in order to 
starkly reinforce its message that: ‘The Autocrat of all the Russia’s possesses in Europe 
alone more than all the states of Western Europe taken together. In Asia the tsar’s 
possessions are more than three times larger than in Europe. From all his subjects he 
extracts a personal income amounting to some 90,000,000 roubles or about £16 4s 6d 
every minute of the day and night and yet he wants more possessions, more income, more 
servants’.459  
      The British Embassy, and some sections of the press, gave credence to rumours that 
the imperial family had invested vast sums in Manchuria but not all commentators 
believed that greed lay behind Nicholas’s attitude towards the Japanese. In a rather 
contradictory article the Times appeared to accept that financial gain lay behind 
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Nicholas’s attitude towards the Japanese and advised the tsar to ‘sacrifice certain material 
interests’ for the sake of peace but the newspaper also insisted that Nicholas  acted as he 
did because he was a prisoner of Russian public opinion.460  In a lengthy article the 
newspaper reviewed the reasons for the apparent dichotomy between notions of the tsar 
as a ‘notoriously pacific’ ruler and the fact he had brought Russia ‘to the very brink of 
war’.  The newspaper dismissed as ‘picturesque anecdotes’ reports which suggested the 
tsar was ‘struggling […] in the cause of peace’ and rejected as ‘unthinkable’ the 
possibility that the tsar was being ‘systematically deceived’ by his officials.461   Although 
The Times acknowledged that the tsar was an autocrat it argued that the autocracy drew 
its strength from being the ‘representative of national aspirations’ and therefore could not 
gainsay his many ‘ultra patriotic’ citizens who wished Russian troops to remain in the Far 
East. Furthermore, The Times explained, Nicholas had only to recall the untimely fate of 
Alexander II at the hands of an assassin to understand that he could not act without regard 
to public opinion.  In 1878 Alexander II had accepted the terms of the Congress of Berlin 
(under which Russian troops withdrew from Rumania and Bulgaria) but, in the opinion of 
The Times, in doing so he had not reflected the national will and had thus diminished his 
‘popularity and prestige’ amongst his people. The article did not draw a direct comparison 
between the terms of the Congress and Alexander’s bloody fate but it was one to ponder 
for their readers, if not the tsar himself. 
 
                                                          
460
 The Times, 21 Jan. 1904, p. 8. 
461
 Ibid.  
137 
 
 
 
 
 
(ii) Loyalty, Opposition and Disorder 
People in Britain may have been divided over whether Nicholas really desired peace or 
the cause of his apparent reluctance to withdraw Russian troops from Manchuria, but 
most believed that any decision to go to war rested with the tsar and not with the 
Japanese.462 For all that Russia’s style of government was often perceived as having 
despotic and therefore Asiatic characteristics, Russia was a Christian, European power, 
her ruling dynasty firmly part of a network of European royal families. In contrast, for 
much of the British public, Japan, although recently an ally, was very firmly rooted in the 
Far East with all that implied about “pagan and inferior races”.  Therefore, when Japanese 
forces launched a devastating and pre-emptive attack on Russian ships in Port Arthur on 
the night of the 8/9 February 1904 it was as unexpected in Britain as it was in Russia.  As 
Thomas Cowen, the Daily Chronicle’s wartime correspondent recalled, the ‘idea of white 
races dominating all others’ was considered so natural that the news from Manchuria 
came like ‘a thunderbolt from clear skies’.463   
    Beyond the initial shock, the conflict in Manchuria attracted a great deal of British 
interest. Amongst the dozens of reporters sent to the region one of the most innovative 
was Lionel James who telegraphed from a Japanese ship enabling his reports to appear in 
The Times the following day.464  For those, for whom even James’s speed of despatch was 
insufficient, one company offered sightseeing trips to the war zone. Battlefield tourism 
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was not new; during the nineteenth century sightseers had flocked to see military 
encounters during the Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil War, and the Franco-
Prussian War. However, it was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that it took 
on a ‘package tour’ aspect.465  This particular trip to the Far East offered, what was said to 
be, the unique opportunity to see ‘the first modern naval battle’.466  Seemingly confident 
of an early victory by Russian forces, the organisers also assured potential customers that 
their ‘absolute safety [was] guaranteed’.467   
     Other commentators responded to the news from Manchuria with less equanimity than 
those for whom the war was a bizarre holiday or money making opportunity. In St 
Petersburg the British ambassador reacted with considerable foreboding. Indeed, his 
report could not have been more sombre since he was of the opinion that it mattered little 
whether Russian forces were successful as the war was likely to ‘have fateful 
consequences’ for the autocracy, the empire and the imperial dynasty.468 In contrast to this 
gloomy despatch, earliest reports in the British press depicted a groundswell of patriotism 
across Russia of which the tsar and empress were the focus. Thus, in the first days of the 
war, British journalists repeatedly observed crowds of patriotic Russians, evidence they 
assured their readers, of support for Nicholas and the war. For example, the Daily Express 
reported that one the streets and in the square in front of the Winter Palace: ‘indignant’ 
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crowds sang the national anthem ‘over and over again’.469 If the Morning Post is to be 
believed this patriotism was not limited to St Petersburg, since, according to the most pro-
Russian newspaper, the tsar was receiving loyal telegrams from across the empire which 
typically expressed ‘feelings of enthusiasm at the rupture of diplomatic relations with 
Japan’.470  
     For British observers, one of the most unusual aspects of this phenomena were the 
numbers of students who joined in these public displays of support for the monarchy 
since the student body was not always associated with manifestations of loyalty to the 
regime. In 1874, students formed part of the so-called ‘Going to the People’ movement. 
In 1879, having failed to galvanise peasant opposition to the autocracy, some of its 
members founded a terrorist organisation, the ‘People’s Will’ and in 1881 succeeded in 
killing Tsar Alexander II. In spite of this particularly notorious incident it has been argued 
that the majority of Russian students were more concerned with disputes with their 
university tutors rather than with wider political matters.471  As Susan Morrissey tells us, 
despite the impression given in published memoirs Russian students did not spend all 
their time reading Marx and fermenting discontent amongst the workers, their notoriety 
came stemmed from their disruptive and drunken behaviour in taverns, restaurants and 
brothels.472  Given their rowdy reputation, it may have been the novelty of seeing “anti-
establishment” students publicly declaring their loyalty to their sovereigns that led the 
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Morning Post and Daily Graphic to focus on these particular responses to the war. For 
example, the Daily Graphic reported that a crowd of ‘600 hundred students bearing flags 
[had] gathered in front of the Winter Palace’ in a show of support for the tsar and 
empress.473 The Morning Post described a similar scene with an added piquancy, saying 
that when young, male students came to Palace Square to pledge their support they were 
rewarded for their efforts by the sight of Alexandra ‘blowing kisses’ to them.474   
    Impressive though they were these images of national unity did not last and by March 
1904, with hope of an early Russian victory fading, British perceptions of the public 
response to the war became rather more considered. Their earlier impressions of a people 
united behind their tsar and empress appeared somewhat hasty, even naïve.  Not 
surprisingly the Anglo Russian Review was amongst the first to question the reports of 
national unity thus far presented by the British press. Indeed, the war in general provided 
an opportunity for the magazine to refocus British attention on the excesses of the 
autocracy and discontent amongst the populace. On the front-page of its March issue the 
magazine asked: ‘Is Tsarism doomed? What is Russia fighting?’475  The magazine’s own 
answer to the first question was clearly in the affirmative. As for what Russia might be 
fighting evidently it was not the Japanese since, according to the magazine, the people 
‘ardently desired to hasten the end of the autocracy’ which they believed would be 
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brought about by successive Japanese victories.476  
    That the Anglo Russian Review highlighted examples of opposition to the regime was 
not unexpected. However, the magazine was not alone in identifying a change in the 
public mood and the existence of an altogether more sinister atmosphere in Russia than 
that which had prevailed at the outbreak of war.  In the British press there was less talk of 
ecstatic crowds of students (and others) singing the imperial anthem and carrying portraits 
of the tsar. Even some mainstream commentators now questioned the validity of displays 
of patriotism, which they had so readily taken as evidence of support for the tsar. The 
Observer, for example, reported instances of militant activity within St Petersburg 
University. These contradicted British perceptions of the imperial couple’s unity with the 
students of the Russian capital. According to the paper’s account, the impressive facade 
of solidarity which had been presented to the British public at the commencement of 
hostilities now appeared to be crumbling. The Observer explained that students were now 
being urged by revolutionaries to charge ‘the government with having dragged the nation 
into senseless war’.477  The Times also noted that when the students were urged by the 
university authorities to re-affirm ‘their approval of the war, out of 5-6,000 students 
barely 200 signed the address to the tsar’.478 Amongst these reports of disquiet within 
groups who had apparently been the most vociferous supporters of the war the most 
serious allegation was made by The Times.       
                                                          
476
 Ibid.   
477
Observer, 6 Mar. 1904, p. 5.  
478
The Times, 12 Mar. 1904, p. 18.  
142 
 
 
 
 
 
       According to an article in the newspaper on 12 March 1904, spontaneous 
manifestations of support for the tsar and empress, which had appeared so impressive to 
British eyes, had not necessarily been entirely genuine. The newspaper claimed that 
across the Russian empire, from Vilna to Rostov-on-Don the ‘the police [had] organised 
the loyal demonstrations [forcing] workmen to attend Te Deum[s] and to address 
felicitations to the tsar’.479 According to the same report even genuine demonstrations of 
support for Nicholas in Moscow had turned into something of a farce. The article 
explained that at the start of the war crowds of patriotic citizens had gathered in the centre 
of the city with portraits of the tsar but that these manifestations of support had turned 
into drunken brawls. When a loyal, but inebriated, mob hissed and booed the city’s 
Governor-General (the tsar’s uncle, Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich) when he failed 
to appear on the balcony of his residence, the authorities banned future demonstrations.480 
        The crowds who had gathered to show their support for the war, whether genuine or 
not, had expected a Russian victory. However, as the weeks progressed it was impossible 
to hide from the public the lack of progress by Russian arms even if the extent of their 
difficulties remained unknown. In May 1904, according to the Spectator, not only was 
there a reduction in popular support for the tsar’s war but there was also evidence that the 
authorities were crushing opposition by means of mass hangings and burials at the dead 
of night.481 It was the periodical’s view that the dispiriting news from Manchuria, rumours 
of untimely and violent deaths at the hands of the authorities, and the suspicion that the 
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regime had kept back its best troops to suppress a possible uprising, had created a sense 
of foreboding that a violent storm was about to break across Russia.482    
      Commentators offered several reasons for Russia’s failure to beat the Japanese. These 
included: the success of revolutionary propaganda, battlefield methods more suited to a 
bygone era, indiscipline in the ranks caused by poor leadership from the officer class and 
the supposed childlike character of the conscripts. Some observers also considered the 
role of the tsar in influencing events the Far East. British reports from the Front suggested 
that on occasion troops had retreated even at the moment of victory. For example, the 
Reuters correspondent, Lord Brooke, claimed to have overheard Russian officers shortly 
after one battle claim that their retreat from Liaoyang was really ‘an advance 
northward’.483  Writing in the Nineteenth Century and After the anti-tsarist Carl Joubert 
offered his readers a different explanation for such apparently perverse behaviour. In an 
article, hopefully entitled “The Coming Revolution in Russia” Joubert claimed that just as 
groups of revolutionaries were agitating in the universities, so their comrades were 
undermining the Russian army’s will to fight. According to Joubert, it was the success of 
the revolutionaries in convincing the peasant conscripts that the tsar’s aims were not 
worth fighting for which explained scenes such as Lord Brooke had witnessed.484  
Nevertheless, if Joubert’s theory sprang from proof, rather than mere hope, he did not 
provide evidence of his sources.  
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Other commentators ascribed the failure of Russian arms to more mundane reasons-albeit 
even more deadly than the effect of propaganda in the ranks or a revolutionary 
conspiracy.  Observers, familiar with battlefield techniques, concluded that it was the 
failure of Russian arms to adapt to modern warfare that had enabled the Japanese 
victories. Sir Ian Hamilton, sent by Lord Kitchener to observe the fighting in Manchuria, 
noted the use of outdated artillery techniques, the parade like regularity of the troops who 
stood shoulder to shoulder on the summit of ridges and the misguided gallantry of the 
officers who exposed their position and that of their men to the enemy.485 Lord Brooke 
graphically described the effects of Japanese firepower on one occasion as ‘an exhibition 
of scientific slaughter’.486 His professional colleague, Maurice Baring, believed that the 
problems were even more deep seated. From his observations at the front he noted a 
catalogue of errors on the part of the Russian troops who, he said, lacked ‘organisation, 
cohesion and discipline’.487  This observation echoed Sir Ian Hamilton’s understanding 
who regarded the ordinary private soldier through the prism of centuries of British 
impressions of the Russian peasant as docile, aspiring to little beyond their traditional 
way of life, regulated by a paternalistic master and a benevolent tsar.  Thus, said 
Hamilton, Russian soldiers were fatalistic, frequently inebriated and, he contended, 
simple peasants who ‘except when drunk or defending their homes were in touch with 
nature, patient and stolid [without] the habitude of war’.488    
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      Beyond consideration of the role of officers and revolutionaries, commentators also 
analysed the possibility that Nicholas, although he was thousands of miles away, was also 
influential in the progress of the war. Nicholas’s father and grandfather had bivouacked 
with their troops in Bulgaria during the Russo-Turkish war (1877-78) but no Russian tsar 
had led his men into battle since Alexander I. Nonetheless, the image of the tsar at the 
head of his army remained a powerful one for British commentators. For example, The 
Times declared that, in past centuries, the presence of the tsar with the Russian army had 
been ‘of great advantage’.489  Mindful of such impressions, Nicholas’s first impulse had 
been to join his troops in Manchuria but was persuaded to remain in St Petersburg where, 
he told his mother, he suffered ‘terrible pangs of conscience’.490  Nonetheless, although 
resident in the Russian capital, British correspondents believed that the tsar exerted a 
variety of influences over his men in Manchuria. There were two ways in which this was 
said to happen. Firstly, it was said that Nicholas was viewed by the men in the war zone 
as a ‘divine being’. Secondly, he was perceived by his commanders as an unofficial, even 
unintentional, but significant military strategist.  
     An incident described by the journalist Thomas Cowen appeared to illustrate the first 
of these contentions and to show the reverence with which Russian forces regarded their 
tsar, even in the bloodiest of circumstances. Cowen claimed to have witnessed a Japanese 
attack on a Russian vessel which left the ship: ‘riddled with holes, her bridge a twisted 
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mass of iron [and] her deck like a slaughterhouse’.491 Nonetheless, in spite of the terrible 
condition of the vessel and the deaths of many of those who had served aboard her, 
according to Cowen when the men abandoned ship took with them a portrait of Nicholas 
all the while treating the tsar’s image ‘as a deity itself’.492 Whether, given the horror 
caused by the Japanese attack, Cowen actually saw the incident he described is less 
important than the fact that his story served to reinforce traditional views of the tsar’s 
relationship with his subjects.  
         Other British commentators believed that Nicholas’s contribution to the war was 
rather more concrete, if not necessarily positive. The Times military correspondent, G.B. 
Bennett, for example, argued that Nicholas’s role in the campaign went beyond that of a 
divine being, patron saint, guardian angel or talisman such as described by Cowen. In his 
opinion the cause of much of the reported confusion on the battlefield stemmed from 
Nicholas’s more earthly influence. The tsar had no practical army experience beyond 
service as an officer in elite Guards regiments in the years before his marriage. As a result 
when he telegraphed hourly to the Front and his suggestions were acted upon as if they 
were ‘imperial commands’ there was inevitably confusion.493  
     In April 1904 Henry Norman, then Liberal Member of Parliament for Wolverhampton 
South, visited St Petersburg. Before becoming a politician he had been a journalist for the 
Pall Mall Gazette and assistant editor of the Morning Chronicle. In addition, having 
published a number of studies of the Far East and, having travelled widely in the region 
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and Norman was regarded as something of an expert.
494
  Through his friendship with 
Grand Duke Aleksandr Mikhailovich he met the tsar and, as he later told Sir Cecil Spring 
Rice, was impressed by Nicholas’s ‘statesman like grasp of the situation in the Far 
East’.495 Norman may have really been convinced by what the tsar had to say or perhaps 
his positive perception was partly influenced by learning that Nicholas had copies of his 
works in his private library.496 However, he was not alone in his positive estimation of 
Nicholas and his understanding of the war.  Douglas Story’s interpretation of events was 
based on a romantic understanding of the relationship between the monarch and his 
armed forces. He asserted that the tsar: ‘personally supervises all great matters of policy, 
all plans of campaign. He is the Soul of the Army, the inspiration of the leaders of the 
war’.497  
     As the casualties mounted the perception that Nicholas’s influence on the progress of 
the war was a positive one seemed, at best naïve and at worst foolish and damaging to the 
image of the tsar. In contrast to such as Norman and Story, the Russianist E.J. Dillon 
offered a more sceptical analysis of the tsar’s effectiveness in Manchuria.  He concurred 
with those Russians who, he said, derided claims promulgated by those he called the 
‘autocratic party’ (the grand dukes) that the tsar stood on ‘a higher plane’ than mere 
mortals and could therefore see beyond everyday considerations his pursuit of the war.498           
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Other commentators also contradicted claims by their compatriots which contended that 
Nicholas had a firm grip on the situation at the Front. Such commentators seem to have 
claimed that Nicholas was unaware of the reality of events in Manchuria in the belief that, 
had he known the extent of the carnage, events might have unfolded differently.  The 
Spectator, for example, alleged that Nicholas was forced to rely on information about the 
progress of the war from letters sent to him by his relatives in Copenhagen and Berlin.499 
The popular digest magazine Public Opinion concurred that: ‘the tsar finds it almost 
impossible to ascertain the truth’ and claimed that he had been forced to send out ‘special 
commissioners to act as spies’ at the Front.500 These explanations may have gone some 
way to explaining to a British audience Russia’s failure to achieve a swift victory over the 
Japanese but such views also echoed well-established perceptions of earlier Russian 
rulers who were not told ‘the truth’ by their officials. These claims, partly based on 
longstanding popular British impressions of the Russian monarchy as well as 
contemporary observation, were not confined to the columns of the press. Following an 
audience with the tsar, the British ambassador, Sir Charles Hardinge, concluded that 
because the tsar was forced to rely for information from his ministers, he ‘was not always 
[in possession] of the facts’.501 
(iii) 21 October 1904: The Dogger Bank Incident 
For all the discussion in the press of Russia’s conflict with Japan, the consequences of the 
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war in the Far East did not impinge on most people in Britain.  In October 1904, the 
Dogger Bank Incident, when three British fishermen were killed by the action of the 
Baltic Fleet, changed this feeling of distance between Britain and the war in Manchuria. 
Suddenly the war had come to British waters.  The British responses to the Dogger Bank 
Incident, in the press, in diplomatic circles and in the public sphere took a number of 
forms. There were speeches calling for bloody retribution, indignation and emotional 
newspaper articles. In an atmosphere of intemperate articles, jingoism, pathos and 
melodrama, a minority, who publicly offered calm reflection, were berated as Russian 
apologists.  However, as had been the case in some earlier unpleasant Russo-British 
encounters, in the public mind a good deal more sympathy was given to the Russian ruler 
than to the Russian state. As a result even some of the most bellicose comments were 
often tempered with an acceptance that Nicholas felt remorse for the tragedy even if his 
ministers dragged their feet over the issue of compensation and suitable punishment for 
the fleet’s commander.  
       The Russian Baltic Fleet was despatched from Kronstadt in the late autumn of 1904 
with the intention of relieving the Russian forces then besieged in Port Arthur. The 
voyage involved a journey halfway around the world and, from the beginning, a number 
of factors militated against its success. Few of the ships’ crews had much experience of 
sailing outside of the Baltic and rumour amongst the Russian sailors claimed that many of 
the vessels were unfit for the long sea voyage. The Dmitri Donskoi, for example, was 
over twenty years old whilst the Svetlana, although relatively new, was a yacht belonging 
to the Grand Duke Aleksei Aleksandrovich and, as a pleasure craft, was believed to offer 
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little protection from enemy shells.502 So desperate were some of the men to remain 
ashore that on the eve of departure, the ships medical officers were inundated with 
spurious claims of illness.503 Among those who did embark on the ill-fated voyage was 
Lieutenant Boris Vyrubov who, for a short time, was married to the empress’s infamous 
confidante Anna Vyrubova.  He later offered an unflattering assessment of the 
commander of the flotilla, calling Admiral Rozhestvensky ‘a blockhead without any 
talent’.504 
  On the night of 21 October 1904, the Russian Fleet came across a group of trawlers from 
Hull fishing for cod off Dogger Bank. Because as Japanese warships had been 
constructed in British shipyards, the Russians assumed the Japanese were familiar with 
the waters of the North therefore, suspecting an ambush the Russians opened fire; three 
British sailors were killed and a number wounded. A sailor and a priest onboard a Russian 
vessel were also caught in the crossfire and later died but the Baltic Fleet sailed off into 
the night.   
    Perhaps news of the attack did not make it ashore immediately or it was not at first 
considered to be as serious as later became the case. It had been no secret that the Baltic 
Fleet had been preparing to leave Russian waters. At least as early as 14
 
October The 
Times reported that the fleet would, in all probability, pass through Danish waters the 
following day however, the newspaper made no mention of the disaster until three days 
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after it occurred.505  The news did not reach the Foreign Office until 24 October and, as a 
result, so The Times claimed, when three survivors arrived at the Foreign Office there was 
considerable delay before a ‘leading official’ was found to speak to them.506  
     In spite of the initially slow response when details of the incident were eventually 
made public they made sober reading for many people in Britain.  A letter writer to The 
Times, with the patriotic nom de plume of ‘A.N. Englishman’, called for: ‘a striking 
public expression of regret on the part of the Russian authorities, compensation for the 
victims, and the punishment of at least one Russian officer’.507 In the same issue of the 
newspaper, another enigmatic letter writer who went by the name of ‘Far East’, 
describing the Russians in terms which conjured up images of an uncivilised and Asiatic 
people, railed against the Baltic Fleet’s ‘barbarous cruelty’.508  These two letters were the 
opening salvo in a war of words against Russia which were to fill the columns of the 
British press. On more than one occasion the Russian ambassador in London was 
concerned to calm the situation lest it lead to war. He assured the British Foreign 
Secretary that ‘no mistake could be greater than supposing that [Russia] was hostile 
towards Britain’.509 
     The events off Dogger Bank were naturally most keenly felt in Hull-the victims’ home 
port where the story was avidly reported by the Hull Daily News. However, in its initial 
report, the newspaper focused on a sensational story, which, had it not been for a quirk of 
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fate, might have carried even more serious consequences than the death of three 
fishermen. According to the Hull newspaper Britain’s Queen Alexandra had been 
holidaying, as she often did, with her sister (the dowager empress of Russia) at their 
family home in Denmark. Though they had been due to return on the night of the disaster 
it was only due to poor weather and a royal dislike of travelling on the Sabbath that had 
prevented the queen from falling victim to Russian guns.510   
   The question of a Russian apology preoccupied many commentators.  In Parliament the 
member for Hull Central, Sir Henry Seymour King, demanded ‘an immediate and abject 
apology from the Russians’.511 As we have noted, during earlier reigns British 
commentators tended to sympathise with or give the benefit of the doubt to Russia’s 
rulers, convinced as they often were of their good intentions even as they berated the 
Russian state. This was also the case on this occasion as an article in the digest magazine 
Public Opinion shows. Thus, the magazine declared that it accepted what it called the 
tsar’s ‘creditable’ apology for the ‘atrocious blunder’ but demanded ‘a sign of regret and 
reparation from [the tsar’s] ministers’.512 
  A week after the tragedy the funerals for the British victims provided an opportunity for 
manifestations of popular anti-Russian feeling and for renewed chauvinism. In London a 
large crowd heckled the Russian Ambassador.
513 
 In Hull the local newspaper used the 
occasion to indulge in emotional (even gory) language in its description of the funeral 
cortege passing through Hull carrying ‘the coffin in which lay the headless body of the 
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martyred skipper’.514 With bathetic imagery such as this it is little wonder that, two 
months after the tragedy, the Russian consul in Hull was offered police protection against 
possible attack by an angry mob.515  
    As the situation threatened to develop into an international crisis, not everyone was 
swept up in this belligerent mood. Sections of the public feared that if Britain continued 
to bait Russia the outcome could be catastrophic.  A public meeting in London’s Finsbury 
Park condemned ‘in the most emphatic manner the unseemly conduct of those who 
treated the Russian ambassador with discourtesy’.516 Similarly, the Manchester Peace 
Society ‘deplored most strongly’ the inflammatory language of some sections of the 
British press.517  In an attempt to calm matters a retired admiral, Robert Edmund 
Fremantle (Commander in Chief of British Forces in China during the Sino-Japanese War 
of 1894-5) wrote to The Times. Drawing on his years of naval experience he insisted that 
the Russians had acted in ‘panic and ignorance’ rather than malevolent intent.518  Also in 
The Times Alexander Murray, the Liberal M.P for Midlothian warned that Russia was ‘a 
proud nation’ and if Britain continued to ‘rub its nose in the dirt’ it might well ‘precipitate 
a conflict to shake the [British] empire to its very foundation’.519 In a similar vein, Philip 
Burne Jones (the son of the pre-Raphaelite painter), condemned intemperate newspaper 
headlines and advised that it would be better to allow Russia ‘to retire without loss of 
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dignity or self respect’.520     
    In Whitehall, after an initially unhurried response, the Foreign Office instructed the 
recently appointed ambassador-Charles Hardinge, to inform the Russian authorities that 
Britain viewed ‘the action of the squadron [...] as a brutal and unqualified outrage’.521 On 
26 October Edward VII wrote to Nicholas as uncle to nephew, sure that his ‘kind heart 
would deplore the loss of life’.522 Although his tone was sympathetic the king, 
nevertheless, expressed some bewilderment at the tsar’s claim that he had only heard of 
the incident from ‘a foreign source’ and furthermore, that the Russian squadron had not 
stopped ‘to offer assistance to the wounded’.523  By way of response to his uncle’s 
missive, late on 28 October 1904, the British ambassador was summoned to Tsarskoe 
Selo where Nicholas begged Hardinge to ‘speak frankly’.524  The tsar commiserated with 
the ambassador for having had to deal with so many difficulties since his recent 
appointment. He also explained that, having noted that the king and queen had made a 
donation to a fund for the sailor’s families, he and the empress would like to ‘make gifts 
of money’ to those affected by the incident in the North Sea.525  
  Specifically in regard to the cause of the tragedy, Nicholas was less accommodating. 
Indeed, Hardinge found him defensive, offended and exasperated.  He complained that 
the British press had been hasty and too ready to accept accounts of the Hull fishermen 
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‘without admitting the possibility of [other] explanations’.526 Hardinge replied 
diplomatically that the press had indeed been ‘unnecessarily defiant in tone’ but that 
much popular talk of British naval preparations for war against Russia had been 
‘exaggerated’.527 He tactfully reminded the tsar that in Britain it was not possible to 
control the press. Hardinge, with a patrician’s understanding of the ‘lower orders’, 
explained the newspapers in writing as they did were simply reflecting the feelings of the 
masses ‘who recognised that no question of politics was involved but that some of their 
brothers and fellow workmen, while in pursuit of their innocent vocation, had been killed 
and injured and they called upon the government for protection’.528 The tsar apparently 
accepted Hardinge’s explanation but bemoaned the fact that ‘the press had become a 
tyranny which [in regard] to foreign politics was capable of great mischief from which it 
was difficult to escape’.529  
It was the ambassador’s personal and professional desire to smooth relations with Russia. 
However his implication that the British response had been overblown in some quarters 
was shared by other members of the British establishment. For example, Lord Onslow, 
who visited St Petersburg in December 1904, reasoned that the British public would have 
been placated if the Russian fleet had simply admitted their error immediately. In a report 
to the Foreign Office he explained: ‘When an incident of that kind happened to men of 
the class of the Hull fishermen, the feelings of the working classes were excited in a 
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manner that would not be the case if the sufferer had been more highly placed. If the 
Russian admiral had called at a Channel port and reported the circumstances with 
expressions of regret I do not think more excitement would have been caused than when a 
motor car accidentally runs over someone and the owner is prepared to make liberal 
compensation’.530  
    Francis Plunkett, Britain’s ambassador to Vienna, took an equally complaisant attitude 
to the incident, which he insisted was ‘not in itself overwhelmingly tragic’.531 However, 
unlike Hardinge who aspired to smooth things over with the Russians, Plunkett hoped that 
the public’s anger might provide the necessary catalyst to end hope of an Anglo-Russian 
entente. In a report to Whitehall he explained that the vehemence of the British public’s 
response showed that a closer understanding with Russia, such as he said had been 
entertained by ‘certain fanciful diplomatists’, was now ‘a bubble which had burst’.532  
Even Vice-Admiral Fremantle, who had previously defended the fleet, was reported by 
the Steam Ship Traveller magazine as saying that the trawler men had been deliberately 
fired upon. Their aim in order to ‘create a war’ with Britain and distract the Russian 
public from the debacle in the Far East.533  
   In the face of official British insistence that there had been no torpedo ships in the 
North Sea that night, the Russian authorities did not give up hope of obtaining evidence 
which might support their case. For example, the Russian foreign minister, S.D. Sazonov, 
suggested that if the Japanese had indeed been preparing to attack the Baltic Fleet they 
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would ‘have been likely to disguise themselves as fishermen’.534 The tsar too continued to 
hold out hope that the Baltic Fleet might yet be exonerated and he sent a supportive 
telegram to ‘my dear squadron’ assuring them that ‘the misunderstanding will soon be at 
an end’.535  Further to this end, on 15 November 1904, advertisements were placed in the 
Jutland Post promising ‘a large reward for information regarding the presence of 
suspicious vessels’ on the night of the tragedy.536 A week later a Dutchman gave an 
interview to a German newspaper, in which he claimed to have been an ‘eyewitness to the 
action in the North Sea’.537 As late as January 1905 a Norwegian sea-pilot came forward 
to say that ‘he had seen torpedo ships with their light extinguished’ just hours before the 
Baltic Fleet opened fire.538   
      In March 1905, at a tribunal in The Hague, which was convened to diffuse the 
tension, even two Englishmen stated that when they were in Hull ‘we heard from the 
fisherman themselves that torpedo boats were present at Dogger Bank at the time of the 
cannonade of the Russian squadron. Besides, we made friends with people who were 
undeniable Japanese’.539   Although both sides seemingly remained convinced that right 
was on their side, the Russians agreed to pay £65,000 compensation which included a 
personal donation from the tsar to the families of those affected by the action of the Baltic 
Fleet.540   The incident was now officially closed and it was hoped that Russo-British 
relations might taken on a more cordial aspect. The positive reaction in Britain to the birth 
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of Nicholas and Alexandra’s son August 1904 gave hope that this might indeed be a 
possibility.  
(iv) August 1904: the Birth of an Heir 
For much of 1904 British discussion of Russian affairs naturally centred on Nicholas, his 
reasons for taking Russia to war, and the extent of his role in determining its possible 
outcome  as well as the events on the Dogger Bank. With occasional exceptions such as at 
the start of the war Alexandra was largely absent from British analysis of events in the 
Far East and its repercussions on the home front.  For a brief moment, in the late summer 
of 1904, this changed when the empress gave birth to a son. In response to the news of the 
birth of a male heir she became the subject of press articles in ways which reflected the 
positive impressions of her which had been common at the start of her life in Russia.  
More widely, news of the heir’s birth provided an opportunity to reiterate Nicholas and 
Alexandra’s family ties to the British royal family. Discussion in the British press also 
considered the effect of the birth on the Japanese war and on the internal politics of the 
Romanov family. The birth of a son and heir had been long awaited. When Nicholas 
ascended the throne in 1894, his brother George was designated heir and on his death in 
1899 the responsibility passed to the tsar’s youngest brother, Michael. The Grand Duke 
Michael was ten years younger than the tsar and the indulged baby of the family. His pet 
name amongst his brothers and sisters was “Floppy”.541 Even after 1899 when he was first 
in line to the throne his name was frequently linked with women whose ancestral pedigree 
made them unsuitable to be Romanov brides. The Grand Duke always seemed more 
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likely to wed for romantic rather than dynastic reasons and, in 1912 he contracted a 
morganatic marriage with a divorcee, Natalia Sheremetyevskaya.  
      The spring of 1904 marked the tenth anniversary of Nicholas and Alexandra’s 
engagement and November would mark their tenth wedding anniversary. Although by 
1901 the imperial couple had four daughters none of them were designated heir because, 
since the reign of Tsar Paul I (1796-1801), male succession to the throne had been given 
precedence over female members of the dynasty. Michael’s personal life, Alexandra’s 
‘inability’ to produce a son, and a Romanov family prophecy that Grand Duke Vladimir 
Aleksandrovich was destined to rule Russia, gave hope to Nicholas’s dynastically 
ambitious relatives.542  
     The importance of a male heir was also felt in British diplomatic circles where the 
empress was regarded as sympathetic to Britain. In 1900, when the empress was pregnant 
with her fourth child, the British Ambassador hoped that: ‘she may have an heir [since] 
from what I hear privately she is our most staunch ally and nobody dares even hint at 
anything against England in her presence. With a man of weak disposition like the [tsar] 
such an influence at his side should be a great safeguard for us’.543 When, in June 1901, 
yet another daughter (Anastasia) was born, Edward VII felt moved to commiserate with 
Nicholas. Mindful of the perceived role of the empress in defending Britain’s point of 
view, the king confided to his nephew ‘I cannot help sharing your natural disappointment 
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that a fourth daughter instead of a son has been born’.544   
      On 13 August 1904, when Alexandra finally gave birth to a son whom they christened 
Aleksei it was a moment of great happiness for the imperial couple. As Dominic Lieven 
explains, his birth lifted a very public burden from the imperial couple and from the 
empress in particular, who bore the responsibility of failing to produce a son.545  Amongst 
contemporary commentators the birth was considered significant for three main reasons. 
Firstly, because Alexandra’s previous children had all been girls. Secondly, the arrival of 
a male heir was said to have secured his parents position on the throne-at least for the 
time being-against the intrigues of their relatives. Thirdly, Aleksei’s birth gave 
encouragement to his father at a time of national trial and was regarded as having boosted 
morale amongst Russia’s beleaguered forces in Manchuria, who believed that God had 
smiled on their cause. Manifestations of British reaction to the birth of the heir included a 
mixture of tabloid enthusiasm for a royal birth, analysis of the political and personal 
implications for the imperial couple, and an examination of its impact on the course of the 
war with Japan.  
     In its analysis of the significance of the birth, the London Evening News considered 
the personal toll, which it believed, the failure to give birth to a son had taken on the 
empress. It was the newspaper’s contention that at the time of her marriage Alexandra 
had been ‘a bright happy girl’ but, her failure to meet the expectations of a nation and of 
                                                          
544
 RA, VICW60/125/A, Letter from King Edward VII to Tsar Nicholas II, 19 Jun. 1901.  
545
 Lieven, Nicholas II, p. 162.  
161 
 
 
 
 
 
the Romanov family, had turned her into ‘a wretched and depressed tsarina’.546 In order to 
illustrate the empress’s unhappiness and to describe her new found maternal joy the 
newspaper composed a ditty entitled “His Majesty the Baby”.  
   The poem’s voice is that of a mother- a stereotypical, warm hearted Cockney of the 
popular imagination, who refutes assertions that the birth of the Russian heir is nothing to 
with her. The poem is light-hearted but it narrates a serious British response to the birth. It 
reveals a woman’s sympathy for Alexandra under the burden of the expectations of an 
empire and a dynasty. It also encompasses two themes which were popular in discussion 
of the empress; it identifies her as a member of the British royal family and reflects, albeit 
in jocular fashion, British perceptions of the central importance the tsarevich’s birth at 
time of war with Japan:  
T’ ain’t my affair? 
Good Lawd. Ain’t I a moother too? 
I ain’t the Queen of Rooshia it is true. 
But I’m a woman with a woman’s heart, I ’opes to feel for them as suffers 
And I’m that bloom’ in glad that the kids a boy 
I feel as if I’d like to jump for joy. 
 
T’aint my affair? 
What when Victoria’s own grandouter 
Is going to show them Rooshians what she orter? Them as ’ave laughed to scorn 
’er purty little gels? The narsyt ’eathen duffers! Them to look down on ’er! Oh 
Lawd! ‘Cause they wus kep awaitin’ by Almighty Gawd! 
 
T’ain’t my affair? 
‘Tis all the world’s affair. It seems to me! It appears all so lurvly, cawnt you see? 
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Just when the bloomin’ war was at its werry wurst and them there Japs a winning. 
The giddy little kiddy comes along. As if so set alright the bloomin’ wrong. 547 
 
      In a more overtly serious vein, students of Russian history were aware that in past 
centuries unpopular or ineffectual Russian monarchs had been overthrown and even 
killed at the instigation of other members of the ruling dynasty. Amongst the most notable 
palace coups were those that had brought to the throne Empress Elizabeth (1741-61) and 
Catherine the Great (1762-96). Bearing these events in mind commentators believed that 
a palace coup remained a possibility, even in the twentieth century. Although no evidence 
has come to light which suggest the existence of any imminent plans to replace the tsar 
with a senior member of the Romanov clan many of the grand dukes were ambitious men 
who might well have been frustrated by Nicholas’s approach to his role. The Spectator, 
for example, asserted that had it not been for the birth of their son Nicholas and 
Alexandra might have been overthrown by rivals within the Romanov family.548 In an 
article which recalled assertions from the start of her association with Russia that 
Alexandra would have a liberalising effect on the monarchy, the Spectator was confident 
that, on account of her son’s birth, Alexandra would now recover her ‘beneficial 
influence over the court’.549   The Illustrated London News agreed that a palace coup had 
been avoided but the magazine was cautious in its analysis of the direction of future 
events suggesting that the imperial couple had only achieved a temporary reprieve. The 
magazine explained that since the Russian people were ‘extremely superstitious’, the birth 
                                                          
547
Ibid.  
548
 Spectator, 20 Aug. 1904, p. 244 
549
 Ibid. 
163 
 
 
 
 
 
of a fifth daughter would have led them to believe that ‘the tsar no longer enjoyed God’s 
favour’.550  However, the article argued that although many Russians rejoiced at the news 
of Aleksei’s birth, some of the tsar’s relatives remained dissatisfied with the progress of 
the war and ‘might yet instigate a palace revolution’.551  
      Whether members of the ruling dynasty remained discontented or whether Alexandra 
might now be better placed to direct a pro-British policy was largely a matter of 
conjecture but the Daily Express was certain of the Russian public’s response to the birth 
of an heir. In an article headlined ‘Russia’s baby boy: A nation gone mad over an infant’ 
the newspaper had little doubt that, amongst the mass of ordinary Russians, the news was 
welcomed.552 Indeed, according to the Express, war news was no longer of any interest to 
the Russian public and such was the demand for pictures of the baby that enterprising 
photographers were selling images of any new born infants which they passed off to their 
customers as that of the tsarevich.553  The populist Daily Mirror was equally delighted 
with the news from Russia and devoted three enthusiastic pages (including its front-page) 
to the birth of the heir to the Russian throne. It offered the congratulations of the entire 
British nation to the imperial couple boldly asserting that ‘in spite of all [our] differences 
the heart of England [now] beats in unison with that of Russia’.554 The newspaper took the 
opportunity to remind its readers of the imperial couple’s links with Britain. Nicholas and 
Alexandra had enjoyed much of their courtship in Russia and Hesse Darmstadt and it was 
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only after their engagement that they spent a relatively long period of time together in 
England. However, in keeping with its theme of Anglo Russian unity, and to emphasise 
the strength of the ties between the two ruling houses, the Mirror asserted that it was at 
Windsor Castle that the tsar had ‘wooed and won his future bride, a granddaughter of 
Queen Victoria’.555  
     Such was the significance of the birth of a Russian heir that British press coverage was 
not limited to mass circulation newspapers. The tone and language of the Anglican 
Church Times was naturally somewhat more reserved than its populist peers but it was no 
less animated in response to the news.  The focus of the newspaper’s attention centred, as 
some of the tabloid press had done, on the fact that Aleksei was ‘a great grandchild of our 
own Queen Victoria’.556  Although Russia was engaged in a war, which some 
commentators believed to have been due to the tsar’s greed, the Church Times remained 
confident that Nicholas had done all he could to prevent the conflict. Indeed, an article, on 
19 August 1904, praised the tsar for what it called his ‘peaceful intent’.557 Furthermore, in 
an echo of British reaction to the Dogger Bank Incident, the newspaper appeared to blame 
the Russian government rather than the tsar for the conflict. Thus the Church Times 
insisted that ‘there is a strong feeling of respect in this country [for the tsar who, 
whatever] his ministers may have done in his name, has shown so earnest a desire for the 
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peace of the world’.558  
    In contrast to the exuberance of much of the press, the digest magazine Public Opinion 
chose to focus on a rather more bleak aspect of the news from Russia. An article on 19 
August noted that for the superstitious, ‘it was an unfortunate omen that at the time of 
[the heir’s] birth the commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet had been killed by a 
Japanese shell whilst on board his flagship the Tsarevich’.559 Public Opinion’s rather 
gloomy anecdote was reflected in an article in the Spectator. The periodical speculated 
what might have happened had Alexandra given birth to a fifth daughter and concluded 
that news might have so ‘depressed the tsar’ he might well have made peace and ended 
the bloodshed in the Far East.560  Nicholas and Alexandra named their son Aleksei, a 
choice the press found intriguing. A number of sources for the name were promulgated. 
The Daily Mirror, for example, asserted that Aleksei had been chosen because their ‘son 
was born on the same day as [Aleksei Petrovich] the last tsarevich born to a reigning 
tsar’.561  Aleksei Petrovich had been the son of Peter the Great and his relationship with 
his father had been fraught to say the least. The two men were completely unalike: while 
Peter was dynamic, forceful and determined Aleksei appeared to prefer spending his time 
in reading devotional literature. At one point he encountered the wrath of his father when 
he expressed a wish to enter a monastery. When Peter’s second wife, Catherine, gave 
birth to a son the tsar planned to give him precedence in the order of succession. As a 
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result Aleksei left Russia to ask for help from the Habsburg court in overthrowing his 
father only to be brought back to St Petersburg. The hapless Aleksei was then imprisoned 
and died after an interrogation by the tsar.562 It was hardly a positive example of a father 
and son relationship and, in view of his untimely end (possibly at the hands of his own 
father), some commentators found the choice of name extremely perturbing.  The 
Spectator believed that by calling their child Aleksei the imperial couple had, at the very 
least, shown ‘a curious contempt for historic omens’.563     
     Although the Spectator believed it knew the origin of the child’s name other 
commentators were divided in their opinion as to its source. The men fighting in 
Manchuria had been made honorary godfathers to the newborn heir and it was a link with 
the war, rather than with Nicholas’s ill-fated ancestor, which the Illustrated London News 
believed had influenced the choice of name.  According to the magazine Nicholas was 
‘very close’ to his uncle Grand Duke Aleksei Aleksandrovich (then the Grand Admiral of 
the Russian Navy) and it was after this relative that the child had been named.564 
However, as one commentator noted, the grand duke preferred ‘to conduct his nautical 
manoeuvres at Monte Carlo or Paris’.565 In the knowledge of the grand duke’s reputation 
for pleasure rather than duty, which gave him an image unsuited to wartime, The Times 
offered a third source for the child’s name.  The newspaper claimed that the imperial 
couple had named their son after Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich (r. 1645-76) the second 
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Romanov tsar. There is some evidence for believing that was indeed the case.  It was 
certainly a more plausible suggestion than those offered by either the Spectator or the 
Illustrated London News. After the fall of imperial Russia the former foreign minister, 
Aleksandr Izvolsky, recalled that it had become the ‘fashion amongst Nicholas II’s 
intimates to eulogise Aleksei the “Most Tranquil tsar” [who was said to have been] given 
to pious exercises, devoted to his family [and have made a] place at his councils for the 
beautiful and virtuous Tsarina, Nathalie Narichkine’.566 More contemporary evidence of 
the imperial couple’s attachment to this early modern tsar could be observed during 1903, 
the year which marked the two hundredth anniversary of the founding of St Petersburg. In 
order to celebrate the birth of the city which had been founded by Peter the Great, 
Nicholas and Alexandra had hosted a lavish costume ball in the Winter Palace. Peter was 
remembered as a reforming, European looking tsar but as a sign of their rejection of his 
attitude toward ‘traditional Russia’, the imperial couple came dressed as the last 
Muscovite tsar, Aleksei Mikhailovich and his first wife Maria Miloslavkaia.567      
      On 24 August 1904 Aleksei was baptised in the imperial chapel of the Grand Palace 
at Peterhof. The guests included the child’s great-grandfather, King Christian IX of 
Denmark, and most of the extended Romanov family. King Edward VII and Kaiser 
Wilhelm II were amongst the tsarevich’s several godparents although the king himself did 
travel not to Russia but sent Prince Louis of Battenberg  (the husband of the empress’s 
sister Victoria) to act as his proxy. The imperial children’s British governess, Margaret 
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Eager, accompanied her eldest charges to the ceremony and her account mixes the 
romantic with the improbable. Thus, she wrote: ‘in the middle of the service when the 
tsarevich was being anointed he raised his hand as if in blessing [as a sign that] he would 
be a good father to his people’.568  
     The tone of much of the British press at this time, if less saccharine, was largely 
sympathetic.  An article in The Times was typical. It reiterated recurring popular notions 
which separated the tsar as a person from the actions of his ministers and reminded its 
readers of the family ties between the two reigning houses. Thus, The Times declared: 
‘despite the British people’s [recent] controversies with the Russian government, they 
have always cherished a kindly feeling towards Nicholas II, a feeling which springs partly 
from the impression they have formed of his personal character and partly from the 
recollection of how close is the tie which exists between him and our own Queen 
Alexandra, while the empress is to them, above all else, the granddaughter of our Queen 
Victoria’.569  
   Ties of kinship were also uppermost in the Public Opinion’s analysis of the 
appointment of Edward VII as the child’s godfather.  Sections of the British press had 
described Nicholas’s decision to give the future Edward VII a central role at the funeral 
ceremonies for Alexander III as a specifically political act in order to show his friendship 
for Britain. Perhaps mindful of this precedent, Public Opinion recognised that people 
might see Edward VII’s appointment as godfather as another ‘political act’ which they 
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might either detest or applaud.570 However, the weekly digest advised it had no political 
significance but was simply ‘a sign of family feeling’.571 
    British perceptions of Nicholas and Alexandra had passed through several phases 
during 1904. The tsar was viewed in some quarters as financially acquisitive, as a 
prisoner of public opinion or a victim of his ministers’ shortcomings. It was widely 
accepted that support for the war was waning amongst most of the population and that 
Alexandra had secured her husband’s place on the throne (temporarily at least) when she 
gave birth to a son. In contrast to the furious attacks on the Russian government in the 
British press, Nicholas avoided personal criticism over the Dogger Bank Incident. The 
British ambassador and other members of the diplomatic corps brushed off the 
seriousness of the incident and suggested that generous compensation to the families of 
the men who had died would be enough to calm the situation.  In spite of the war with 
Japan and the deaths of several North Sea fishermen British perceptions of the tsar 
remained largely positive. In the following chapter we shall discuss the resilience of these 
images and the extent to which they were challenged as a result of Bloody Sunday and the 
outbreak of revolution across Russia.  
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Chapter 4: The 1905 Revolution  
Neither a revolution nor an insurrection is threatened. The descendants of the Romanovs 
mounting the scaffold and condemned to death as a traitor to his people is a picture 
which only the wildest imagination or ignorance of the Russian national character can 
conjure up.572  
His Majesty is living in seclusion which has been systematically imposed upon him by his 
advisers who are jealous of others to their sovereign […] under these circumstances it is 
not surprising that the tsar should be so little in touch with his people.573 
 The violence which occurred across Russia during the year 1905 gave British 
commentators pause for thought. For writers, trade unionists and others who were 
opposed to the regime Nicholas’s violent response to events served to lay bare the 
ruthlessness of the autocracy. The responses of those who were sympathetic to the regime 
were somewhat more nuanced. In the light of uprisings throughout the Russian Empire 
British commentators re-considered the nature of Nicholas’s relationship with his people. 
Did he perceive that his subjects had been led astray by more dominate personalities bent 
on revolution? Had he been justified in suppressing the revolt? Was his attitude to the 
events of 1905 formed from credible evidence that the mass of Russians were loyal or 
where the imperial couple being deceived by their officials, as perhaps they had been over 
events in the Far East during 1904? In addition commentators considered the tsar’s 
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decision to permit a Duma and a number questioned whether this was the result of a 
genuine desire to seek a closer union with his people or a deception in order to bide time 
before reasserting his autocratic authority. Others looked back in Russian history and 
perceived the Duma in terms of a renewal of the sacred bond between the tsar and his 
subjects which permitted the reassertion of traditional Russian society.   
(i) The Blessing of the Waters and Bloody Sunday 
In retrospect, the opening days of 1905 can be seen as an omen for the violence and 
unrest which was to mark the whole of the year. On 19 January 1905 (n.s.), the ceremony 
of the Blessing of the Waters to commemorate Christ’s baptism in the Jordan took place 
on the banks of the river Neva. It was conducted in the presence of the tsar and the grand 
dukes. The empress, the diplomatic corps and members of the press watched from the 
windows of the nearby Winter Palace. From across the river in the Peter and Paul fortress, 
the cannons, some rounds of which were live, fired an imperial salute. The shrapnel 
caused considerable damage to the Winter Palace and a quantity was later found in the 
pavilion in which the tsar had been standing.  
    Many years after the revolution Nicholas’s sister, Grand Duchess Olga, recalled the 
incident at the Blessing of the Waters. According to her account the tsar had explained: ‘I 
knew someone was trying to kill me. I just crossed myself. What else could I do?’574  If 
Olga’s memory of the day’s events is accurate Nicholas evidently believed he had 
escaped an assassination attempt. Nonetheless, a contemporary report in The Times noted 
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that a commission of enquiry set up to investigate the incident had dismissed allegations 
of an army plot.575 However, the British ambassador, Sir Charles Hardinge, was wary of 
official claims that he had witnessed a very unfortunate accident. At the very least, 
Hardinge believed, it showed a careless disregard for the life of the autocrat. As Hardinge 
wrote, however the authorities chose to explain the events at the Blessing of the Waters it 
was ‘undeniable’ that troops have been implicated in an incident by which the tsar’s life 
had been ‘seriously endangered’.576  The British ambassador’s report revealed a sense of 
unease about the incident and for the tsar’s safety have been said to explain Nicholas’s 
absence from the capital a few days later when troops fired on hundreds of workers as 
they attempted to present a petition at the Winter Palace.577   
    Unsurprisingly, given the importance of this event in the founding myth of the Soviet 
regime, much has been written about the impact of Bloody Sunday on imperial Russia. 
Analysis has centred on Russian perceptions of the massacre and its influence on the 
course of future events.578 In contrast, little has been written on specifically British 
responses to the massacre. For example, in their extensive studies of British-Russian 
diplomacy before the revolution, neither Keith Neilson nor Michael Hughes devote more 
than a few lines to the British embassy’s reaction to the events that day.579 However, the 
march and the ensuing massacre were so extraordinary that they attracted discussion and 
analysis from a broad range of contemporary British commentators.  
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        The killing and wounding of hundreds of unarmed workers on Bloody Sunday may 
have appeared all the more shocking to British commentators because Father Gapon, who 
led the ill-fated march to petition the tsar, had previously enjoyed a degree of official 
sanction. His “Assembly of Factory and Mill Workers of the City of St Petersburg” drew 
its philosophy from the so-called Zubatov unions which, although disbanded by the time 
of Bloody Sunday, had promoted the idea of the crown as mediator between Russia’s 
workers and their employers.580 A contemporary report claimed that Gapon had 
corresponded with the empress from whom he was said to have received ‘high praise for 
his ideas’.581 However, the authorities had told Gapon that Nicholas would not receive the 
petition and had ordered him to call off the march.  When Gapon refused, at least one 
British newspaper believed the stage was set for confrontation. Thus, in a front page 
headline, Lloyds Weekly asked: ‘Will the strikers triumph or will they be shot down?’582 
The subsequent issue ran the stark headline: ‘By Order of the tsar. Men, women and 
children butchered’.583 In the immediate aftermath of Bloody Sunday rumours suggested 
that Nicholas had fled Russia aboard a ship bound for Copenhagen or that he had escaped 
to his palace in the Crimea.584  In fact the tsar was resident at nearby Tsarskoe Selo but he 
did not appear in public until February, and then only under constrained circumstances.  
     In the weeks following the massacre British discussion of Bloody Sunday centred on 
the degree of the tsar’s foreknowledge of Gapon’s plans, the extent to which Nicholas 
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might be personally culpable for the deaths of his subjects and whether he was the master 
of his own destiny. Journalists, diplomats and authors of anti-tsarist propaganda agreed 
that the events of Bloody Sunday had negatively affected the relationship between the tsar 
and his subjects. It could hardly be otherwise given the reports of the number of dead and 
injured, although the number has never been independently verified. At the time the 
British Embassy noted official claims that there had been seventy-six fatalities including 
three policemen.585  G.H. Perris estimated the figure to have been much higher and 
claimed that ‘500 had been killed and 1,500 wounded’.586 At least two broadsheet dailies 
thought the fatalities were higher than official sources were prepared to admit. In the 
aftermath of such an unprecedented incident there was no easy or neutral way to establish 
the truth of the number of casualties. As result, correspondents could only rely on rumour, 
perhaps based on anti-tsarist propaganda for news of the victims. The Times, for example, 
reported ‘20,000 were dead and 4,000 injured’.587  In its earliest reports of the incident the 
Manchester Guardian seems to have added the two figures together and solemnly 
declared that ‘24,000 men, women and children’ had been killed as they marched to 
deliver their petition.588 The true numbers of dead and injured will never be known but 
modern estimates suggest that the number of wounded ran into the hundreds589 with at 
least one hundred fatalities.590  
     Whatever the true figure the violent reaction of Nicholas’s troops towards the workers 
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on their way to the Winter Palace necessarily challenged images of the tsar as the father 
of his people, even amongst commentators who did not necessarily fully sympathise with 
the workers’ demands. In the light of claims by three unidentified English eyewitnesses 
that the troops had fired without provocation, Hardinge told Whitehall that he was at a 
loss to explain: ‘the callous indifference of the Russian military authorities in taking the 
lives of quiet and orderly workmen who were unarmed and showed no sign of aggressive 
action’.591  
    Nicholas and Alexandra’s own response to Bloody Sunday was mixed. On the one 
hand the imperial couple were said to have given £5,000 to relieve the needs of those 
families whom the troops had deprived of their breadwinner.592 They regarded the 
massacre with sorrow but they also believed that the troops had had little option but to act 
as they did.593 Their views were akin to those Hardinge identified amongst the educated 
classes in St Petersburg whom he noted ‘were somewhat ashamed of the massacre of 
innocent lives [although they argued] that Gapon’s movement was purely revolutionary 
and could only have been dealt with by force’.594  Having reflected on these views and the 
wider elite’s fears of workers being “led astray”, Hardinge was now less emotional than 
he had been in his first report. His analysis reflected the elite’s understanding of the 
petitioners as people who were loyal subjects of the tsar but who had fallen under the 
influence of ruthlessly persuasive radicals.  Thus, in contrast to his immediate response to 
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the massacre, the ambassador now focused, not on the loss of life but on the “fact” that 
‘the workers had been ignorant of the demands made in the petition’ and insisted that they 
had been ‘duped by extremists who hoped to provoke disorder’.595   
As was often the case during Nicholas’s reign, in interpreting the events of Bloody 
Sunday, in apportioning blame and looking to the future more sympathetic commentators 
were faced with a dichotomy. As we have shown, in the first years of his reign the tsar 
was reported to be an Anglophile, more liberal than his late father, and when he called for 
the convening of an international peace conference in The Hague, he was seen by some as 
a man of peace. Such images were very persuasive and even the war with Japan had 
failed to shake them entirely.  As a result the Daily Mail rejected claims that Nicholas had 
personally ordered the troops to fire on the crowd on Bloody Sunday. The newspaper 
explained the action of the troops in terms which echoed age old perceptions of a Russian 
ruler prevented from acting for the good of the people by a nefarious court. Thus, the 
Mail presented the tsar to its readers as a ruler who was intimidated by his uncles and 
cousins into acting against his more peaceful inclinations. By way of illustration the Mail 
published a cartoon which showed a fearsome collection of gigantesque grand dukes 
glowering at a miniscule tsar who wore a stage halo and nervously held in his hand a 
large olive branch.596 Similarly, the Spectator alleged that ‘under the influence of the 
grand dukes’ he had empowered his uncle Vladimir ‘to deal with the agitation as he 
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deemed fit’.597  
    The discussion about Bloody Sunday was not limited to columns of the mainstream or 
anti-tsarist press, the Anglican Church Times also discussed the events that day. As 
Bernard Palmer, a former editor and the author of a history of the newspaper noted, the 
Church Times reflected the opinions of the more conservative elements in the Church and 
the wider establishment. Most notably it ‘ranged itself with the opponents of women’s 
rights’ and ‘trembled in its editorial shoes’ at industrial unrest which, it claimed, 
threatened ‘the whole fabric of civilisation’.598 However, in regard to Bloody Sunday, 
despite its social conservatism, the Church Times, writing in religious terms, called on the 
autocracy to ‘atone for the slaughter’.599 Nonetheless, the article exonerated Nicholas from 
personal blame and in order to explain the tragedy, fell back on well established notions 
of a well-meaning tsar surrounded by a conniving bureaucracy and devious imperial 
court. Thus, the newspaper argued, although the tsar was an absolute monarch he could 
not always act as he would like since he was surrounded by advisers who ‘shirk from 
nothing’ to defend their interests.600  In contrast to the Church Times understanding 
response in regards to the extent of Nicholas’s personal culpability in the massacre 
another Church newspaper The Rock took a more radical stance. Its tone was very 
different to those English churchmen who sought unity with the Russian Orthodoxy. 
According to its editorial the deaths of hundreds of the tsar’s subjects had shattered 
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Russia’s ‘faith in their Little Father the Tsar and the spirit of blind idolatry [had] been 
broken more effectively than if every icon had been destroyed’.601 
   The question as to the extent of Nicholas’s foreknowledge of Gapon’s plan to lead a 
march of petitioners to the Winter Palace occupied a number commentators. At least two 
were scathing of the claims that Nicholas had been unaware of Gapon’s plan. For 
example, in the Quarterly Review, E.J. Dillon insisted that for days before the proposed 
march Nicholas had received ‘clear and exhaustive accounts of [Gapon’s] movement’.602 
In its coverage of the tragedy the Today magazine was heavy with sarcasm. In an article 
which discussed Nicholas’s role in the debacle the magazine noted: ‘apologists maintain 
that the tsar was kept in ignorance of the whole terrible business and when he learned the 
“real truth” his heart bled for his people. However, this cardiac explosion appears to have 
taken place at Tsarskoe Selo in the security of a strongly garrisoned palace and was not, 
unfortunately, attended by any fatal results’.603   
       For the anti-tsarist author Carl Joubert the events of Bloody Sunday provided an 
opportunity to depict the tsar as a weakling, as a coward and as a ruler who was 
surrounded by advisers prey to the wiles of cunning revolutionaries. In his hopefully 
entitled polemic The Fall of Tsardom, Joubert attempted to counter popular images of a 
typical tsar-powerfully built and omnipotent. He ridiculed Nicholas’s slight build and 
claimed that he was a coward who lived in constant fear of assassination. Thus, he 
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asserted, the tsar: ‘is spare and short in stature with narrow shoulders, like most little men 
he is highly endowed with self-importance. He is not remarkable for his physical or moral 
courage and lives in a state of perpetual anxiety. On one occasion he was driving in an 
open carriage, a little girl bravely threw a bouquet of flowers into the carriage. A certain 
general who was seated beside him had to fish Nicholas up from the bottom of the 
carriage; but not before he had convinced him that they were very fine flowers and quite 
harmless’.604  
     Joubert offered an intriguing theory by way of explanation as to why the tsar had 
refused to meet Gapon. It was one which managed to suggest the existence of a band of 
revolutionaries with contacts at court and give the impression of an isolated monarch 
unable to trust those around him. Joubert noted that the Russian revolutionary movement 
recognised the existence of an (albeit, in their terms, misplaced) bond of trust between the 
tsar and many of his subjects. As a result, Joubert informed his readers, fearing that ‘a 
few vague promises might pacify’ the workers, a group of revolutionaries had 
successfully persuaded Nicholas’s closest advisers to persuade him not to accept the 
petition.605  
      In London at least two members of the Establishment sought to defend the tsar from 
his critics in the British press. The first, the Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir 
Thomas Sanderson, bemoaned the ‘carping’ tone in the press who, he said, failed to give 
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the tsar  ‘sufficient credit for the good qualities which he undoubtedly possesses’.606  
Another well-connected source, Sir Francis Knollys (Edward VII’s private secretary) 
made a sterling attempt to exonerate the tsar.  In a letter to Hardinge he suggested that, 
since the tsar’s mother (Queen Alexandra’s sister) had been unaware of ‘any 
disturbances’ in St Petersburg, it might be presumed that the tsar’ was also kept in the 
dark as to what was going on’.607  According to Nicholas’s diary the dowager empress 
was ‘in town’ that Sunday, her residence was only a short distance from the Winter 
Palace.608  It therefore seems more than possible that she would have heard the troops 
firing on the crowd, even if she was unaware of the reasons. We can only speculate as to 
why Knollys made such a claim. It may have been family loyalty or the solidarity of 
king’s, perhaps the British royal family hoped that by spreading such stories they might 
prevent a backlash against the king and queen whose family ties to the Romanov dynasty 
had been highlighted only a few months earlier.   
      If the king was worried that his association with the Romanov dynasty might be used 
against him by radical politicians and others within his own country he could take some 
comfort from articles in two widely read middlebrow publications which at least depicted 
his niece, Alexandra in a positive light.  The first in the Evening News and Mail asserted 
that in the immediate aftermath of Bloody Sunday, while portraits of the tsar had been 
destroyed, those of the empress had been ‘treated with respect’.609  A few weeks later on 
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the 22 February referring to the recent assassination of Grand Duke Sergei 
Aleksandrovich, Today magazine suggested that should Nicholas fall victim to an 
assassins plot Alexandra might also be killed. In sentimental terms the magazine asked its 
readers to remember that the empress was ‘the daughter of our sweetest and bravest 
princess and [to] concern themselves with her safety […] every minute she is in danger. It 
is conceivable that she may not be as fortunate as her sister Grand Duchess Elizabeth in 
escaping her husband’s fate’.610 
    Amongst the many articles, letters and reports about Bloody Sunday: the horrified, the 
understanding, the scathing and the sentimental, the claims and counter claims, there was 
one unique British response. On 31 January 1905 a headline in the Daily Mirror declared 
in a sensational headline that the tsar was ‘to be tried at Smithfield’.611 According to the 
accompanying article a Smithfield butcher by the name of Harris was displaying an effigy 
of the tsar in his shop window. He had organised a group of salesmen into a jury with the 
intention of putting the tsar on trial who, if found guilty, would be hanged with what the 
newspaper described as ‘gross familiarity’.612  For all that newspapers and other 
commentators in Britain were free to criticise the tsar it would seem that critics such as 
Harris were rather more constrained by an atmosphere of deference towards royalty, even 
foreign (and despotic) royals. The British authorities were sufficiently alarmed at the 
prospect that the Russian monarch might be ‘hanged’ that Scotland Yard were tasked 
with investigating the matter. However, in a letter to the Home Office, the Yard admitted 
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they would be unable to prevent the butcher from carrying out his threat since he could 
easily barricade himself in his house and hoist ‘the effigy on a pole through the chimney 
onto the roof’.613 The fact that his scheme had attracted their interest may have been 
sufficient for him to abandon his plan, since there appears to be no further account of him 
in the archives. 
(ii) W.T. Stead interviews the tsar 
Although a great deal of the comment about the events of 1905 was made by astute and 
well qualified  commentators, few observers could provide an account of Nicholas’s 
attitude towards Gapon and to the unfolding crisis in Russia based on his own words. A 
notable exception in this regard was W.T. Stead, social commentator, journalist and 
newspaper editor. Stead interviewed Nicholas (and briefly met Alexandra) in the summer 
of 1905. As we have noted earlier this was not Stead’s first visit to Russia, neither was it 
the first time that he had interviewed a member of the imperial family. A keen advocate 
of Russo-British rapprochement since the 1870s, he had interviewed Tsar Alexander III in 
1888 and Nicholas II in 1898 and1899. Given Stead’s unstinting support for the imperial 
regime, it is ironic therefore, that the 1898 interview was censored when it was published 
in Russia.614  
     Stead approached his task with a number of positive preconceptions and a good deal of 
sympathy for the tsar’s attitude towards calls for reform. He believed that Nicholas knew 
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best his people’s needs but was enslaved by a bureaucratic machine. Modern 
commentators such as Keith Neilson have noted that ‘not even the repressive actions of 
the tsarist regime could dissuade Stead that Nicholas II was essential to the future of 
Russia’.615  In retrospect Stead’s views may appear naïve, even ill-informed. But unlike 
many other British commentators who wrote about the events of 1905, he wrote from a 
position of one who had entrée to the highest echelons of Russian social and political 
society.  
      In order to meet the tsar, Stead travelled to the family villa at the imperial resort of 
Peterhof on the Gulf of Finland. Stead admitted that he did not feel quite so ‘at home’ as 
he had at Tsarskoe Selo some years earlier, noting that, although the tsar’s manner ‘was 
easy he seemed to have a slight hiccough or heartburn which made me feel 
uncomfortable’.616 In addition Nicholas appeared somewhat preoccupied: ‘his attention 
was taken up by something beyond my head outside the window’.617  However, Stead was 
a resilient man confident of his ability to help the tsar overcome his political difficulties, 
and he was not easily put off by his uninterested air. At one point in their conversation 
Stead offered to telegraph across the world that the tsar had assured him that the ‘four 
fundamental liberties’ would be granted to Russia before the election of the Duma.618 
When Nicholas suggested that this idea was somewhat premature Stead turned the subject 
of their discussion to some articles which he was planning to write for the Times. He 
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explained that the subject of one of his essays was to have the title ‘the Emancipation of 
the Emperor’. On receiving this information even Stead had to admit that the tsar ‘did not 
exactly look beaming’ but he ploughed on even going so far as to ask Nicholas if he 
would correct the proofs before publication.619  
Undaunted by Nicholas’s irritation, Stead referred to Gapon in the course of his 
conversation. According to his subsequent account, on hearing the priest’s name the tsar 
became extremely animated calling him ‘that pig’ and declared ‘all that nonsense ought to 
have been stopped long before it reached such a head’.620 In regard to the question of did 
Nicholas know about Gapon’s intention, Stead accepted the tsar’s claim that he had only 
heard about the priest’s march on the eve of Bloody Sunday.621 The inference was that at 
that late hour it had been impossible for Nicholas to find a peaceful solution given 
Gapon’s insistence the march go ahead.  
      Stead’s aim in speaking to the tsar had been to publicise what he believed was the 
tsar’s well-intentioned attitude towards demands for reform.  However, his visit to 
Peterhof was not entirely taken up with politics. While he was waiting for his audience to 
begin he heard the sound of children’s feet running into the palace and the noise of a baby 
(the tsarevich) crying in the corridor. Shortly afterwards Stead was introduced to 
Alexandra and his description provides a relatively rare image of the empress during the 
first Russian revolution. Some commentators, who saw her, albeit usually from a 
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distance, often noted her statuesque height and confident regal aura in contrast to her 
husband’s more nervous public persona. On this occasion however, Stead observed a 
rather more timid person who appeared to have spent a large amount of time out of doors. 
Specifically, he recalled that ‘she was not as tall’ as he had expected, her ‘face was wind 
reddened’, an unusual feature in a member of the upper classes.622 When Stead attempted 
to kiss her hand she nervously withdrew it ‘as if afraid he might bite it’.623   
(iii) Nicholas meets with the workmen at Tsarskoe Selo 
Modern historians such as Andrew M. Verner, have suggested that in deciding to go 
ahead with his march after he had been forbidden to do so Gapon was indulging in 
‘monarchist fantasies’ in which he imagined the tsar coming to the aid of the working 
men.624 This idea of the ordinary people’s ‘primitive right’ to petition a tsar conformed to 
British images of the masses circumventing the bureaucracy to appeal directly to their 
ruler.
625
 It was with this in mind that G.H. Perris explained the violent manner in which 
Nicholas had refused their petition had made ‘a deep and indelible impression’ [and that] 
cries of direct antagonism to the monarchy’ could be heard on the streets.626   In February 
1905 the tsar had the opportunity, if not to make amends, at least to persuade the 
workmen that he really had their best interests at heart. Although no Briton is known to 
have been present at the encounter both the press and the British ambassador offered 
reports which suggested that Nicholas had not sought to placate the men.  The sources for 
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these accounts is not known but they were plausibly well informed and may have come 
from the workmen themselves or perhaps court officials who were present as the tsar gave 
his speech.  The Spectator described how ‘thirty workmen [were] routed out of bed 
before dawn, roughly washed and newly clad [were taken to Tsarskoe Selo] where the 
Lord’s anointed spoke in an almost inaudible voice [and granted] his pardon to the 
workers for the crime, which they imagined, and still believe, he had committed against 
them’.627  The Times claimed that the tsar had acknowledged that the life of the workmen 
was hard but those who had marched to the Winter Palace were ‘a rebel mob’.628  
     The popular Daily Graphic illustrated its cynical attitude towards the entire encounter 
by means of a cartoon which suggested that the delegates at Tsarskoe Selo were not even 
genuine workmen. It reflected well worn notions which suggested that the tsar was 
prevented from knowing “the truth” which had been a feature of British discussion about 
the Russo-Japanese War. The cartoon showed a room in which a number of policemen 
were disguising themselves as peasants by means of false beards and peasant-style 
clothing. On a wall was a poster which advertised a play entitled: ‘the Tsar’s Solicitude’ 
at the ‘Theatre Imperial, Tsarskoe Selo’.629 An accompanying “review” described the 
“play” as a ‘screaming farce’.630 
       The British ambassador reported that the tsar had read an address to the deputation in 
‘a low, hurried voice without looking at the men or conversing with them [and then] 
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immediately left the room’ and did not join them for refreshments.631   After lunch the 
men were given a souvenir copy of Nicholas’s speech and packed off back to St 
Petersburg. If the tsar had assumed his message might give reassurance to the workers of 
his concern he was to be disappointed since it was widely reported that their factory 
colleagues doubted that the men had really met the tsar.632 Nicholas had appeared more 
like a nervous minor functionary of the sort who traditionally came between the tsars and 
their people rather than an all powerful but benevolent ruler. In reporting what had 
occurred at Tsarskoe Selo, Hardinge offered no opinion as to whether Nicholas should 
have received Gapon’s petition or acquiesced to any of their demands. However, he 
wearily observed that, had the tsar been more amenable to the men, he ‘might have 
succeeded in arousing enthusiasm and inspiring a sense of loyalty to the person of the 
sovereign which would have been a stronger safeguard for autocracy than any display of 
armed force’.633  
(iv) Loyalty and Alienation 
In February 1905 the tsar’s uncle, Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich, was assassinated 
as he drove from his apartments in the Kremlin. In April 1905, Dmitry Sipyagin the 
Minister of Interior was murdered, in June the governor of Finland fell victim to a 
terrorist’s gun and in August Vyacheslav Plehve the Minister of the Interior was killed.   
In the meantime calls for an end to the war with Japan grew louder. In April at a public 
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meeting in Rostov-on-Don, professional men as well as the working classes demanded an 
immediate cessation to hostilities. One speaker proposed that ‘the Romanovs pay all the 
cost of the war out of [their] millions deposited in the Bank of England’.634  The murder of 
the grand duke and the allusion to Nicholas and Alexandra’s personal wealth, the defence 
of which had been said to be behind the war in Manchuria, struck at the heart of the 
imperial family. Yet, because these instances of political discontent were centred within 
the metropolitan areas of Russia it was possible to view them as actions of an 
unrepresentative urban minority. However, during 1905 much of the Russian countryside 
was engulfed with violence. Manor houses and estates were burned and looted by peasant 
mobs. Given that the majority of those involved in the violence were peasants and that the 
object of their violence was the elites it had the possibility to present a challenge to many 
mainstream British perceptions of Nicholas and Alexandra’s relationship with their 
subjects.    
  The historian Leonid Heretz has argued that the manifestations of peasant violence were 
not symptoms of antagonism towards the tsar but on the contrary were undertaken in the 
belief that Nicholas had given them freedom to act as they did.635  This was very much the 
understanding of several British commentators who questioned whether the violence in 
the countryside really was a sign of alienation between the ruler and his peasant subjects 
as some on the Left claimed. The Times for example, insisted that the burning and looting 
of estates and the murder of a number of landlords were not manifestations of anger with 
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the monarchy since the peasantry remained deeply loyal to the institution.636   In keeping 
with endlessly repeated assertions that Russian tsars were kept in ignorance by their 
bureaucrats, the article went on to say that the peasantry were ‘firmly convinced that 
[they and] “the Little Father” were victims of the same officials’.637 In a similar vein an 
article in the Fortnightly Review by A.S. Rappoport rejected the suggestion that ‘Russia 
was standing on a volcano’ of revolution.638 Nothing, Rappoport asserted, could be further 
from the truth since ‘no one who has lived amongst the peasants and breathed their air of 
fatalism’ could imagine such a thing happening.639 Likewise, Maurice Baring explained 
the riots in the countryside were manifestations of hunger rather than a political uprising. 
In his account of the time he spent in Russia during 1905  he asserted that, if given 
enough to eat, the peasant was content with his lot, was uninterested in politics and that if 
anyone attacked the tsar ‘he will tear him to pieces’.640   These frequent, if 
unsubstantiated, claims of peasant loyalty and identification with the tsar provided 
commentators with ready tools with which to explain the actions of the mass of Russians 
in the countryside.  However, when the crew of the battleship Potemkin mutinied in the 
summer of 1905 the paternalistic terminology and references to innate peasant loyalty 
could not so easily be employed to interpret events on the Black Sea. Nonetheless, 
although commentators discussed the danger to the imperial regime should the mutiny 
spread they did not identify any grievances specifically aimed at Nicholas and Alexandra.   
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      The mutiny of the battleship Potemkin in the summer of 1905, its causes and the 
violence which followed in the port of Odessa, has sometimes taken on an iconic status in 
the history of Russia’s struggle against autocracy, not least because of Sergei Eisenstein’s 
1925 film of the same name.641 However, its potential significance for the autocracy was 
no less real for all that. The Russian navy was in a parlous state in the summer of 1905. 
The Far Eastern Fleet had been more or less completely destroyed in February 1904 and 
much of the Baltic Fleet had met with a similar fate at the Battle of Tsushima in May 
1905. In the wake of Bloody Sunday the British ambassador had noted that ‘as long as the 
soldiers remain loyal [to the tsar] and to their military oath there is no danger of 
dissatisfaction among the troops’.642   
     The Potemkin mutiny was only one of very many instances of unrest in the armed 
forces that year but it was a symbol of the fragility of the imperial government and 
demonstrated the fine dividing line between the continued existence of a stable, if 
autocratic, regime and its collapse into chaos and revolution.  By the summer of 1905 
G.H. Perris believed that the loyalty of the troops could no longer be guaranteed. Perris 
examined the gravity of the cumulative effect of a number of incidents involving the 
armed forces on the future of the regime. For example, he noted the frequency with which 
‘subversive literature’ had been found in army barracks, the mutinous incidents ‘in the 
Baltic Fleet, on Kronstadt and on the Black Sea’ as well as ‘the incident of the Neva 
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Salute’.643  Perhaps of greater significance for the future course of events, Perris 
highlighted the “ties of kinship” between the civilians who rioted and the ordinary rating 
or private soldier who were ‘peasants and workmen at one remove’.644  Similarly, the 
Spectator reiterated that, in order to survive, the monarchy had to be assured of the 
support of the armed forces. Thus, the periodical explained that were the whole of the 
Black Sea fleet to revolt (a prospect it thought not impossible) the future for the regime 
would be very grave indeed since the ‘tsar has no other fleet left with which to coerce the 
mutineers [and] all southern Russia is boiling with revolutionary fervour’.645 In a second 
report on 8 July 1905 the magazine argued that the survival of the autocracy hung by a 
slender thread. In particular it argued that events on the Potemkin might be replicated in 
the army since: ‘if a battleship can mutiny why not a regiment? Every ruling man in 
Russia knows that if the regiments revolt, even if they [simply] refuse to fire, the system 
has collapsed’.646   
(v) Reform or Reaction 
An accumulation of months of social, economic, political and military turmoil eventually 
persuaded the tsar, albeit reluctantly, to agree to a measure of reform. In order to explain 
what was happening in Russia during this period, British commentators continued to draw 
on a number of earlier themes. They included Nicholas’s understanding of his role as a 
specifically Russian monarch, the role of the army in supporting the autocracy, the 
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alleged duplicity of Russian officials and the apparent disloyalty of members of the 
imperial family. British interpretations of the 1905 reforms were also coloured by their 
perceptions of the advent of British democracy and the long gestation of Russia’s 
reforms. Although when Nicholas met with the workmen at Tsarskoe Selo he had 
appeared extremely timid, his public pronouncements and stubborn defence of the 
autocracy gave the impression of a confident, determined individual. However, British 
commentators began to identify other traits in the tsar’s character at this time including 
his apparent inability to be assertive when confronted by a stronger personality.  
     Nicholas’s initial response to the crisis was in keeping with his understanding of 
Russian history and his perception of his role as tsar. In early March 1905 he accused 
those he believed were responsible for the disorders of wanting a form of government 
innately alien to Russia.647 As Dominic Lieven has emphasised, the tsar’s political 
philosophy was partly influenced by a belief in a past, when the relationship between the 
autocrat and his subjects had allegedly been characterised by a ‘fatherly, accessible 
authority’.648  True to this way of thinking Nicholas asked private citizens and institutions 
to send him ideas and suggestions for ways in which the state organisation might be 
improved. Despite the tragedy of Bloody Sunday Russians seemed not to have entirely 
lost their confidence in the tsar’s goodwill and his call for suggestions met with 
considerable success. As Abraham Ascher notes, following the tsar’s initiative, from 
across Russia, ‘zemstovos, city councils, cultural and professional societies’ responded 
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with suggestions and much enthusiasm.649 However, Nicholas’s attitude towards the 
question of constitutional change could appear inconsistent. For example, the British 
ambassador was unable to explain why, on one occasion, the tsar had told a politically 
conservative zemstvo delegation that he favoured separate representation of the nobility, 
peasants and towns in any future consultative body since had only recently told another 
group the exact opposite.650   
     The tsar’s seeming frequent change of mind caused some British commentators to 
doubt his commitment to constitutional reform.   When in August 1905, Nicholas agreed 
to the creation of a Duma which was to be elected on a limited franchise and which would 
not enjoy any legislative powers. British responses to the new body which was to have no 
legislative function and which was to be elected in a limited franchise were varied. They 
ranged from the extremely optimistic to the bluntly dismissive. The British ambassador, 
for example, was of the opinion that in accepting the need for a Duma ‘the autocracy has 
been dealt a blow’.651 However, the Spectator dismissed it as ‘a clever device to grant a 
minimum of substance with the maximum of flourish’.652 Punch magazine took a typically 
satirical response to the news.  It took the view that not only had the tsar failed to really 
concede his autocratic powers but that he had so little wit that he relied on his baby son 
for political advice.653 
Whatever the reality the reforms did little to quell the unrest in Russia’s industrial cities. 
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By early autumn more than one million factory workers, 700,000 railwaymen, 50,000 
government employees and tens of thousands of shop-workers, were on strike.654 
Nonetheless, in September, in contrast to its forbidding tone in June, the Spectator 
considered that the internal unrest was of little consequence since Nicholas could rely on 
loyal regiments to defend the crown.655 The periodical argued that the army held the key 
to the future of the monarchy and that: ‘until the army expresses a will which is not that 
of the throne [..] the Romanovs are at least as strong as their opponents probably much 
stronger’.656  
     This was hardly a ringing endorsement of Nicholas’s future as tsar and indeed, the 
internal situation in Russia continued to deteriorate.  British Consuls in Warsaw, Kiev and 
Rostov on Don, Odessa and Baku reported the cities having been left in the hands of the 
mob for days on end. Moscow was said to be ‘in total darkness and the water supply cut 
off’ while the cost of food in the city was said to have risen ‘to famine prices’.657  In 
October a British resident in Baku was attacked, in early November the British Consul 
building in Kiev was riddled with bullets.658   Just before Christmas 1905 the British 
Embassy was so worried about the internal situation in Russia that it advised London to 
plan for an evacuation of British subjects. In order to facilitate an orderly departure the 
Embassy suggested that ‘merchant steamers be charted at once’ and warned that London 
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they might need to ‘send a man of war’ to the ports threatened by mutiny.659    
  In response to the spiralling turmoil, the tsar met with his ministers, most notably the 
interior minister P.N. Durnovo and his finance minister Count Sergei Witte. Together 
they examined ways in which the unrest might be quelled but for much of the public the 
tsar seemed inscrutable.   In seeking an answer to the tsar’s apparent sang-froid the Daily 
Mirror revisited claims previously made in the British press to explain Nicholas’s public 
silence at times of national crisis.  On this occasion, under the banner headline ‘How the 
tsar is being deceived’, the Mirror explained that before the imperial train halted at a 
country station the police selected ‘the healthiest and cleanest peasants and supplied them 
with good clothes’ before later presenting them to the imperial couple.660 It was by this 
ruse, the Mirror asserted, that the tsar and empress were reassured as to the economic, 
material and physical well-being of their people as well as being provided with evidence 
of their loyalty.  
  Notwithstanding these claims of centuries British observation of Russia had long 
concluded that, should the mass of the people be given a say in the government of the 
country, they would be temperamentally and educationally ill-prepared. Yet, when the 
news of the so-called October Manifesto reached London, The Times was triumphant 
declaring that: ‘The People have won the day. The tsar has surrendered. The autocracy 
has ceased to exist’.661  The Daily Express was just as ecstatic insisting that the ancien 
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regime had fallen and that Russia was entering an embryonic democratic phase akin to 
that enjoyed in England during the thirteenth century following the sealing of the Magna 
Carta.662 The Daily Express’s choice of the phrase ‘Russia’s Magna Carta’ was especially 
interesting.663  In the English national myth Magna Carta-the barons’ success in 1215 in 
limiting the arbitrary power of the feudal King John- was an especially potent symbol of 
English freedoms and democracy.  
As W. Harrison reminds us, most British people were ‘confident that their own Mother of 
Parliaments was a suitable model for all nations [and that] the Russian solution to the 
crisis was the formation of a constitutional monarchy dominated by liberals and 
moderates’.664   However, the Express recognised that just as King John had been 
reluctant to concede to the barons’ demands, so Nicholas had been less than wholehearted 
when he signed the manifesto. In an anonymous article published under the intriguing 
nom de plume ‘A. Diplomat’ the Express cautioned that it would be ‘the wildest madness 
[and] would undoubtedly rob him of his throne’ should the tsar follow King John’s 
example and attempt to retake his autocratic powers.665 While the Daily Express, in 
typically parochial style, boasted of British democracy, other people in Britain, including 
political radicals and members of the working class, believed that British democracy had 
some way to go before it was worthy of such plaudits. A few days after the Manifesto was 
published, in early November 1905, the Social Democratic Federations held a 
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demonstration in Trafalgar Square in support of Russian workers.  A collection amongst 
the crowd raised eight pounds. The gathering provided an opportunity to compare the 
battle for democracy in Russia with British working class struggle for economic, social 
and political change. One speaker, a member of the London Trade Council, praised the 
Russian workers and those he said that were struggling against ‘despotism’.666 In an 
impassioned speech he exhorted his compatriots to ‘rise up against those things which 
oppressed them’ and he berated his compatriots for not having ‘the pluck to do as the 
Russian comrades were doing’.667  
    Many British commentators whose views of the events of 1905 we have considered 
were professional ‘Russian specialists’, journalists, trade unionists and diplomats. As we 
have noted there was a substantial British community in Russia whose plight during the 
revolutionary upheavals was recorded by provincial Consuls. However, the view of 
‘ordinary’ expatriates their experiences their fears and their opinions during this time 
were largely aired in private.  One whose analysis of the 1905 revolution is known on 
account of the letters he wrote home is Walter Philip. During 1905 he was the head of the 
Russo-Scots department store Muir and Merrielees. Philip’s widowed mother, Alice 
married Andrew Muir in 1861 and it was a result of these family connections, as well as 
his strong business acumen, that Walter eventually became a partner and company 
director of this famous store.668 During his time at Muir and Merrielees, the Tolstoyan 
Aylmer Maude, would have liked to see the overthrow of the autocracy and an end to the 
                                                          
666
 Times, 6 Nov. 1905, p. 14. 
667
 Ibid. 
668
 Pitcher, Muir and Mirrielees, pp. 112-13. 
198 
 
 
 
 
 
fawning court which surrounded the monarchy, Philip’s personal inclinations, as well as 
his business interests, led him to a quite different point of view. He preferred the retention 
of the status quo or, at the very least, the exclusion of the masses from most of the 
machinery of government. A comfortably off and successful businessman he viewed the 
events of 1905 through the eyes of one used to the deference of the ‘lower classes’.  His 
letters home during the revolutionary upheavals of that year show no sympathy for those 
who fought the autocratic regime but much relief when order is finally restored.669 When 
Nicholas did institute reforms and allowed for the creation of a Duma, Philip interpreted 
Russian responses in the light of his understanding of Russian history.   
     In letters to his wife Laura, on the occasion of the October Manifesto, Philip reflected 
on the relationship between the tsar and his people and the role of the ‘court party’. This 
so-called ‘court party’-Nicholas’s cousins and uncles- were, as Keith Neilson tells us, 
thought to be ‘corrupt’, ‘anti-British’ and politically ‘reactionary’.670 Given its anti-British 
bias, it is not surprising that Philip noted his delight that the ‘court party has had its wings 
clipped’.671 He even envisaged that their residences on the Neva ‘were to be let’ and the 
grand dukes, whom he viewed as extremely meddlesome, ‘will go abroad’.672 Viewing the 
October Manifesto through the prism of his understanding of Russian history, Philip 
hoped that, free of the nefarious influence of his uncles and cousins, Nicholas might enter 
into a period of renewed unity with his people such as he believed Alexander II had done 
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more than forty years earlier.  First as tsarevich, and later as tsar, Alexander II had visited 
Moscow where he was met by popular demonstrations of loyalty.673   
       In addition to creating sentiments of support to the dynasty-both real and constructed-
Alexander used his visits outside of St Petersburg to make overtly political points. Thus, 
in 1862, Alexander took the opportunity to re-affirm the autocratic principle and to 
rebuke the Moscow nobility for what he called their ‘betrayal of the bond of affection’ 
with the tsar. 674 Alexander’s attitude to the nobility echoed Nicholas’s reaction to the 
workers who had marched with Gapon. To what extent Philip was fully cognisant of the 
comparison between the two rulers is unclear but his “remembered” images of the success 
of Alexander II’s visit to Moscow had clearly impressed him. He felt sure that, when the 
terms of the Manifesto were fully understood, ‘a strong feeling in favour of the emperor 
[would] seize all classes and, were the tsar to come to Moscow, he would have a welcome 
as [great] as was given to Alexander II’.675 In early December and again in the New Year 
Walter Philip wrote to his wife. As a businessman whose livelihood had been under threat 
by the revolution his relief that the worst seemed to be over was palpable. He believed 
that the violence which had engulfed Moscow in recent months had opened the eyes of 
the populace to the realities of revolution.676  He positively gloated that ‘arrests were in 
full swing’ and was gleeful that the “natural order” of things had been restored that, as a 
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result, ‘the lower classes were [now] bowing and scraping to us, as good as gold’.677 
      The tsar had agreed to the October Manifesto because he had been persuaded it was 
necessary to restore calm in the country. It failed to do so but, although the imperial 
regime tottered, it did not fall. Nonetheless, the perception grew that support for Nicholas 
and Alexandra amongst the key stalwarts of the monarchy the armed forces and senior 
members of the imperial family was severely weakened. An air of fin de regime was 
given credence by a succession of diplomatic and press reports.  For example, on 21 
November, the British embassy in Stockholm treated as credible ‘the firm conviction’ of 
the king of Sweden that Alexandra and her children had fled to Denmark.678 Two weeks 
later, the Daily Mirror claimed that a naval mutiny at Sevastopol had so ‘benumbed [the 
tsar that he was in] a state of mental torpor’.679 Unrest in the navy was not the only threat 
to the regime. In early December, The Times revealed a sense of alienation within a 
guards regiment said to be barracked close to the imperial residence at Tsarskoe Selo. 
According to the newspaper it was not a desire for revolution which had caused the troops 
to mutiny. Indeed, if the article is to be believed it was the very opposite. The regiment 
sought to crush unrest and were frustrated that the tsar had not ‘allowed then to march on 
the revolutionaries’.680  
During these months of unrest British diplomatic and press reports added to impressions 
that support for the tsar was crumbling in the very highest echelons of Russian society. 
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Reports of testy relations between the grand ducal families and the imperial couple and 
the former’s dynastic aspirations were not new. A few days before the signing of the 
October Manifesto Sir Cecil Spring Rice had observed that in the salons of Grand 
Duchess Maria Pavlovna ‘the language used about [the tsar] and is wife is most 
violent’.681 However, these latest reports suggested that the situation had progressed 
beyond unpleasant gossip and that a palace coup was now a very real possibility. On 4 
December, the Daily Telegraph reported what it said were ‘strange rumours at Tsarskoe 
Selo’ and asked ‘will the Tsar be compelled to flee? 682 Furthermore, the report went on, 
there was talk of ‘a violent scene involving the Grand Dukes Kiril and Vladimir in which 
the tsar was [reported] as having been wounded in the arm’.683 In regards to how the tsar 
had been injured, whether in a duel, an assassination attempt or as self-defence, the 
Telegraph did not say. The Telegraph was not known for its sensational style of reporting 
and, as a result, this may have given the story an air of credence to the newspapers 
readers.  
   Only a few months earlier during the constitutional crisis of the summer and early 
autumn, some British commentators had bemoaned the reactionary influence of the 
Russian grand dukes. However, despite their apparently malevolent influence, on 
occasion the Daily Mail at least recognised the critical role these senior members of the 
Romanov family played as bulwarks of the tsarist regime. Therefore when the Mail 
bluntly asserted that Nicholas had been ‘deserted by the majority of the Grand Dukes’ it 
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seemed that Nicholas’s reign was drawing to a close.684 The newspaper also seemed 
willing to reject any pretence at a defence of Nicholas and ridiculed his apparent attempt 
to regain the loyalty of his troops by means of what the newspaper called ‘a ludicrous 
manifesto’ the chief provisions of which were that the soldiers were to receive an increase 
in pay to 3/5 of a penny a day and be provided with a separate piece of soap every 
month.685  
   In the light of months of internal unrest, mutinies within the armed forces and reports of 
disgruntled grand dukes an article in the Daily Express suggested that Nicholas was 
mentally and physically worn down. According to the Express, he had been seen ‘pacing 
in the imperial park looking worn and haggard’ and well-known lack of decisiveness in 
the face of a crisis was ‘now more marked’ so that he frequently countermanded orders 
which he had given only a short while previously.686 Warming to its theme of a doomed 
monarch the Express drew parallels between events in Russia and the fall of the French 
monarchy over a hundred years earlier and claimed that the tsar had ‘shown an 
extraordinary desire’ to study the French Revolution.687  However, whether Nicholas 
looked to the past in an attempt to avoid the mistakes of Louis XVI, or whether he studied 
the events of 1789 in order to discover his own fate, the Express did not say. 
     During 1905 British commentators revealed a number of inconsistent perceptions of 
the imperial couple. A number of them enthusiastically greeted the creation of a Duma 
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and even though it had been wrought from the tsar by violence they insisted that the mass 
of the people remained loyal. Traditional notions that the true state of affairs in the 
country was being kept from the tsar were repeated during this time to explain Nicholas’s 
reaction to events. However, for all the supposed loyalty of the tsar’s subjects 
commentators also described the fragility of the regime as specifically represented by 
Nicholas and Alexandra when they spoke of the empress having fled abroad and the tsar 
having been involved in a violent altercation with senior grand dukes. As if in a 
premonition of the final years of the regime, some reports claimed that Nicholas was 
physically and mentally weakened by the strains of eleven years of rule. At the end of 
1905 it seemed to several British commentators that although the autocratic regime was 
resilient perhaps Nicholas himself had had enough and, exhausted by events and his 
hectoring relatives, he might not resist if the grand dukes launched a palace coup. As we 
shall discuss in the following chapter between 1906 and 1913, in the light of the 
establishment of the Duma and Nicholas and Alexandra’s relatively informal encounters 
with the peasantry, British commentators considered whether or not they had observed a 
reaffirmation of Nicholas and Alexandra’s relationship with their subjects sufficient to 
overcome to difficulties created by the revolutionary events of 1905.  
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Chapter 5: The Years of the Constitutional Monarchy 1906-1913 
 
Not only has there been no attempt to dispense with the rule of the tsar but what is more 
striking still, the name of the tsar has been constantly used by the agitators to urge the 
people to rise. 688 
During 1905, the tsar received praise from some quarters for instituting constitutional 
change but, inevitably, given the brutality of the regime’s response to the revolution, his 
prestige and personal standing suffered. However, as the quote at the start of this epigraph 
suggests, the violence and divisions of 1905 did not entirely alter British perceptions of 
Nicholas and Alexandra’s relationship with their subjects.  Established images of peasant 
loyalty, and devotion to the crown remained popular and persuasive ways of 
understanding the Russian monarchy. Nonetheless, only the most myopic observer could 
have failed to notice that after 1905 Russia was a very different country from that which it 
had been before the unrest.  
    During the years of the constitutional monarchy British opinion was sometimes more 
polarised. An increasingly assertive Labour party sought to provide a conduit for 
opposition towards the regime. In Parliament and in the trade unions the Labour 
movement protested against what it saw as the excesses of tsarist Russia, the pogroms and 
the crushing of political opposition. Their reactions to events were influential in forming 
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attitudes towards the royal and imperial visits of 1908 and 1909. Alongside feelings of 
revulsion at state violence commentators considered the Duma. Responses to the 
embryonic parliament were perhaps more nuanced than might be gained from a reading 
of post-revolution interpretations of these years. In particular commentators considered 
the opening of the Duma in a ceremony in the Winter Palace and the nature of the 
Duma’s role: discussion centred on whether it ought to draw attention to the regime’s 
errors or work with the government. In addition, commentators were divided over the 
tsar’s right to dissolve the Duma when he chose.  
    The discussion of the Duma took place against the background of Nicholas and 
Alexandra’s encounters with their peasant subjects during celebrations to mark a series of 
national jubilees including the three hundredth anniversary of the founding of the 
Romanov dynasty. These years also set the tone for discussion of Alexandra which would 
become a common feature of perceptions of the empress especially after the 1917 
revolution. The empress’s personality, her health and her religious focus, as well as her 
alleged interest in the spirit world, were subjects which both fascinated and appalled 
British observers of Russian affairs.   
(i) 1906: The First Duma 
In the spring of 1906 Nicholas and Alexandra came to St Petersburg by sea from Peterhof 
for the opening of the newly established Duma. The previous autumn the British press 
had reacted positively, if with caution, towards the establishment of an elected Duma.  By 
the time of its inauguration some months later sections of the press tended to be less 
206 
 
 
 
 
 
convinced that the Duma had solved Russia’s problems or that the country would develop 
peacefully towards greater democracy. The Daily Mail, for example, claimed that the 
imperial programme had not been published in advance because the authorities feared a 
terrorist outrage.689  According to the newspaper Nicholas and Alexandra’s arrival in the 
capital was so low key that the Mail’s reporter was the sole witness as they disembarked 
at the palace quay.690 The Mail may have exaggerated in order to claim a ‘scoop’ or to add 
to the drama surrounding the opening of Russia’s first national Duma. However, the 
undoubted absence of show and ceremonial may also have reflected Nicholas’s 
ambivalent attitude towards the Duma. He had agreed to the formation of a consultative 
body but, as a result of his upbringing, he remained convinced that, in God’s eyes, he 
alone was responsible for governing Russia. Although the tsar may have chosen not to 
bestow his approval on the Duma by means of the pomp and circumstance which was 
normal for such occasions, the sight of Nicholas and Alexandra forced to come ‘secretly 
and stealthily’ to their capital gave the impression that the couple feared a hostile public 
mood.
691
 Such a negative view rather contradicted the traditional images of the close 
relationship between Russian rulers and their people.   
      In an attempt to assert his autocratic authority, Nicholas presided over the opening of 
the Duma, not in the Tauride Palace (where it was to sit), but in the Winter Palace the 
citadel of Romanov power. Nicholas entered the throne room to the strains of the Russian 
national anthem accompanied by Alexandra, the dowager empress and members of the 
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extended Romanov family. It was said that Alexandra, who had been responsible for the 
design of the opening ceremony, had been anxious to imbue the inauguration with 
specifically Russian features and to avoid similarities with any western models.692 Flanked 
by the imperial crown, sceptre, and orb which had been brought from Moscow for the 
occasion, the tsar addressed the deputies from an imperial dais. As R.S. Wortman tells us, 
the purpose of the presence of the symbols of monarchy was to demonstrate the sacred 
source of Nicholas’s authority and to underline his pre-eminence as representative of the 
nation.693   
    A contemporary report in the Spectator provided an eyewitness account of the opening 
of the Duma and the tone of the reception with which the imperial party were met: it was 
distinctly uninviting. Thus, the article noted, the hall was full of ‘surly peasants and men 
of the intelligentsia who stood like the depressed and shabbily clothed, but rightful heirs 
at the funeral in some comic melodrama’.694 The unfolding ceremony offered little further 
comfort for the imperial couple. The empress and the other female members of the 
Romanov family were dressed in formal court attire, their décolletage covered in jewels. 
However, if the intention of the court had been to overawe the deputies with their 
magnificence, it appears to have backfired. As Bernard Pares later explained, the peasant 
deputies ‘were shocked by the display of wealth at such a critical moment, when the tsar 
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had to appeal to his people to help him save the country’.695  
    In 1906 Nicholas was nearly forty years old.  Since his coronation ten years earlier he 
had taken his country to war and crushed a revolution. However, for many commentators 
Nicholas failed to meet British popular expectations of a Russian tsar either in his 
physical stature or in his body language.  At the time of his marriage and coronation 
Nicholas’s slight build, diffident appearance and deference to his family’s wishes, seemed 
merely the endearing traits of a modest youth who had been unexpectedly thrust into the 
limelight.696 
      A decade after his accession, the tsar’s uncertain demeanour appeared profoundly 
inappropriate. His critics depicted him as malleable, weak and susceptible to the 
malevolent influence of those around him.  The Times account of the inauguration of the 
Duma bleakly indicated that Nicholas had singularly failed to stamp his authority on the 
occasion. The newspaper noted that he appeared very ‘timid […] glancing furtively at his 
subjects’ and that while the members of the imperial court greeted him with ‘wild 
hurrahs, apart from some peasants who joined in, the deputies were icily impassive’.697 
Rather surprisingly, the Tribune newspaper, which the Russian ambassador to Britain 
once described as his ‘bête noire’ on account of its anti-Russian stance, offered a rather 
more complimentary account of the ceremony in the Winter Palace.698 In contrast to 
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reports of a frosty reception from the deputies and images of a tsar ill at ease amongst his 
subjects, the newspaper contended that Nicholas had spoken ‘in a clear voice which was 
heard throughout the hall’ and that although his face was extremely pale he had 
‘descended from the throne with a firm carriage and left the hall to deafening cheers’.699 
Although the Tribune was more positive in its coverage of the opening ceremony than 
might have been expected, the Anglo Russian Review ran true to form. Throughout the 
spring and late autumn of 1906 the periodical ran a series of articles on the Duma but its 
analysis of ceremony in the Winter Palace focused on Nicholas who, in its view, was an 
inept monarch, dominated by stronger personalities. Describing the tsar as ‘that fool’, one 
article recalled how the people had been met by violence in January 1905 and speculated 
as to whether Nicholas, or those who had influence over him at court, might respond to 
the Duma in the same manner.700 By June 1906 the Review was optimistic that the Duma 
would go from strength to strength and, rather than securing the throne, that this would be 
to Nicholas’s detriment since before long the Russian people would ask themselves ‘is the 
tsar needed at all?’701   
 Amongst commentators who were more sympathetic to Nicholas than the Anglo Russian 
Review there was a feeling in some quarters that Russia’s future had not yet been secured. 
Maurice Baring looked to the example of earlier revolutions and noted, with unfortunate 
prescience, that in studying history  ‘we see how, in every epoch, in obedience to some 
mysterious law, a fatal mist seems to blind those in authority, and how they deliberately 
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choose to court the disastrous perils which seem so obvious to us’.702   At the British 
Embassy, the prognosis of the new ambassador was equally as gloomy.  Sir Arthur 
Nicolson believed that the advent of the Duma had placed Nicholas in an invidious 
position. In spite of the disasters of the war with Japan, Bloody Sunday and the violent 
suppression of many of the regime’s opponents, Nicholson insisted that the tsar had 
‘enjoyed immense prestige and popularity because it was believed his heart was with his 
people and that he was prevented by evil counsellors from giving effect to his good 
intentions’.703   However, the ambassador now warned that should the tsar neglect the 
voice of the people’s representatives it could no longer be due to ignorance [..] and cannot 
fail to be disastrous to the imperial person and to the continuance of the autocratic 
regime’.704    
      Almost immediately after the opening of the Duma, that which Nicolson had feared 
came to pass: the tsar and the deputies became set on confrontation. The latter made a 
number of demands including one that the peasants be given land from the largest estates. 
Horrified by their radicalism and unwilling to give them credence, Nicholas refused to 
personally accept the ‘Reply to the Speech from the Throne’. The result of his rebuff to 
the deputies was effectively a stand-off and so began a battle of wills between the 
fledgling parliament and the autocracy.       
   There were a variety of British responses to the impasse in St Petersburg and the tsar’s 
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subsequent decision to close the Duma. Some were supportive of the tsar’s intransigence. 
Others hoped his attitude would bring the overthrow of the Romanovs a step nearer.  
During this period of national uncertainty Nicholas and Alexandra lived quietly away 
from the public gaze but the tsar did grant an audience to Nicolson in order for him to 
present his official credentials.  The new ambassador travelled to the tsar’s holiday 
residence at Peterhof where, as was characteristic of such an occasion, and a reflection of 
the tsar’s attitude towards foreign diplomats, there was no discussion of internal affairs. 
Nonetheless, Nicolson gauged that political events were not weighing heavily upon the 
tsar since he noted in his diary that Nicholas was in ‘excellent spirits and looking in 
robust good health’.705 In his report to London, Nicolson explained the tsar’s attitude 
towards the Duma as follows: ‘They do not believe that the Duma is representative of the 
people but to have been elected largely under false pretences. They think that if the Duma 
is allowed a free hand it will flood the country with purposeless and ineffective talk and 
will disgrace itself in the eyes of the world by its absurdities’.706   Nicolson was personally 
inclined to regard the Duma with similar disdain observing, the deputies had occupied 
their days ‘in somewhat sterile debates’.707    
     Nicolson was not alone in his negative observation of the Duma. Even Bernard Pares, 
who had made a study of Russian history, who spoke the language fluently and who had 
travelled frequently to Russia, appears to have been unprepared for the realities of a 
Russian Duma. In particular he was frustrated by the amateurishness of some of the 
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educated deputies and the resilience of traditional peasant attitudes towards the tsar. Thus, 
Pares observed in report to Lord Cranley, ‘I have been to the Duma everyday so far. I am 
struck most of all by two things, the inexperience of many of the members, especially 
some of the peasants and the radical intelligentsia. The peasants say silly things such as 
“apply direct to our Father the Tsar”.’708 
     When Nicholas refused to be browbeaten by the Duma’s demands Walter Philip, was 
pleased with his resolute stance towards the deputies as he explained in a letter to his 
friend Charles Hagberg Wright. The Chief Librarian at the London Library, Wright had 
lived in Russia, spoke the language fluently and was an avid Tolstoyan and a supporter of 
the Society of Friends of Russian Freedom. His interests led him to advocate reform in 
Russia but though he claimed to have met Lenin at luncheon he had thought him both 
‘dogmatic and mediocre’.709 Philip told his friend that he was ‘delighted’ at the tsar’s 
riposte to the Duma.710 He argued that, far from the reasoned ‘voice of the nation’, which 
its supporters claimed, the Duma was the voice of a nation ‘without principles or common 
sense’.711   
   Amongst the tsar’s opponents the radical magazine Justice: the Organ for Social 
Democracy believed that Nicholas was eager to dissolve the fledgling parliament and had 
only allowed it to remain open for ‘fear that it would provoke a general rising’.712 Edited 
by Harry Quelch, Justice had been founded in 1884. An indication of Quelch’s personal 
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enthusiasm for revolution in Russia can be gauged from the fact that he facilitated the 
publication of the revolutionary émigrés journal, Iskra in Britain.713 Justice and its editor 
were confident that, whether or not the Duma was closed prematurely, Nicholas could not 
prevent a revolution. In an article in keeping with Quelch’s ardent revolutionary beliefs, 
and in apocalyptic terms, Justice declaimed that nothing will ‘stop the avalanche coming 
down on the heads of Russia’s rulers, let Nemesis have what is her due. Russia has 
suffered long at the hands of tsardom. Her retribution will be great’.714  
      When Nicholas did order the closure of the Duma it created a furore amongst its 
supporters in Britain.715 The decision coincided with a visit to Britain by a number of 
Russian deputies and when the Liberal Prime Minister, Henry Campbell Bannerman, 
theatrically asserted his support for the elected by body by declaring La Douma est morte! 
Vive La Douma!, the Russian ambassador lodged an official protest.716  However, 
although the Liberal government vocally opposed the closure of the Duma, the British 
ambassador believed that, after weeks of uncertainty, the tsar had shown effective 
leadership and put the deputies in their place. One can detect in his attitude an element of 
disdain for people outside of the upper class elites who sought a role in government, a 
characteristic which he shared with his predecessor.  In the privacy of a letter to Hardinge 
the ambassador was fairly sanguine in the immediate aftermath of the Duma’s closure.  
As he explained: ‘Daily life [in St Petersburg] is proceeding as normal. The mills are 
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working and the English foremen had their game of cricket yesterday.717 With a patrician 
air he added that ‘the Duma was getting a little bit above itself and was showing 
tendencies to usurp government functions’.718  
     Nicolson had not long been in post and his opinions may have been influenced by his 
relative lack of experience in Russian affairs. However, the ‘Russianist’ Maurice Baring 
also took an unsympathetic view of the deputies. In an article for the Morning Post, 
Baring challenged those in Britain who believed the closure of the Duma to have been an 
‘arbitrary act’ and rather than finding fault with the tsar, blamed the Kadets 
(Constitutional Democratic Party) for the constitutional crisis.719 Baring irritably berated 
the deputies of the Constitutional Democrats for having acted as ‘an assembly sitting in 
judgement on the autocracy’.720 Russia had ‘demanded statesmanship’ but, he said, the 
Duma had responded with ‘a rechauffe of ultra-radical doctrines of which western 
democracies have long since tired’.721   
 
(ii) June 1908: Edward VII’s visit to Reval 
A great deal has been written by historians about British diplomatic relations with Russia 
during the reign of the last tsar but there has been little analysis of the variety of reactions 
of the British public, politicians and advocates of the development of a liberal democracy 
in Russia, to the royal visits of 1908 and 1909.  These visits attracted comment from a 
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variety of quarters. A number returned to a theme which had preoccupied them at the start 
of the Nicholas’s reign, namely the role of the imperial couple within international 
politics and their ties with the British royal family.  Others considered the visits in the 
wider context of Anglo Russian relations and Britain’s role as the preeminent democratic 
state in Europe.   
    In the months after Edward VII’s coronation in 1902 the king made a series of official 
visits to the royal courts of Berlin, Lisbon, Madrid and Rome, but he did not travel to 
Russia. In January 1906, in the continued absence of a royal visit, E.J. Dillon advised the 
Foreign Office that ‘the king should come here [to St Petersburg] at once to make an 
agreement’ directly with the tsar.722 Nicholas himself complained to the British 
ambassador that he ‘felt neglected’ and pointed out that the French president ‘had come to 
both Tsarskoe Selo and Peterhof in perfect safety’.723  However, although the 
establishment regarded the cordial relations between the two ruling houses as a 
potentially useful tool of British foreign policy, plans for a royal visit remained in 
abeyance.724 The internal situation in Russia was judged so serious that in June 1906 a 
visit by Britain’s Channel Fleet was cancelled, causing much offence in imperial circles 
but jubilation in revolutionary ones.725 It was not until 21 May 1908 that the Foreign 
Office finally made an announcement (which emphasised the family rather than political 
nature of the visit) that the king intended shortly to visit ‘the Tsar of Russia with whom 
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he is closely allied by ties of friendship and near relationship’.726  
        Although this was to be Edward VII’s first visit to Russia as a reigning monarch he 
had made several visits to the country as Prince of Wales.  His first visit in 1866 was to 
attend the wedding of Princess Dagmar to the future Tsar Alexander III. Dagmar was his 
wife’s sister. In a letter to Queen Victoria (the then Prince of Wales) explained that would 
interest him ‘beyond anything else to see Russia’.727 Aware of the possible political 
difficulties raised by such a visit, Edward told the Prime Minister, Lord Derby, that he 
was ‘only too happy to be the means of promoting entente cordiale between Russia and 
Britain’.728  According to Edward’s biographer, Philip Magnus, the visit was a great 
personal success, the prince being met on his arrival by Tsar Alexander II and 
subsequently entertained lavishly in St Petersburg and Moscow.729 It was therefore with 
warm feelings towards Russia that, in 1873, the prince went to St Petersburg to attend the 
wedding of his brother, Alfred, to the Grand Duchess Mariia Aleksandrovna. Edward 
greatly enjoyed his visit particularly a boar hunt at which 80 beasts were killed.730 By 
1881, when he embarked for Russia to attend Tsar Alexander II’s funeral, Edward’s 
diplomatic credentials in regards to Russo-British relations seem to have been well 
established. The relative frequency of his visits to Russia would have meant he was well 
known to the tsar’s family and the imperial entourage and as a result the Foreign 
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Secretary, Lord Granville, was in no doubt that his visit would be ‘productive’.731   
The mutual awarding of honours, in which flattery mingled with diplomacy, was typical 
of visits between members of European royal houses. The occasion of Alexander II’s 
funeral was no exception: the prince invested the new tsar, Alexander III, with the Order 
of the Garter.732  In 1894, when Alexander III died, Edward received even more plaudits 
for his influence over Russo-British relations than those proffered by Lord Granville 
thirteen years earlier.  On Edward’s return to London, having attended the late tsar’s 
funeral, Lord Rosebery praised him enthusiastically for the ‘good and patriotic work 
which you have accomplished [for the] country, [for] Russia and the peace of the 
world’.733 
     In 1908 British reaction to the announcement that the king was to travel to Reval was 
animated; there was little room for disinterest let alone neutrality on the subject. In part 
this was due to the fact that it came less than a year after the conclusion of the Anglo-
Russian Convention. The agreement, which had proved controversial in some quarters, 
was signed in August 1907. It had three main strands.  Firstly, Persia was divided into 
British and Russian spheres of influence. Secondly, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward 
Grey obtained the Russian government’s agreement that it would deal with the Emir of 
Afghanistan only through the British authorities and thirdly, Russia agreed to acquiesce to 
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Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.734 Obtaining the agreement had taken painstaking and 
patient work by politicians, civil servants and diplomats. Although the entente was signed 
during the term of a Liberal government, diplomatic feelers had been extended towards 
the Russians by the previous Conservative administration (1902-1905) led by Arthur 
Balfour. However, these particular overtures had come to naught when relations between 
the two countries reached a nadir during Russia’s war with Britain’s ally-Japan, not least 
on account of the Dogger Bank Incident.  After the election of a Liberal government in 
December 1905, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, his Permanent Under Secretary 
(PUS), Sir Charles Hardinge and newly appointed British Ambassador in St Petersburg, 
Sir Arthur Nicolson focused their energies on bringing about an Anglo Russian Entente.  
     The Convention was agreed in the wake of Russia’s defeat by the Japanese in 
Manchuria and the 1905 revolution. Humbled by her war with Japan and the autocracy’s 
failure to quell the political and economic violence which had been an especial feature of 
the years since the outbreak of hostilities in the Far East--Russia was hardly in a position 
to embark upon another imperial adventure.  However this did not mean that the British 
authorities were entirely easy in regards to Russian foreign policy. In particular Britain’s 
longstanding fear of a Russian invasion of India remained a bugbear, especially amongst 
those who were wary of a rapprochement.  Following Britain’s own salutary experiences 
in the Boer War the authorities in India were convinced that in the event of a similar 
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imperial conflict Russia might well take advantage of the situation to damage Britain’s 
overseas interests. During the chaos of the Russo-Japanese War and particularly in wake 
of the Dogger Bank Incident when Britain and Russia seemed on the brink of war some 
British commentators suspected that Russia might use the moment to ‘advance towards 
India’.735   Bearing this in mind, and in the light of historical concern about Russian 
intentions in Central Asia, the Committee for Imperial Defence planned for a war with 
Russia and estimated that an army of 535,000 men would be required to defend the sub-
continent.736 A report from a British military attaché in the region which found that there 
was ‘no evidence at all of any immediate Russian threat to India’ did little to persuade the 
sceptics or those with an interest in bolstering the army in India.737  
   Unable, or unwilling, to fund the forces thought necessary to defend India, the Liberal 
government worried about the consequences, not least the inevitable loss of prestige to 
the Mother Country and to the Empire, should Russia invade India.  The timing of the 
Liberal government’s desire to reduce spending on the Indian army and concern about 
Britain’s naval ability to hold the Straits against Russian aggression, fortuitously 
coincided with Russia’s need to avoid conflict overseas while the autocracy struggled to 
re-establish domestic order.  
    A history of suspicion between Britain and Russia, a loathing in some quarters of the 
autocracy and the violent suppression of the 1905 revolution ensured that any agreement 
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with Russia had the potential to be controversial. For these reasons, and in keeping with 
the view held by his predecessors at the Foreign Office, Grey believed that policy towards 
Russia should largely be decided himself with advice from his PUS and a small number 
of others who shared his views on European affairs.  Against this background of 
confidential discussions within a small clique, the British public were kept in the dark 
about the negotiations as Grey effortlessly cultivated a persona of aloofness from the  
hurly burly of daily politics.738  However, Grey also sought to prevent discussion of it 
within the elites.  Most notably he avoided consulting his colleagues in the Cabinet for 
fear that those who were opposed to the autocracy might cause a storm and that the more 
radical elements might even wreck the delicately balanced talks. 
      In spite of Grey’s wish to keep the details of any negotiations secret the subject of 
Russia’s internal affairs was never far from the minds of anti-tsarists and Russophobes.  
For such commentators the notion of rapprochement with a despotic state jarred with 
Britain’s long held sense of itself as a liberal, democratic society and ‘the only defender 
of liberty in Europe’.739  There was a sense that an agreement gave the tsar and the 
reactionary forces in Russian society an opportunity to gather the strength necessary to 
crush the opposition once and for all.740 Antipathy towards the Russian government was 
most evident in the House of Commons during the months leading up to the agreement as 
a result of a succession of the violent pogroms against the Russian Jewish community. 
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     During 1906 at the height of the violence, thousands of Jews fled Russia, many settled 
in Britain including London, Manchester and Hull.  Their arrival caused concern in some 
quarters that these impoverished migrants only added to the overcrowding and unsanitary 
conditions in the poorer districts of Britain’s cities.  In response, on behalf of the 
government, Earl Percy, the Member of Parliament for Kensington South, made vague 
noises of sympathy and suggestions about acquiring territory in Africa to resettle the 
exiles.741  However, for Radical Liberal and Labour members of parliament the forced 
departure of hundreds of men, women and children from their homes and from their 
country represented all that was despicable about the Russian autocracy.  
    In July 1906, concern amongst Radicals in the Liberal party, as well as Labour 
members of the House, that a planned visit of a squadron of the Royal Navy to Kronstadt 
represented approval of the Russian regime led to its cancellation. Talks with the 
Russians were nearly thrown into disarray, if not abandoned, in July 1907 when, as we 
have noted, the Liberal Prime-Minister Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman so publicly 
showed his support for the recently dissolved Duma. However, the Foreign Secretary and 
the British Ambassador in St Petersburg doggedly pursued an agreement. Grey and his 
spokesman in the House were asked by a succession of Members of Parliament to tie any 
agreement with Russia to an undertaking by her to institute internal reforms. At least one, 
the Labour Member for West Ham South, William Thorne, proposed that diplomatic 
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relations with the autocracy should be completely severed.742  On 8 July 1907 the 
Independent Labour Party passed a resolution denouncing the spirit of reconciliation with 
Russia which it accused of using ‘barbarism to suppress constitutional freedom’.743  
However, the government simply rebuffed suggestions that ‘Russian internal affairs 
[were] relevant to negotiations between the two governments’.744 
     When the negotiations were concluded those who had been intimately involved 
including Grey, Hardinge and Nicolson congratulated themselves on the successful 
outcome and the sense that Britain had achieved the greater share of the bargain. Their 
enthusiasm with the Convention was shared by the Spectator which looked back to the 
recent past when fear in Whitehall of a Russian invasion of India meant that ‘every action 
of the Romanovs was [thought to be] dictated by a secret hope of ultimately conquering 
India’.745  The Convention having been signed the periodical now cautioned that 
friendship with Russia needed to be ‘kept in repair’ and even that Britain must now give 
‘proper consideration to Russia’s legitimate claims and aspirations’ in the Balkans and in 
Constantinople’.746  For its part the Quarterly Review bemoaned the Radicals in 
Parliament who, it said, had previously regarded the first Russian constitution with favour 
‘simply because it was a stumbling block to Tory governments and now that friendly 
relations had been established were bent on condemning the [latest] Russian 
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constitution’.747 The satirical magazine Punch or the London Charivari took a sideways 
look while making a serious point in its reaction to the details of the agreement to divide 
Persia between Russia and Britain.  In cartoon which depicted a British Lion and a 
Russian Bear stroking different parts of a Persian cat the feline complained that it had not 
been consulted about the attention it was being given by the two larger beasts.748  The 
Tory inclined Blackwood’s Magazine was especially despondent that Britain had 
concluded such an arrangement with Russia and declared that she had ‘surrendered every 
political advantage’749 and had achieved nothing but ‘loss for England.’750  In a letter to 
The Times Colonel C.E. Yate agreed that ‘commercially and industrially Britain and 
India’ had lost heavily.751 The colonel, who had seen action during the Afghan War 
(1880-81), blamed the state of affairs on Sir Edward Grey’s refusal to consult experts in 
Middle Eastern and Central Asian affairs, choosing instead to rely on his ambassador in 
Russia for advice.752 
    Amongst those who perceived the Anglo-Russian Convention in negative terms a 
number also opposed Edward VII’s visit to Reval for very similar reasons.  Its opponents 
argued that the king’s presence in Russia implied British support for the suppression of 
Russian dissent. In the House of Commons James O’Grady, the Labour M.P. for Leeds 
East demanded that ‘representation be made to the king that the visit to Reval be deprived 
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official status’.753 O’Grady argued that ‘in the eyes of Europe this country had always 
stood up for the representative institutions’.754 Yet, he explained, in spite of this ‘liberal 
heritage’ the country’s head of state planned to visit Russia where:‘100 members of the 
first Duma and 50 members of the second Duma are either in Siberia or in chains as 
common criminals awaiting a trial which may never take place’.755   
   O’Grady’s description of the fate of the deputies may have been exaggerated for 
political effect but he was not alone in the House in opposing the visit. The radical 
socialist William Thorne (M.P. for Plaistow in east London)
 756 complained that the 
British royal family’s ties with the house of Romanov were being used for political ends 
to the benefit of an authoritarian regime. A speech he gave on the subject gives an 
indication of the passion which the king’s visit aroused amongst its opponents.  Thorne 
was contemptuous of both the king and the tsar. He  asserted that it was ‘quite bad enough 
that the head official of the United Kingdom [i.e. the king] should be related to such a 
monster [the tsar] but that if his avuncular feelings must be humoured by a visit to his 
nephew he ought to have the decency to pay that visit in private, or even better, 
incognito’.757 Another vociferous critic, the Member of Parliament for Tyrone East, 
bemoaned what he said was Britain’s ‘fraternisation with the hangman of liberty’.758 
     Not everyone in Britain was against the proposed visit. Amongst those who favoured it 
                                                          
753
 Hansard, 26 May 1908, 189, p. 966.  
754
 Ibid.  
755
 Ibid. 
756
 William Thorne, My Life’s Battles (London, 1925).   
757
 Justice, 30 May 1908, p. 6.  
758
 Hansard, 3 June 1908, p. 264.  
225 
 
 
 
 
 
some argued that the king’s presence at Reval would represent British support for the 
Russian people and the fledgling democrats. For example, in a letter to the Spectator, 
Bernard Pares outlined his view that far from condoning a reactionary regime the king’s 
visit would aid the development of parliamentary democracy in Russia.759 The Daily 
Express took a similar, positive view. In typical tabloid ‘British is best’ fashion the 
newspaper declared that the king’s visit would be welcomed by the Russian people since 
he was ‘the very type of constitutional monarch many of them so ardently desire’.760  
Other supporters of the visit argued that its cancellation would harm the substantial 
British community living and working in Russia although this was contradicted in the 
House when one honourable member informed the Commons that many of his former 
constituents who were resident in St Petersburg were ‘in harmony with the struggle of the 
Russians around them’.761        
     In the Foreign Office Charles Hardinge met calls for the visit to be cancelled with 
some derision. In a letter to Hugh O’Beirne at the Petersburg embassy he denounced 
Ramsay Macdonald alleging that he was in collusion with Russian revolutionaries.762 In 
keeping with the governing elite’s belief in its own innate right to direct foreign policy, 
Hardinge brushed off calls in parliament for the visit to be cancelled as the ‘work of mere 
busybodies’.763  The opponents were a minority in the House and when it was put to the 
                                                          
759
 Bernard Pares ‘Letter to Spectator’, 6 Jun. 1908, p. 7.   
760
 Daily Express, 5 Jun. 1908, p. 3.  
761
 Hansard, 3 June 1908, p. 227.  
762
 CUL Hardinge Papers vol. 13, Sir Charles Hardinge to Hugh O’Beirne, 27 May 1908.  
763
 CUL Hardinge Papers vol. 13, Sir Charles Hardinge to Sir Edward Goschen, 2 Jun. 1908. 
226 
 
 
 
 
 
vote they were defeated by 225 votes to 59.764 
      In keeping with the emphasis on the family nature of the visit, the king was 
accompanied by Queen Alexandra and their eldest daughter, Princess Victoria. Since 
Nicholas’s accession it had been almost a cliché in some British quarters that the tsar was 
extremely shy and, as a result, lacked authority.  This view of the tsar was taken up by the 
Daily News which had been prominent in providing a forum for British opposition to the 
visit. One article had sarcastically described Nicholas as: ‘The Man of the Week, a 
hapless pitiful figure’.765  Reporting from Reval the newspaper continued claimed that 
Nicholas had ‘a diffident [..] nervous manner as if he wished the fuss and parade were 
over and he could go home to play with his children’.766 The Daily Telegraph’s special 
correspondent (possibly E.J. Dillon) also noted that Nicholas, although surrounded by 
friends and family, seemed ‘rather self-conscious and slightly embarrassed’.767 The 
Telegraph was often more thoughtful in its response to the tsar but the newspaper’s 
impression on this occasion hardly presented the tsar with any great conviction. If the tsar 
was ill at ease with relatives whom he had known since boyhood, the article implied there 
was little immediate prospect of his stamping his authority on his country.  
  In addition to the coverage on the Daily News and the Telegraph an article in the 
populist John Bull magazine on 6 June was light hearted but it had serious intent. In a 
reference to Edward VII’s well known passion for horse racing, John Bull depicted 
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Nicholas dressed as a jockey riding a horse called ‘Duma’. The advice from the king (in 
the guise of the horse’s owner) to the ‘jockey’ was that he would ‘do better without the 
whip’.768  A rather more scurrilous report about the tsar centred on the relationship 
between the tsar and his mother which appeared in E.A. Brayley Hodgett’s 1908 account 
of the Russian court. Apparently based on rumours current at the time of the overbearing 
influence of the dowager empress over her son, Brayley Hodgetts told his readers of a 
cartoon. Supposedly drawn by Alexandra, for the amusement of her ladies in waiting, it 
was said to have depicted the tsar with his crown, wearing a bib and tucker, seated in a 
high legged baby chair to which he was securely fastened, while his mother was severely 
lecturing him.769   
     In spite of the opposition in some quarters in Britain, the visit was deemed a social and 
political success by the king, the tsar and the British government. Much of the credit was 
apportioned to the role that the family ties between the British royal family and the 
Romanovs had played in proceedings. An article in the populist Daily Graphic was 
typical of this genre. The newspaper reminded its readers that ‘the empress was the 
daughter of Edward VII’s late sister Alice’ and enthused that Reval had seen a 
combination of ‘a happy family picnic [and] a festival of international peace’.770  
      These intimate ties allowed the king to make his own particular mark on the visit 
when, without prior approval from his ministers, he made the tsar an Admiral of the 
British Fleet. He later implausibly claimed to have been totally unaware of the 
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constitutional impropriety of his action.771 However, the government understood that, in a 
country where the person of the monarch was paramount, the king’s visit had secured the 
future of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention in a way in which no diplomat or official 
could have hoped to achieve. In Britain the anti-tsarists were never reconciled to the 1907 
agreement but when Edward VII visited Reval in 1908 his bonhomie, his diplomatic skills 
and his position as a member of Nicholas and Alexandra’s extended family, and the warm 
feelings they no doubt recalled from 1894 when he had offered his solicitude towards the 
bereaved Romanov family, sealed the agreement. Amongst those who had supported both 
the visit and the Anglo-Russian Convention there was deep satisfaction at the outcome. 
As Hardinge reported cheerfully to the Cabinet, Nicholas had ‘repeatedly [declared that 
the visit] had sealed and confirmed the intention and spirit of the agreement’.772 
 
(iii) August 1909:  The Tsar visits the Isle of Wight 
 The diplomatic and family success of the king’s visit to Reval was underlined in the 
summer of 1909 when Nicholas and Alexandra paid an official visit to Britain, albeit 
though for security reasons, they did not set foot on the mainland. Instead they lived 
aboard the imperial yacht anchored off the Isle of Wight. There were a multitude of 
responses to the visit from a wide number of sources including politicians, trade unionists 
and senior members of the Anglican clergy as well as broadsheet and tabloid newspapers. 
In addition, members of the general public flocked to catch sight of the tsar and empress 
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during the few days they spent visiting the island.  
    Political responses to the visit, in some instances tempered by the expediency of Russo-
British relations, were largely divided along ideological lines. As had been the case vis-à-
vis the Reval, visit much of the opposition centred on British perceptions of internal 
events in Russia. When a House of Commons motion calling for the postponement of the 
visit was defeated by 166 votes the ‘oppositionists’ proclaimed it a victory. Thus, they 
explained that while British citizens were free to oppose their government, such a 
situation did not pertain in Russia.773  More widely, discussion focused on conflicting 
impressions of Nicholas as a bloodstained tyrant or a sincere and wholehearted 
constitutional monarch. The Spectator asked for the public’s understanding of the 
difficulties faced by the tsar as he struggled to deal with unrest. Not for the last time there 
were made comparisons between Nicholas’s reign and that of Louis XVI of France, when 
the periodical asserted that the Labour Party had failed to comprehend that Nicholas’s 
actions were not due to his free will but as a result of being surrounded by ‘a reactionary 
camarilla’.774 According to the Spectator, this sinister group constantly reminded him of 
the unhappy fate of Louis XVI and warned him that by ‘introducing constitutionalism he 
[was] risking his own life and that of his children’.775  At least one provincial newspaper 
was sympathetic to the tsar and offered this laudatory explanation of his actions. The 
Birmingham and Standard Despatch believed that Nicholas was ‘extremely well disposed 
towards the constitutional movement and [was] with complete honesty of purpose trying 
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to do his best in exceptionally trying times’.776 Such sympathetic perceptions however, 
were stridently rejected by other commentators.  
   The mass circulation Star called such perceptions ‘simply nauseating’, it ridiculed 
claims that Nicholas was a constitutional monarch and denounced the tsar as ‘a despot, in 
league with men who have made massacre and murder a fine art’.777 Similarly, the Nation 
refused to welcome the man ‘who dragooned his dissenters; [..] the man who gave the 
order to slaughter a peaceful crowd on St Vladimir’s Day; the man by whose will martial 
law is maintained, the prisons crowded [..] to the faults of a weakling he has added the 
crimes of a despot’.778   Even support for the visit from some members of the Duma who 
had recently visited Britain failed to dampen the controversy.  In a fiery speech Keir 
Hardie, Labour M.P. for Merthyr Tydfil, fulminated against both the visit, and as he 
perceived them, the misguided deputies.  On leaving for home the Russian delegation had 
expressed the hope that Britain would replicate for the tsar the warm welcome which they 
had received. Keir Hardie angrily accused the deputies of being ‘insolent’.779 He 
challenged the king to ‘drive the tsar of Russia through the streets of London and [then, 
he said, the Duma] would find out who represented the people of England-the Labour 
Party or Mr Asquith, Sir Edward Grey and the king’.780  A mass meeting was convened in 
London’s Trafalgar Square to protest against the visit. It was attended by a crowd of 
nearly 7,000 people who held aloft banners upon which were written: “A Message from 
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Hell, Welcome Little Father” and “Down with Nicholas the Tyrant”.  The speeches 
reflected these sentiments.  One speaker denounced Nicholas as a ’scoundrel’ and shouted 
to the crowd ‘Let the king kiss him, let Mr Asquith [the Prime Minister] beslobber him, 
let Sir Edward Grey [the Foreign Secretary] kiss his boots. The people spurn him and spit 
in his face’.781  
    As part of its discussion of the visit, Justice: the organ of social democracy was less 
overtly vitriolic that the speeches we have noted above. However, it was no less cutting in 
its effect. Using the medium of a dream the periodical managed to attack the entire 
Romanov dynasty and to depict Nicholas as the worst of the lot. According to this 
scenario, the tsar, having returned to his apartments from ‘a typical function at Tsarskoe 
Selo, the laughter and music of the voluptuous scene still buzzing in his brain; the fumes 
of the wine, the perfumes of the women still titillating his senses’ fell into a state of 
‘exhausted depression’.782 According to Justice’s imaginative scene, as he slept the tsar 
was berated by his long dead ancestors ‘murderers, prostitutes [and] imbeciles who 
pointed at him and cried you Nicholas, last of the tsars are the weakest, the most 
cowardly, the most cruel, the most bloodthirsty, the vilest of us all’.783  
     The tsar and empress’s visit to the Isle of Wight took place in August 1909 and 
coincided with the Cowes Regatta. Perhaps because of the summer holidays and the 
diverting attention of the yacht races there was a relative dearth of comment, at least in 
comparison to the fevered debate which had been a feature of discussion before the visit. 
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There were, however, some significant exceptions to this absence of news. They included 
the sarcastic, the reserved and the enthusiastic. Opinion was very broadly divided 
between members of the public who welcomed the imperial couple and left wing 
politicians, as well as social reformers in the Church and amongst the laity who protested 
against the visit. The Daily News, for example, which had provided a channel for 
opposition to the king’s visit to Reval, continued to give voice to those who opposed the 
autocracy. The newspaper reported Keir Hardie’s caustic observation that having been 
unable to prevent the visit he was: ‘grateful that the tsar is being guarded in the Solent 
[and] the course of a race changed to protect us from this contamination [..] little wonder 
that the heavens are draped in grey when we remember the degradation brought upon the 
British name by this man being received in our midst’.784  Even the usually temperate 
Daily Telegraph announced its intention to reserve a welcome for Nicholas until the day 
when the tsar ‘grants his people the same liberties of speech as the Germans possess’.785   
      On the day that the imperial party arrived off Cowes an eclectic mix of well-known 
public figures, including the former headmaster of Rugby school, John Percival, Bishop 
of Hereford and his Anglican colleague, Charles Gore, Bishop of Birmingham, together 
with the social reformers Sidney Webb and Bertrand Russell, wrote to The Times. The 
four men had very different characters, but they all had an interest in social reform and 
Russian affairs. In their letter they drew the public’s attention to the persistence in Russia 
of martial law which had been introduced in response to the unrest of 1905 and protested 
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against what they said were an increasing number of capital sentences in the country.786  
The following day however, The Times own leader writer dismissed the letter as a ‘piece 
of gratuitous boorishness’.787   
     The Isle of Wight was no stranger to visits from foreign royalty. The German Kaiser 
came regularly to the Island for Cowes Week but this did not mean that locals or 
holidaymakers were blasé about Nicholas and Alexandra’s visit. The response of the 
members of the public to the visit was a good deal warmer than those whose views we 
have considered above. This was reflected in the fact that the two local newspapers the 
Isle of Wight County Press and the Isle of Wight Herald took an avid interest in the 
Russian visit.  
     The imperial party were met in British waters by a fleet of over 153 ships of the Royal 
Navy but there were also more workaday vessels eager to greet the tsar and empress.788 
The Isle of Wight Herald recorded that as the Russian yacht passed Spithead, a pleasure 
steamer carrying day-trippers had passed within fifty feet of the vessel and those on board 
had ‘lustily hailed [the Russian party] with rousing cheers’.789  According to the Isle of 
Wight County Press, when the imperial family came ashore they received an equally 
warm welcome from the ‘thousands of holiday makers’ who had journeyed to Cowes 
especially to catch a glimpse of the tsar and empress.790 In contrast to the naysayers, such 
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as Keir Hardie, the public, it seems, were not to be put off by Nicholas’s record in dealing 
with internal unrest. The streets of the island were so crowded that it was said ‘all 
previous records of the number of Bank Holiday visitors must have gone by the board’.791 
There was a particular moment of excitement when the imperial children went shopping 
for souvenirs and ‘speaking in English had overwhelmed a shopkeeper’ with demands for 
postcards featuring the Russian and British ruling families.792 So dense were the crowds of 
onlookers who followed the grand duchesses from shop to shop that the police had 
difficulty in carving a path through the crowd to allow them to pass.793 
     A few weeks before the visit to Cowes the Evening News had returned to the theme of 
Nicholas’s reading material as evidence of his Anglophilia which had been especially 
popular at the time of his engagement. According to the newspaper the bookshelves of the 
imperial yacht’s private quarters contained volumes on specifically English heroes: the 
Life of Wellington and the Letters and Despatches of Nelson, as well as works by the 
prolific Victorian novelist, Mrs Oliphant.794  
     These were not the only ‘English’ references in the press with regard to the imperial 
visit.   As had occurred on many occasions since the imperial couple’s engagement 
several publications focused on the kinship between the reigning families of Britain and 
Russia.  Alexandra had spent happy summers before her marriage on the Isle of Wight in 
the company of her grandmother, Queen Victoria. The empress remembered them with 
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fondness and so it would seem did the Lady: a Journal for Gentlewomen since an article 
in the magazine waxed lyrical on the subject. Thus, the magazine asserted ‘there is 
scarcely another place in England where [Alexandra’s] coming again could be more 
welcome [since it was on the Isle of Wight] that the tall, sweet faced Princess of Hesse 
Darmstadt, who more than any other member of the royal family, resembled in 
appearance their grandfather, the Prince Consort, won general admiration’.795  In keeping 
with this theme of shared family ties the Isle of Wight Herald reported the imperial 
couple’s visit to the room at Osborne where Queen Victoria had breathed her last. 
Evidently the many references over the years in the national press and elsewhere to 
Nicholas’s excellent command of the English language had yet to reach the Island. Since, 
according to the Isle of Wight Herald, the tsar’s fluent English ‘excited much comment’ 
amongst his listeners especially when he recalled ‘the many kindnesses’ he and the 
empress had received from the ‘beloved and venerated queen’.796       
      During the years of the constitutional monarchy British commentators and observers 
of Russian affairs employed a number of strategies in order to understand Nicholas and 
Alexandra. Most significantly they included reference to traditional British motifs of 
Russia and her rulers. Not only commentators who were sympathetic but also those who 
were antagonistic to them explained Nicholas and Alexandra’s motivation and response 
to events by means of discussion of these familiar themes.  In particular they focussed on 
conflicting views of the ruling couple’s relationship with their people. Firstly, as we have 
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discussed there were images of antagonism, as witnessed by some accounts of the 
opening of the Duma. However, for some these negative images were contradicted by 
reports of hundreds of loyal peasants who gathered in large crowds in the hope that they 
might catch a glimpse of, or even exchange a few words with, the tsar and empress.  
(iv) 1909-1913: Imperial Jubilees 
The years between 1909 and 1913 marked a variety of anniversaries, which enabled 
Nicholas and Alexandra to meet their humblest subjects.  They did so with memories of 
Bloody Sunday, the 1905 revolution and events which had led to the creation of the Duma 
fresh in the public mind.   Perhaps of all these events the creation of the Duma was 
responsible for the most substantial change to the Russian political landscape and the 
dynamics of the tsar and empress’s relationship with their subjects. However, for both 
Nicholas and Alexandra many of the more vocal members of the Duma represented little 
more than a self-serving group with aims which were totally alien to the aspirations of the 
mass of ordinary Russians.797 The tsar and empress’s understanding of their relationship 
with their peasant subjects was informed by occasions such as the 1903 canonisation of St 
Serafim (1759-1833). A monk, Serafim lived in a hermitage for twenty-five years where 
in 1815, following a vision of the Virgin Mary, he began to receive pilgrims. Attracted by 
his reputation for healing and prophecy many thousands of ordinary Russians were drawn 
to his hermitage.  
     The decision to canonise Serafim in 1903 was controversial, forced on the Synod by 
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the tsar himself. Hélène Carrère d'Encausse has argued that Nicholas’s decision to 
sponsor Serafim as a patron saint of his reign reveals the tsar’s (fatalistic) religious 
outlook and his identification with a hermit who ‘accepted his fate in the darkness and 
silence’ of the forest.798 At the newly established shrine where they celebrated Serafim’s 
rise to sainthood, Nicholas and Alexandra believed they had shared a deeply spiritual 
experience with the ordinary people of Russia.799  However, although both Nicholas and 
Alexandra were elated by their experiences at Sarov, after the revolution, the imperial 
couples understanding of such encounters with their peasant subjects appeared at best, 
simplistic and, at worse, hopelessly naïve.800 Nicholas and Alexandra’s encounters with 
their subjects, such as occurred at festivals, were thought to be quaintly outdated, and the 
response of the crowds to the sight of the tsar and empress, unrepresentative of public 
attitudes as whole within late imperial Russia. For example, specifically in relation to the 
canonisation at Sarov, Gregory L. Freeze has concluded that, as a result of the exclusion 
of the people from the ceremony itself and the expensive shrine which housed the relics, 
the event served only to emphasise the gulf between the lives of the tsar and empress, and 
the mass of the people.
801
  
     However, such views in regards to other opportunities for the imperial couple to meet 
their humblest subjects were contradicted by a number of contemporary British 
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commentators. In British newspapers, journals and official correspondence, observers 
noted demonstrations of monarchical feelings whenever the tsar and empress appeared 
before their subjects. From time to time, it was said, the uneducated peasant might be 
persuaded by a charismatic revolutionary or a political demagogue, but that was merely 
an aberration. In reality, observers insisted they were loyal to the monarchical principle as 
defined within Russian tradition. In the light of these impressions, commentators believed 
that if the tsar and empress extricated themselves from the malevolent courtly cliques and 
showed themselves more frequently in public they could revitalise enthusiasm for the 
monarchy. 
    Whether an observer believed that Russians had been alienated from their tsar by 
recent events or whether they concluded that they remained loyal despite Bloody Sunday 
there was a contradiction in their summary. Even to the most unobservant, there existed a 
vast social gap between the imperial family and the mass of the peasantry particularly, in 
terms of education and wealth. However, this was not necessarily seen as a bar to tranquil 
relations between the tsar and his subjects. Rothay Reynolds argued that the distance, 
created by class and even hauteur, between the ruler and the ruled was necessary in 
Russia.  Until the eve of the First World War Reynolds’ had been the Daily News 
correspondent in St Petersburg and before that he had been Anglican chaplain to the 
British embassy in the city. In the light of his experiences he argued that Russian 
emperors were forced to assume an ‘attitude of aloofness appropriate to godlike beings’ 
because that was expected of them by their people who placed their portraits alongside 
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the icons of their favourite saints.802     
     Perceptions of Nicholas and Alexandra’s relationship with their subjects were rooted 
in ‘memories’ of the founding of the Romanov dynasty. In 1613 an assembly, or zemsky 
sobor, had ‘humbly entreated’ Nicholas’s ancestor Mikhail Fedorovich to accept the 
Russian throne and put an end to the so-called Time of Troubles.803  Before agreeing to 
the creation of an elected Duma, and in a reference to this founding myth of the Romanov 
dynasty, the tsar had mooted the idea of calling together an Assembly of the Land.804  The 
idea of direct interaction between the tsar and his subjects at times of crisis was entirely in 
keeping with Nicholas’s way of thinking and it evidently appealed to E.J. Dillon.    In 
reality the peasants had not formed part of the delegation to Mikhail Fedorovich but such 
was the power of this myth that Dillon seems to have ignored the historical record. His 
account of an imagined meeting between the tsar and his lowliest subjects depicted not 
only an ‘archetypal Russian scene’ but illustrated the endurance of British perceptions 
that a tsar did not yearn for power for its own sake. It also recalled rumours, current at the 
time of Alexander III’s death, that Nicholas was reluctant to accede to the throne. The 
Time of Troubles had been characterised by factionalism, violence and foreign 
intervention when Russia seemed on the brink of disintegration.805  Bearing this in mind 
Dillon imagined Nicholas summoning ‘the peasant elders from across the empire’ who 
would then recall that in the sixteenth century the shared aims of the monarchy and the 
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people had rescued Russia from the abyss.806 According to Dillon the tsar would issue a 
blunt ultimatum to his subjects in the following terms: ‘Your forefathers made my 
forefather tsar of Russia at a moment when the nation was confronted with ruin. Then the 
union of the monarch and people saved Russia. At present a still worse crisis threatens to 
annihilate the work of ages and with it the Russian race. This threat you can avert or 
realise according to your votes. If you like, you can send deputies to the Duma who 
advocate revolution. But I, who foresee dreadful consequences of such a choice, refuse to 
govern the country. I am however, ready to lay down the crown and retire, leaving you to 
work out your own fate’.807  
   The fact that Dillon believed Nicholas might be willing to lay down such a challenge 
suggests he was confident that the tsar retained the loyalty and support of most of his 
subjects. Such views were apparently vindicated by the cordial reception accorded the 
imperial couple during the Poltava anniversary in 1909. 
   The summer of 1909 marked the two hundredth anniversary of Peter the Great’s victory 
over Charles XII of Sweden at Poltava which paved the way for Russia’s rise to power in 
the modern era.  The format of the anniversary celebrations at Poltava followed the 
imagery beloved of Nicholas and Alexandra: a church service, a review of an army corps 
and a meeting with a peasant delegation. The site of the celebrations hundreds of miles 
from St Petersburg necessitated a two day journey across Russia through urban areas and 
open countryside. Initial British impressions were wary. The British ambassador noted 
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that despite the crushing of the revolution, the imperial train had been surrounded by very 
tight security.808 Moreover, Nicholson reported rumours that ‘suspect persons’ had been 
removed from the locale.809 However, at Poltava the ambassador noted that, in spite of 
security fears, Nicholas mingled with the crowd ‘virtually unguarded for over three 
hours’: far longer than had been allowed for in the official programme.810 The 
ambassador’s interpretation of the tsar’s meeting with his subjects could equally have 
been written by British commentators of an earlier generation. It shows the persistence of 
a belief that a tsar, whose everyday experiences were far removed from the mass of his 
subjects, nevertheless understood their needs. These impressions had seemingly not been 
broken the bloodshed of 1905.  
      On the site of his ancestor’s great victory Nicholas gave a speech, relatively 
unbending in its tone, calling on his subjects to ‘show their devotion to the throne’.811  
However, the ambassador told London  that ‘the delight of the peasants at seeing their 
[tsar] was unbounded and [what is more] they were much impressed by the simple, 
unaffected manner in which he spoke to them and the knowledge he possessed of their 
affairs’.812  At the opening of the Duma Nicholson had worried that accounts of the tsar’s 
negative relationship with the deputies and his defence of his autocratic powers might 
spread across the countryside with possibly unfortunate consequences.  In 1909, however, 
swayed by the persuasive ideas of naïve monarchism, the ambassador was certain that the 
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peasants would take back to their villages’ stories of their encounter with the tsar which 
would have a beneficial effect on the internal situation.813 Later, reflecting more fully on 
the Poltava jubilee and the reaction of the peasants to the sight of their monarch, Nicolson 
hoped that it might be a prelude to other similar occasions. As he explained to the Foreign 
Secretary he was certain that by ‘frequent intercourse’ with their subjects Nicholas and 
Alexandra would surely ‘revive the old loyalty to the throne’.814   
    The most significant anniversary of Nicholas and Alexandra’s reign occurred in 1913 
and marked the three hundredth anniversary of Romanov rule. As R.S. Wortman explains 
for Nicholas and Alexandra the anniversary of the election of the first Romanov tsar 
evoked the seventeenth century national myth, of Russians personally devoted to their 
tsar.815 It was an era which the imperial couple yearned to recreate. Their fondness for the 
time of the first Romanov tsar can be seen by their patronage of, and participation in, the 
founding of a number of buildings both religious and secular whose architecture reflected 
twentieth century interpretations of seventeenth century Russian vernacular buildings. 
The most striking of these was a short distance from the imperial residence at Tsarskoe 
Selo where Nicholas and Alexandra constructed an entire village in pastiche styles of the 
seventeenth century complete with a church dedicated to St Fedor, the Romanov family’s 
patron saint.  
    In celebration of the Tercentenary, for the first time in many years Nicholas, Alexandra 
and their children spent three weeks residing in their capital. As part of the celebrations 
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the imperial couple went to the theatre and hosted a number of court events. The centre of 
St Petersburg was lit by half a million coloured light-bulbs and projectors shone pictures 
of Romanov rulers into the clouds.816  The imperial couple also marked the jubilee by 
visiting many of the cities of old Russia including Suzdal, Vladimir, Nizhny Novgorod, 
Kostroma and Moscow. Nicholas and Alexandra viewed their dynastic pilgrimage along 
the Volga in May and June 1913 as an opportunity to reaffirm the bond between 
themselves and the Russian people. The enthusiasm of the crowds in the Romanov’s 
traditional lands and the respectful attitude of their peasant subjects served to confirm 
their conviction that the mass of ordinary Russians were deeply loyal to them.817  
    In retrospect the tercentenary divides opinion. It has popularly been perceived it as a 
tragic last hurrah which revealed the fragility of the public mood before the ‘final storm’ 
broke over imperial Russia.818 More critical commentators such as Orlando Figes have 
depicted the 1913 celebrations as symptomatic of the foolishness of an outdated regime 
which hoped to blind Russia to its shortcomings by ‘indulging in a ritual of self-
congratulation’ even as the regime tottered.819   Other historians, such as Lindsey Hughes, 
have set the celebrations in the more positive context of the many achievements of 
Nicholas’s reign which show that economically and culturally Russia was becoming a 
powerhouse.820 
   Despite the lack of agreement about the appropriateness of the tercentenary festivities 
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amongst modern commentators, it would seem that it is only with the benefit of hindsight 
that that the celebrations of 1913 have appeared so significant, at least to British 
observers. At the time they took place, British commentators made relatively little 
comment. In part this may have been because, as The Times noted, unlike the coronation, 
‘few foreigners were expected to attend [since] it is an eminently national [rather than 
international] occasion’.821  At the coronation the Russian authorities had especially 
facilitated the work of foreign journalists, providing them with Kremlin passes and easy 
access to the telegraph system.  Without this assistance foreigners may have found it 
difficult to obtain the necessary permissions to work and travel in the Russian provinces. 
Furthermore, news from Russia at this time may have been overshadowed by specifically 
‘British interest’ stories. Some of the news items which captured the British imagination 
during 1913 included the aftermath of the discovery of R.F. Scott’s body in the Antarctic, 
the fiftieth anniversary of Queen Alexandra’s arrival in the country, a bomb at a house in 
which Lloyd George was intending to stay, the burning down of the tea pavilion at Kew 
by suffragettes and the arrest of an alleged German spy in Portsmouth.  Amongst the few 
publications which marked the tercentenary the Daily Telegraph published a full page 
spread. However, the ruling tsar and empress were strikingly absent from the illustrations, 
which featured Tsar Michael, Peter the Great, Catherine the Great and the emperors 
Alexander I and II.  Nor were the imperial couple mentioned in the accompanying article, 
the focus of which was Peter the Great’s visit to London.822   
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     The Times, reflecting its role as a chronicler of the social, civic and religious activities 
of Europe’s royalty, did report the Tercentenary thanksgiving service in St Petersburg, the 
gala opera and the memorial exhibition in Moscow. It also offered a brief survey of 
Russian history since the accession of the first Romanov tsar. The Times was fulsome in 
its praise of the Romanov dynasty which, the newspaper declared, had been the ‘happy 
and fortunate choice’ of the Russian people.823 In looking to the future the same article 
admitted that not all signs were propitious. However, describing Nicholas as ‘the tsar 
enfranchiser’ (an allusion to Alexander II, the tsar liberator) the newspaper concluded 
optimistically that ‘no hope seems too confident or too bright’ for the tsar’s reign.824  
When Nicholas and Alexandra travelled along the Volga their reception from the peasants 
and townspeople appeared to replicate these images of loyalty. It was a phenomenon 
which had been remarked upon on other occasions such as during the coronation, again in 
1909 and even, at times, during the revolution of 1905. In light of their perception of the 
way in which the imperial family were received by some of their humblest subjects, some 
British commentators believed that the tsar was representative of a valid political concept 
even in twentieth century Russia. However, in spite of its apparent significance even The 
Times correspondent seems to have lost interest in marking the perambulations of the 
imperial court much beyond noting its arrival in Moscow. Even the usually vocal anti-
tsarist magazine, Anglo Russian Review, which generally lost no opportunity to attack the 
Russian monarchy, failed to offer its opinion on the significance of the tercentenary. It is 
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true that in July 1913 the middle-class Illustrated London News published ‘the latest 
official portraits of the imperial family’ but only as part of what it said was a wider public 
interest in “all things Russian”.  The accompanying explanatory lines set the publication 
of the photographs in the context of wider interest in Russian culture and rather 
defensively observed that the magazine had ‘no need to offer an excuse’ for the 
photographs since ‘the world is so much interested in praising Russian ballet, Russian 
opera and Russian art’.825  
     It was not until the end of 1913, nearly seven months since Nicholas had visited his 
ancestral lands that the British ambassador reflected on the time they had spent away 
from the capital.  The ambassador (by then Sir George Buchanan) was confident that the 
celebrations had been an unqualified success. Although a diplomat of the old school, with 
a natural respect for monarchy as an institution, Buchanan was not blind to the tsar and 
empress’s shortcomings. Yet, it was his considered opinion that the response of ordinary 
Russians to the tercentenary had shown that any dissatisfaction in the country was 
entirely directed towards the bureaucracy.  
      In a detailed review of 1913 Buchanan informed the Foreign Office with apparent 
satisfaction that: ‘The tercentenary of the Romanovs was celebrated with great ceremony 
[and accompanied] by a great display of loyalty to the throne on the part of the gentry, the 
military [..] merchants and peasantry.826 Furthermore, Buchanan reported, throughout 
central Russia the tsar ‘received the most striking proofs of the personal devotion to him 
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of the peasants’.827 Buchanan did not indicate the sources of his impressions perhaps he 
had gleaned them from members of the imperial family, a sympathetic British journalist, 
a junior member of the diplomatic corps or the Russian press. Whatever the source, 
Buchanan interpreted Nicholas and Alexandra’s reception in the country as a sign that the 
divisions of the past had been healed. However, Bernard Pares, whose acquaintances 
included members of a wider ranging milieu than those of the ambassador, had a less 
positive view of 1913.  From soundings taken amongst members of the political elite and 
the intelligentsia his conclusions were contrary to those of Buchanan. Where the 
ambassador perceived unity Pares believed that the celebrations had failed to repair the 
rupture between crown and people. In a report to the Foreign Office written in early 
January 1914 Pares looked back over the past twelve-months and tersely observed that 
the tsar is spoken of ‘without any confidence’.828  
   From the outbreak of war in August 1914 until the fall of the imperial regime in March 
1917 many of the themes which had been popular during the years of the Constitutional 
Monarchy were revisited by British commentators. Perceptions of Nicholas and 
Alexandra’s relationship with their subjects, their ties with the British royal family and 
the specifically “Russian” nature of the society over which the couple presided were 
much discussed.  
     As we shall see in the following chapter, traditional images of despotism, anti-
Semitism and reaction were largely absent from British discourse until the fall of the 
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monarchy.  
 
 
Chapter 6: 1914-1917:  War and Abdication 
The Black shadow which for many years has hung over the Russian throne has passed 
away. The monk and prime favourite, Grigori Rasputin is dead. There is something of the 
east about someone from the farmyard who dictated the policies of the Tsar of all the 
Russias.829 
The tsar is said to have exclaimed “Thank God” when he heard the wish of the people 
that he should abdicate. In all the various narratives we have read we have see nothing to 
make us suppose that the tsar has not behaved as a man of honour. 830 
War with Germany, the scandal of Rasputin and the drama of the abdication; blindly, 
wilfully Nicolas and Alexandra pursued a path which led to their downfall. These are the 
features which colour modern popular impressions of the last tsar’s reign. In particular, in 
the years since 1917, the tsar’s decision to assume command of his army has been 
identified as the fatal catalyst. His absence from the capital has been shown as the key 
factor which permitted Alexandra and Rasputin to govern Russia which in turn led to the 
revolution.  
    However, as we shall discuss, although there was concern in some quarters at 
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Nicholas’s decision to reside at the front, many commentators greeted it with relief. A 
number believed it was a positive development and explained its significance in terms of 
British perceptions of a tsar’s paternal relationship with their subjects and images of 
earlier Russian rulers who had commanded gone to war at the head of their armies. 
Similarly, although some observers reported rumours that the empress was secretly 
arranging a separate peace with Germany, those who met her in person were impressed 
by her loyalty to the allied cause. With the benefit of hindsight Nicholas’s abdication may 
seem unexpected, but, as we shall discuss, even diplomats with long and distinguished 
careers in Russia and the British Foreign Office failed to foresee the outbreak of violent 
revolution in March 1917.  
   The British public had always responded with interest to the tsar and empress (as they     
typically did to their own royal family) at times of celebration such as their marriage, 
Nicholas’s coronation and the birth of their son as well as during the royal and imperial 
visits of 1908 and 1909. More specifically ‘Russian focused’, concepts of despotism and 
democracy and the extent to which the tsar was able to act as he wanted were an 
important feature of articles in a variety of British publications. In addition the public 
followed the twists and turns in Russo-British relations in regards to India as well the 
Dogger Bank Incident. However, prior to 1914 the focus of British attention on the tsar 
and empress had come from (broadly) two groupings. One such group consisted of men 
and women whose employment or personal inclination offered them the opportunity to 
encourage political, artistic and ecclesiastical intercourse with the Orthodox Church and 
to travel within the Russian Empire.  Another group, often those on the left of British 
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politics, was made up of persons who attacked the autocracy as a political concept and 
who publicised the tsar’s failings.  For most people in Britain, Russia’s internal politics 
could seem an abstract issue with little bearing on their own lives.  However, during the 
First World War, Nicholas and Alexandra’s personal and political attributes became of 
much greater significance for the ordinary Briton. In order to meet the demand for 
information from the public several newspapers based a number of their journalists in 
Russia. They included Robert Wilton and Stanley Washburn who wrote for The Times as 
well as long the established Russian experts, E.J. Dillon and Bernard Pares, who were 
employed by the Daily Telegraph. In addition, Hamilton Fyffe reported for the Daily 
Mail, Arthur Ransome for the Daily News and Leader and Morgan Philips Price for the 
Manchester Guardian.  
     Reporters had to tread a careful path since there were severe penalties for those who 
transgressed Russian sensitivities. In Russia, British newspapers were commonly 
‘smeared out with the toughest of blacking’ before going on sale.831 As we have noted, 
even articles by journalists such as W.T. Stead who were sympathetic to the regime could 
be censored before it was allowed to go on sale in Russia.   On occasion this censorship 
could be carried to ludicrous lengths as occurred when an advert in the London Illustrated 
News was covered up. Further investigation revealed it to show the tsar supposedly 
receiving a box of pills from a Lancashire manufacturer.832 On a more serious note, in 
1903, The Times correspondent, D.D. Braham, who gave prominence in his articles to the 
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pogroms, was expelled by the Russian authorities for ‘attacking Russia and Russian 
policy’.833 Harold Williams, a passionate Tolstoyan, was permitted to return to Russia as a 
reporter for the Daily Chronicle after having been expelled in 1911 for espionage while 
working for the Morning Post.834  Accusations of spying were not necessarily the figment 
of an overwrought Russian imagination. For example, in addition to his work with The 
Times, Robert Wilton also reported to the SIS in London.835  Indeed, it may have been that 
his spying activities took up a large part of his time since does not appear to have exerted 
himself as journalist. He had an extensive network of Russian contacts and was especially 
close to the foreign editor of Novoe Vremya. As William Harrison has noted, much of 
what Wilton wrote about Russia was gleaned, second-hand, from this newspaper.836 
Wilton, who is remembered today for his claims that Nicholas and Alexandra were 
murdered as part of a Jewish plot, was greatly disliked by General Sir John Hanbury 
Williams.837  The attaché who had a military man’s dislike of all journalists, described his 
compatriots as ‘men of no brains’ but he reserved his particular ire for Wilton who, he 
said, was ‘the least capable of them all’.838   
    In August 1914, when Russia went to war with Germany, the tsar invoked God’s 
blessing in a ceremony in the Winter Palace. The Times correspondent boasted that he 
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was the only foreign journalist allowed into the palace that day. From his apparently 
privileged position he reported how the tsar had vowed in front of Russia’s holiest icon to 
‘lay down his life for Russia’s sake’.839 Nicholas’s declaration gave him a sacrificial air 
and conjured up images of earlier Russian rulers who had led their troops into battle. In 
reporting it The Times perpetuated British images of the exceptional nature of the 
relationship between a Russian tsar and their subjects, since, amongst the major European 
powers which went to war 1914, no other ruler made such a dramatic gesture. The 
Austrian Emperor was too old to personally go to war, and in response to a Berlin crowd, 
the German Kaiser had spoken in only general terms of the great sacrifices that would be 
needed by the German nation.840 In Britain, although King George V had served in the 
Royal Navy in his youth and his son Prince Albert (the future George VI) would see 
action at the Battle of Jutland in 1916, no British monarch had led his troops in battle 
since George II in 1743.  
     As the tsar took the oath to defend Russia even at great cost to himself, a large crowd 
assembled in the square outside the palace. The exact number of people in the crowd is 
unknown, but the Evening News asserted there were ‘at least 100, 000’.841  The Daily 
Telegraph which claimed a substantial, if lesser figure, of ‘up to thirty thousand’ recorded 
that many in the crowd carried portraits of Alexandra and her son which had been cut out 
of popular magazines and then decorated with handmade paper flowers.842     Although the 
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scene was reminiscent of the workers who had carried icons and portraits of the imperial 
family as they had sought to petition the tsar on Bloody Sunday, the article made no 
mention of this dark episode in recent Russian history. The reaction of the crowd to the 
war echoed the first weeks of the war with Japan but memory of the later disillusion was 
also ignored in the drama of the moment. According to The Times correspondent even the 
Duma, with whom Nicholas had enjoyed a problematic relationship, had spontaneously 
sung the national anthem in an ‘outburst of love and loyalty to the throne’.843 Whether 
from genuine optimism or wishful thinking, the newspaper claimed that the enthusiasm of 
the people and the politicians at the sight of the tsar signalled a return to more tranquil 
relationship between the people and their ruler than had often been the case.844   
    As Britain itself teetered on the brink of war the reception given to the imperial family 
gave the comforting perception that the tsar, the empress and the Russian people were 
united in a common cause. This impression may have been given even greater credence 
by the reduction in the number of troops guarding Nicholas and Alexandra. On this 
occasion the Telegraph observed that, despite the presence of most of the Romanov clan, 
security measures were less visible than was normally the case on such occasions.845 In 
the light of his understanding of Russian history and traditional British perceptions of the 
relationship between a tsar and his subjects Stephen Graham reflected on the exuberant 
reception accorded Nicholas.  Perhaps also bearing in mind Nicholas’s relatively recent 
successful receptions at Poltava and in the towns along the Volga on 1913, Graham 
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concluded that it had been the very lines of soldiers supposed to protect them which had 
prevented the imperial couple from having meaningful contact with most of their subjects 
‘with whom they had longed to be at one’.846  
      Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914 and, only three days later, 
parliament passed the Defence of the Realm Act (D.O.R.A). Although there had been an 
attempt at press censorship during the Boer War, in general, if a newspaper, with a 
foreign correspondent in situ, wanted to publish it largely did so without restriction.  The 
government established two agencies whose role it was to ensure the press complied with 
the act. The first, the Foreign Office News Department, ensured that newspapers exported 
to the United States of America, the British dominions and neutral countries presented the 
war news in a way that was beneficial to Britain.  The second agency called the Press 
Bureau, restricted news of diplomatic activities, troop movements and anything which 
was deemed likely to cause ‘unnecessary alarm’ in  the civilian population  and, equally 
important, ‘injure the susceptibilities’ of Britain’s allies in the British press.847 The issue 
of press censorship, in a nation which prided itself on free speech, was a sensitive one but 
as one director of the Press Bureau, Sir Edward Cook, explained it was ‘deemed 
necessary to restrict freedom in order not to lose it’.848 Under the terms of D.O.R.A, 
newspapers were forbidden to indicate where cuts had been made.  Because, by its very 
nature, censorship was carried out in secret it has not been possible to scientifically gauge 
the extent to which censorship may have effected what was written about the tsar and 
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empress.  However, in order to prevent publication of certain news items, the British 
authorities issued a number of D (Defence) notices.  In total, it has been estimated, 747 D 
notices were issued during the entire length of the war of which sixteen specifically 
referred to news from Russia.849 The relative paucity of D notices in relation to Russia 
may belie their importance since several were issued at especially critical moments during 
the war.  
     On 7 October 1914 a D notice was issued due to concern that Russian efforts on the 
eastern front were not being fully appreciated in the British press. In July 1915 a further 
D notice was issued requiring the press to refrain from mentioning Russian munitions 
shortages and, on the eve of the February Revolution, the press was banned from 
mentioning anything about the internal unrest in Russia.850  However, the absence of news 
did not always fool the reading public. As Edward Cook later recalled, despite the efforts 
of the censor to his conceal his work, people in Britain suspected that they were not 
always given the entire truth about events in Russia.851 Moreover, although Charles à 
Court Repington was fined £100 for criticising the British High Command in the columns 
of the Morning Post, censorship was not applied equally to all publications. As K.M. 
Wilson has explained in his study of the Morning Post, tensions between politicians with 
axes to grind conferred ‘a degree of immunity’ on some sections of the press.852 Similarly, 
Sir Stanley Buckmaster recalled how, during his time at the Press Bureau, he had been 
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prevented from prosecuting both The Times and the Daily Mail by unnamed, but 
powerful, people anxious to secure the support of these newspapers.
853
    
      The recollections of heads of the Press Bureau show that, despite government 
restrictions, the press was not monolithic in its responses to the war: indeed there were 
pacifist journalists and writers who questioned the need for conflict in Europe.854 
Nonetheless, much of the British press and public were willing supporters of the war with 
Germany and of Britain’s Russian ally. Attitudes to Nicholas and Alexandra at this time 
were tempered by a number of factors; fear of government censure, patriotic jingoism, 
danger of a German invasion, and the urgent need to promote Russo-British friendship as 
part of the war effort.  An article in the Daily Mail illustrates the lengths to which that 
particular paper went to uphold spirits on the Home Front and promote the concept of a 
strong alliance with tsarist Russia.  In the early days of the war and despite the fact that it 
was high summer the newspaper published a ‘blurrily illustrated’ tale of the tsar’s ‘snow 
encrusted Russian soldiers speeding through the night the length of Britain to join their 
allies on the western front’.855 The story, which was described by one contemporary as 
utter ‘bunkum’, is an extreme example but it provides a flavour of the desire amongst 
sections of the press to reinforce notions of Russo-British unity.856  
    Against British perceptions of their political democracy and their constitutional 
monarchy Britain’s alliance with an absolutist state was difficult to defend, although that 
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the enemy was portrayed as German militarism. In this respect support for the tsar came 
from a hitherto unexpected quarter.  With German forces just across the Channel, such 
was the heightened atmosphere of enthusiasm for the war in Britain, even the anti-tsarist 
magazine Free Russia felt compelled to lay aside its antagonism towards the autocracy. 
Since its foundation Free Russia had published articles deploring the excesses of the 
autocratic regime, carried interviews with Russian political exiles and looked forward to 
the establishment of a democratic state in Russia. In the autumn of 1914 the magazine 
voluntarily ceased publication but before it did so it took a stance which was strikingly at 
odds with its previous editorial policy.  For much of Nicholas’s reign, Free Russia had 
campaigned vociferously against the injustices of the tsarist regime and carried articles 
ridiculing and belittling the emperor. However, such was the atmosphere in the early 
weeks of the war, that Free Russia not only decided to cease publication but, in its final 
edition, also printed an editorial which supported the tsar and gratefully associated his 
actions with Britain’s own fate and the ‘welfare and free institutions of England’.857    
(i) September 1915: Nicholas Takes Command of the army 
The allied war with Germany started optimistically and nowhere more so than in Russia, 
as witnessed by Nicholas and Alexandra’s reception in St Petersburg. However, whether 
from incompetence, lack of materiel, superior German forces, simply bad luck or a 
combination of all four, by the summer and late autumn of 1915 the Russian army had 
suffered defeats at Warsaw and the fortress city of Lemberg and the authorities even 
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considered evacuating St Petersburg.858
  
 The situation was so serious that, as early as 18 
August 1915, General Sir John Hanbury Williams noted there were rumours of revolution 
and talk of a separate peace with Germany.859  
    On 5 September 1915, in response to events on the Front, the tsar assumed command 
of the Russian forces. In retrospect his dismissal of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievich as 
commander-in-chief and his frequent absences from the Russian capital have been seen as 
contributory factors in the outbreak of revolution in March 1917. Clearly, the change of 
command of the Russian army, in the midst of a great and terrible war, was a potentially 
controversial decision for Russia’s allies. In Britain, Hansard, the record of Parliamentary 
proceedings, could be quoted in the press and remained outside of the remit of the censor. 
It was with this in mind, as well as the finer points of Commons etiquette, that the 
Speaker forbade Joseph King, the Liberal M.P. for North Somerset, to speak in the House 
on ‘Russian internal affairs’.860 However, this was not before King had launched an attack 
on the censorship of the British press, alleging the public were being kept in the dark 
about the fact that Russia  was passing through a revolution and that the whole 
government [was] being shaken’. In particular, he noted, the news which he said had 
come as ‘a thunderclap’ to the British public that the Grand Duke Nikolai, who had 
hitherto been held up as a ‘great general of the war’, had been replaced.861 Nonetheless, in 
spite of the subject’s sensitivity within Parliament, there was considerable coverage of the 
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tsar’s decision in the press. It provided an opportunity for some newspapers to ‘let off 
steam’ and vent their frustration with Russia’s inability to successfully prosecute the war 
on the eastern front. The reason why such articles were passed for publication may be 
because the censor was reassured by the fact that many of the same commentators praised 
Nicholas for taking command of his army.  
      As a young man, the tsar had spent five years as a subaltern officer in some of the 
most elite regiments of the Russian army but this was scant preparation for his role as 
commander in chief in wartime. However, despite his lack of practical experience, his 
resolve was greeted with enthusiasm, even elation in some British circles. The 
Manchester Guardian, for example, admitted that the Russian army had, as it 
diplomatically put it, been denied success. However, it was the perspective of the 
newspaper that the grand duke had, in effect, been a virtual ‘dictator’ who should bear 
responsibility for events across vast swathes of Russian territory which had affected the 
lives of millions.862 The newspaper listed what it said had been the grand duke’s many 
errors: ‘failure of Russian arms, the chaos in the services of supply, the reactionary 
internal government, the persecution of, and wholesale expulsion of, Jews from the war 
zone’.863 Nevertheless, having reviewed events on the eastern front and found the grand 
duke’s leadership wanting, the article concluded on a relatively optimistic note when it 
declared that ‘before the whole world, [the tsar has] identified himself and his throne with 
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war until the enemy is defeated’. 864  
     The image presented by The Times of the Grand Duke Nikolai was somewhat more 
flattering than that in the Manchester Guardian. Rather The Times described him as a 
man of ‘strong character’ and ‘iron will’ who ‘was loved by those under his command’.865  
Yet, for all its praise of the former army commander, the newspaper presented a positive 
view of the future for Russian arms. Under a headline ‘Russia’s Favourable Position’, 
which belied the situation on the eastern front, The Times carried two full pages of 
comment. The newspaper began by setting the tsar’s action in the context of past Russian 
history and asserted that Nicholas was following the example of ‘his illustrious 
ancestors’.866   The last time Russia had been so imperilled by a foreign army had been in 
1812 when Napoleon’s troops had entered the city of Moscow. However, presumably, 
since France was now an ally of the entente powers, The Times focused on a comparison 
between Nicholas and his grandfather Tsar Alexander II who had freed the serfs.  The 
Times was confident that under Nicholas’s personal leadership Germany would be beaten 
and future Russian generations would honour him as a ‘second Tsar Liberator’.867        
    Given that other monarchs of allied nations were unlikely to take personal command of 
their armies, some commentators explained the tsar’s decision by reference to images of 
‘traditional’ Russia.  Indeed these perceptions were a feature of an article in the 
Illustrated London News were echoing reports from Port Arthur during 1904 which 
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described how the portrait of the tsar was carried under special guard by his troops during 
‘an advance’ at the Front.868  If the tsar’s image was treated with such reverence, how 
much more so his person, at least a according to an article in the Daily Telegraph. The 
newspaper explained, ‘the peasantry of Russia hold the person of their Sovereign sacred 
[therefore] the knowledge that he is sharing their fate and […] their hardships will 
exercise a profound [and positive] effect’ on them.869 An analysis in the Spectator is 
particularly interesting since the periodical was recognised as a vehicle for ‘philosophical 
radicalism’ and might therefore have been expected to eschew more conservative theories 
of peasant devotion to their tsar and notions of “Holy Russia”.  However, the Spectator 
argued that, whereas in other countries, should the monarch take command of the army it 
would count for very little, in Russia it held ‘vast symbolic potency’.870 The article 
explained that for his subjects the tsar was no ordinary monarch, no ordinary war leader 
but ‘ordained by God […] Russia’s religious, political and family head’.871  There was one 
notable exception amongst those commentators who eulogised Nicholas’s decision and 
who asserted that his new role dovetailed exactly with Russian history and the structure of 
society as a perfect example of the relationship between the tsar and his subjects. In light 
of the time he had spent with the Russian peasantry and his understanding of their regard 
for their tsar, Stephen Graham cautioned against Nicholas spending time in the trenches. 
He argued that the common soldier would be confused by the presence in their midst of 
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the man they regarded as ‘a demi-god’.872  There may have been many reasons for the 
British response to Nicholas’s decision to assume command of his army.  In part the 
positive response in the press was based on a traditional British understanding of the 
relationship between a tsar and the expectation that Nicholas’s presence at the front 
would reinvigorate his troops. Given such views, it may also be public commentary was 
partly influenced by the fact that it took place at a critical moment for British forces. 
Troops on the western front were making little headway and in the spring of 1915 
Germany had, for the first time, used poison gas against entente troops and launched an 
unrestricted U-boat campaign against allied shipping. In addition to the thousands of 
British troops in Belgium and France, many were now fighting in Africa, the Middle East 
and the Balkans.  If the press had greeted Nicholas’s decision with dismay, not only 
might they have given encouragement to the enemy, but they may well have depressed 
morale amongst Britain’s own forces. 
     In public, in articles which had been passed by the censor the tsar’s assumption of 
command was met with approval. However, in view of the fact that an M.P. had been 
prevented from speaking on the subject in the Commons chamber, it might be reasonable 
to suppose that, within some elements of the British Establishment, the tsar’s decision 
was controversial. However, the response of the British ambassador was as hopeful and 
uncritical of as any journalist who wrote under the gaze of the censor. On 23 August 
1915, when Buchanan first noted rumours that there might be a change of commander-in-
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chief, the ambassador treated the idea somewhat laconically. In a report to London he 
noted, without offering any specific comment that the tsar ‘was thinking of taking up 
supreme command’.873 Two days later, when he heard from the Russian minister of 
foreign affairs that the grand duke was to be relieved of his post, he received the news 
with equanimity. Buchanan’s concerns about political intrigues in Tsarkoe Selo, which 
were a feature of the last years of the regime, were noticeably absent on this occasion, In 
all probability recalling images of Nicholas’s successful encounters with his subjects 
during recent years, the ambassador hoped that, having taken command of the army, the 
tsar would ‘not make the mistake of spending his time at headquarters but would show 
himself to his troops’.874  
      When Nicholas’s decision to assume command of the army was made public, 
Buchanan’s testimony to the Foreign Office remained unflustered. Indeed it contained a 
distinct element of optimism and appeared to recall the heady days of August 1914 when 
the Duma had pledged loyalty to the tsar and support for the war. In the twelve-months 
from the outbreak of war Nicholas’s relationship with the Duma had not always been so 
equitable. For example, in the summer of 1915, the centre parties of the Duma and the 
State Council had formed a so-called Progressive Bloc which demanded a government 
accountable to the Duma. However, over the question of the change of army command, 
Buchanan was hopeful of a more amicable relationship between the deputies and the tsar. 
Thus, he informed London that ‘the removal of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaeivch 
                                                          
873
TNA, FO 800/75, Sir George Buchanan to Lord Grey, 23 Aug. 1915. 
874
TNA, WO 105582/120948, Sir George Buchanan to War Office, 25 August 1915.  
264 
 
 
 
 
 
will be welcomed by the Duma’.875  Buchanan brushed aside objections, insisting that: 
‘apprehensions expressed in certain quarters seem to me exaggerated’ since there is no 
doubt the tsar’s decision will be ‘well received in the army’.876 In Britain George V seems 
to have been swayed by Buchanan’s optimism since he telegraphed to his cousin of his 
delight that he had ‘assumed command of [his] armies in the field’.877   
    In Moscow, R.H. Bruce Lockhart, having taken soundings from his contacts including 
the mayor of the city, was apparently resigned to the news. His report to London 
informed Whitehall that the ‘change of command was of no great significance’.878 
However, whether this was a result of confidence that Nicholas’s presence at the Front 
would contribute to a previously elusive victory or because he despaired of the situation is 
not clear. Within the privacy of confidential correspondence Major General Sir Alfred 
Knox was more critical. In a report to London he sounded a note of caution and offered a 
gloomy prognosis should victory remain elusive. Knox had a number of acquaintances in 
the Russia army and was therefore in position to obtain the opinion of officers in the field. 
His findings were far from reassuring.  In a report to Whitehall he claimed to have been 
able to find only one officer in favour of Nicholas’s assumption of supreme command.879   
In a derisory reference to the empress’s influence over her husband, Knox described it as 
‘a strange decision’. He reported that the ordinary St Petersburg public believed 
Alexandra had encouraged the tsar to take this momentous step following a vision of the 
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archangel Gabriel.880 According to Knox, popular gossip claimed that the empress had 
been told by the angel that Russian troops would continue to suffer defeats until the tsar 
stood at the head of his army. Other, more cynical citizens, he reported, insisted that her 
advisor had not been a heavenly messenger but the rather more diabolical Rasputin.881  As 
an Ulsterman, he may well have had little time for tales of angelic visions, but for Knox 
the source of the advice was less important than the damage the change of command 
might do. In particular he warned that with Nicholas at the front, it opened up the distinct 
likelihood of an ‘increase in intrigues’ amongst pro-German elements at court.882   
  Knox was not alone in expressing his fears that Nicholas’s decision to assume supreme 
command was likely to have unintended but grave consequences. Even before the 
decision was confirmed General Sir John Hanbury Williams wrote to General Kitchener. 
He argued that were the tsar to take command it would be ‘a very grave error’ since his 
fate would be inexorably identified with the fortunes of his troops.883 He therefore warned 
that if the Russian army continued to suffer defeats then ‘heaven knows what will happen 
to Russia but it is infinitely certain what will happen to His Majesty’.884 As senior British 
military attaché Hanbury Williams was based at military headquarters where he had 
enjoyed frequent meetings with Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievich whom he evidently 
admired.  In support of his argument that it would be a mistake for the tsar to remove the 
grand duke from his post and to assume command of the army himself, Hanbury 
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Williams drafted a lengthy defence of the grand duke.  In particular, he described him as 
an honest man, well loved by the army who had not allowed personal intrigues to cloud 
his judgement.885 In contrast to the grand duke’s excellent personal qualities, Hanbury 
Williams offered an acerbic assessment of the tsar’s ability to successfully combine the 
roles of military chief and monarch. He crossed out his initial draft of a report to London 
in which he declared that it was extremely ‘doubtful whether [the tsar] could claim any of 
[the grand dukes positive] qualifications’.886 However, his more circumspect, but equally 
depressing, conclusion that: ‘it is doubtful whether one man can [efficiently] fulfil the 
duties of head of state and commander in chief of the army’ remained in the report he sent 
to Lord Kitchener.887  
Although initially despondent at the change of command, Hanbury Williams continued to 
live at imperial headquarters (Stavka) and despite his misgivings he was swayed by the 
tsar’s great personal charm. Living in relatively close proximity to Nicholas the two men 
appear to have enjoyed an easy rapport. In their leisure time the two men discussed 
Hanbury Williams’ ancestor who had served at the court of Empress Elizabeth, and the 
tsar laughed at the attaché’s jokes about Russo-British rivalry in India and popular 
Russian allegations that Britain had ‘stolen Russian munitions’.888 The tsar confided to 
Hanbury Williams on a wide range of subjects including his feelings of utter exhaustion 
on the day Russia went to war, his shyness and even the fact that the empress had once 
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been engaged to someone else.889 Imperial headquarters was some distance from any real 
fighting and life there could be extremely pleasant. Both the tsar and Hanbury Williams 
made time for long excursions into the countryside, the Englishman favourably 
comparing the scenery around Mogilev with the Vale of Aylesbury in Buckinghamshire. 
He often found himself jokingly chided when Nicholas suspected he had taken a different 
route in order to avoid encroaching on the imperial entourage.890   
   Hanbury Williams’ diary shows that he was much liked by the empress who 
occasionally visited Mogilev with her daughters. For example, during June, July and 
August 1916 the empress sent Hanbury Williams several boxes of roses, lilies of the 
valley, sweet peas and orchids to decorate his room at the imperial Stavka.891 As had been 
the case with the tsar, Hanbury Williams fell under Alexandra’s spell. In June 1916 he 
noted in his diary that the empress was ‘most charming [and] had a great love for Britain 
[and had sent] a most kind and sympathetic message’ following the loss of General 
Kitchener. 892 The Secretary of State’s ship was torpedoed en route to Russia. Conspiracy 
theorists attributed his death at this most critical juncture of the war to German fore-
knowledge of the general’s mission, perhaps as a result of pro-German forces in Russia.893   
   If Hanbury Williams is to be believed, not only did the empress share his loss at 
Kitchener’s death and shower him with flowers but she also ‘poured out her troubles’ to 
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him.894   He must surely have been flattered by the friendship of the imperial couple and, 
in these convivial surroundings he became more understanding of their predicaments and 
blamed any shortcomings on the Russian system of government. Albeit that Nicholas was 
an autocrat, Hanbury Williams grasped the limited realities of ruling over a vast empire. 
As a result he   once observed Nicholas was ‘no more an autocrat than our own king’.895 
Hanbury Williams’s role at Stavka combined that of a soldier and courtier. In retrospect 
his comments about the imperial couple can sometimes give the impression that he was 
blind to their faults. However, when Russia, the tsar and the alliance stood on the brink of 
catastrophe, he used his friendship to plead for a change of course.  Thus, on the eve of 
the revolution, with a sense of confidence engendered by his cordial relationship with the 
tsar, and without consulting either London or Buchanan, Hanbury Williams appealed to 
Nicholas to: ‘govern with the advice of good councillors [..] chosen from amongst the 
people themselves’.896  Whether the tsar would have taken the advice of an Englishman, 
even one whose company he appeared to enjoy can only be guessed at. The appeal came 
too late and Hanbury William’s letter was returned after the abdication with the seal 
unbroken.  
(ii) Rasputin and Pro-German Plots 
       Nicholas was extremely conscientious and fully aware of his duties as autocrat but, as 
more than one historian has noted, when the tsar assumed supreme command of the army 
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he felt ‘the heavy burden of political leadership slipping from his shoulders with immense 
relief’.897 From headquarters he made extensive journeys, reviewing Russian troops on 
their way to battle and visiting others convalescing from their wounds in military 
hospitals. On his daily walks in the countryside the tsar engaged in animated conversation 
with the local peasantry.898 Nicholas recreated something of his more carefree, days as a 
young army subaltern and avoided giving attention to some of the mundane but vital 
political tasks which had previously called upon much of his time.  In one telling letter, 
after a visit by some ministers to Mogilev, he complained to his wife that they were 
‘wasting his time’.899 Nicholas’s physical distance from the capital, his preference for 
specifically military concerns and his frustration with the machinery of government 
created a political vacuum. This void was filled, with the encouragement of her husband, 
by the empress.900  
    Although the empress was of German birth Alexandra’s response to the war had been 
as patriotic as any native-born Russian.  From the outset of hostilities she centred her 
concerns on the wounded and the civilians displaced by the conflict.901 A number of 
hospitals and field evacuation trains were established under her patronage. An English 
nurse on the Russian Front recalled seeing Alexandra’s ‘beautifully equipped hospital 
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trains’.902 The empress trained as a Red Cross nurse, assisted at medical operations and sat 
by the beds of the wounded and the dying. In September 1916 the Daily Mirror carried an 
article entitled ‘The Empress of Pity’ which explained that Alexandra, dressed in the 
uniform of a nursing sister visited Russia’s wounded at a palace now turned into a 
hospital.903 As Orlando Figes and Boris Kolonitskii tell us, in Russia, for social and 
cultural reasons her role as a nurse became a matter of controversy.904 In contrast, in 
Britain, members of the upper classes worked in army hospitals where it was said they 
undertook ‘disagreeable tasks, with no thought of fame or glory but for the sake of 
sharing in the huge fight’ against Germany.905  In St Petersburg, in April 1916, Lady 
Muriel Paget established an Anglo-Russian hospital in a palace belonging to the 
empress’s sister, Grand Duchess Elizabeth.906 It was therefore a matter of pride that the 
wife of an allied ruler should also bring comfort to the wounded.   In addition, the 
empress’s evident devotion to the wounded and dying such images reiterated British 
understanding of a Russian empress as the mother of the nation. However, as the months 
passed and the defeats mounted however, the positive aspects of Alexandra’s wartime 
role were pushed to the background. In its place suspicions arose rumours which 
suggested the empress’s loyalties lay with the land of her birth and that she was working 
to secure a separate peace with Germany, thus leaving the allies bereft of a vital ally in 
the east.  For British commentators’, aspects of Alexandra’s character, her political 
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influence, her dislike of court life as well as her German roots, which had once seemed 
such virtues later came to be seen in a more troubling light.  
    Between September 1915 and February 1917 Russia had four prime ministers, three 
ministers of transport and four ministers of agriculture. In peacetime this might have been 
the source of confusion. In wartime the frequent changes of government officials 
combined with Russia’s failure on the battlefield gave rise to rumours that the country 
was being deliberately undermined.907   In the spring and early summer of 1915 nearly 
500 shops, offices and factories owned by persons of German descent in Russia were 
attacked by the mob. In addition 275 apartments were looted and 700 ethnic Germans 
were attacked, some fatally.908 The British ambassador hypothesised that the Germans 
themselves had been responsible for the violence in order to disrupt the war effort.909 In 
such an atmosphere, where apparently sane people made such ludicrous accusations, it 
was easy for commentators to imagine that the empress retained the German loyalties of 
her youth. This was serious enough and reflected the changes in British perceptions of 
Alexandra since her marriage. In those days her German descent had been viewed as a 
factor for peace.910  
      Rumours that Alexandra was not entirely loyal to the allied cause were partly given 
credibility because of the very private world inhabited by the tsar and empress. The 
imperial couple found immense satisfaction in encounters with their ordinary subjects but 
                                                          
907
 William C. Fuller, Fantasies of Treason: The Foe within (Ithaca, NY., 2006).  
908
 Fuller, Fantasies of Treason, pp. 345-349.  
909
 TNA, FO 371/2452, Sir George Buchanan to Lord Grey, 12 and 14 Jun. 1915.  
910
 See Chapter 2.  
272 
 
 
 
 
 
they also rejoiced in their family life and shunned the social sphere traditionally inhabited 
by Russia’s rulers. At the time of Nicholas’s accession, his dislike of the court and its 
inevitable cliques was interpreted by British commentators in beneficial terms.911 
However, in later years, the fact that the tsar and empress lived within a relatively closed 
world gave some cause for concern. In the final years of imperial Russia the political 
influence of their imperial relatives, mystics and religious charlatans was a thread that ran 
throughout British interpretations of the imperial couple’s actions.  Even before the war 
British diplomatic and other correspondence was peppered with assertions that senior 
members of the imperial family were a powerful and negative influence at court. These 
groupings, invariably regarded as reactionary, were described in the British press and in 
diplomatic correspondence as ‘the court party’, ‘court camarilla’, a ‘grand ducal’ or 
‘military party’, or, most damming of all, ‘the German group’.  W.T. Stead of the Pall 
Mall Gazette believed that a senior member of the so-called ‘court party’ was the 
dowager Empress Mariia Fedorovna. Reflecting on a discussion with the dowager 
empress Stead recalled that she had laughed off his suggestion of any political influence 
over her son.  He nevertheless recorded (without dissension) that many Russians believed 
that ‘she is an evil influence’.912  
    The influence at the imperial court of two sisters (Grand Duchesses Anastasia and 
Militsa) was considered to be especially unfortunate. Originally from the Balkan kingdom 
of Montenegro the two sisters had married Russian grand dukes, Anastasia to Grand Duke 
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Nikolai Nikolaeivch and her sister, Militsa, to his younger brother Peter. In 1901 the 
Montenegrin sisters introduced the tsar and empress to a Frenchman, and so-called 
mystic, clairvoyant and faith healer, Philippe Nazier-Vachot. Monsieur Philippe, as he 
was known, was said by his critics to be no more than a butcher’s assistant from Lyons. 
However, after the birth of four daughters, Alexandra was desperate to have a male heir 
and seems to have been swayed by his personality. In 1902 he predicted that she would 
soon give birth to a son but the empress appears shortly afterwards to have suffered either 
a false pregnancy or an early miscarriage. Philippe returned to France but the influence of 
Anastasia, Militsa and their circle did not diminish.  It was through their auspices that, in 
1905, the imperial couple met Rasputin whom the empress came to believe could prevent 
her son dying from the effects of haemophilia. The fact that the tsar and empress 
surrounded themselves with such apparently shady characters gave rise to salacious 
rumours of occult and, worse, goings on at Tsarskoe Selo. For some commentators, they 
underpinned Nicholas and Alexandra’s motivation, for others, rumours of ‘dark forces’ at 
work reinforced centuries of perceptions of the Russian court as medieval, backward and 
distinctly un-British.  
      British commentators found the apparent influence of spiritualist practices at the 
Russian court especially fascinating. Observers of all political hues often presented an 
interest in spiritualism as the epitome of superstitious, dissolute and corrupt regime. 
Nonetheless, a belief in the supernatural was well established across Russia throughout all 
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sections of the populace long before Nicholas and Alexandra came to the throne.913 This 
was the case even within educated and aristocratic circles: the court of Alexander II was 
said to have taken an enthusiastic interest in the subject.914 After 1905, when censorship 
was relaxed, a number of “spiritualist” journals were published in Russia. These 
magazines enjoyed a wide readership with topics which ranged from animal magnetism to 
automatic writing.915 However, an interest in the spirit world was also part of a wider 
European phenomenon which took hold amongst all classes during the second half of the 
nineteenth century.916 In Britain, W.T. Stead and Arthur Conan Doyle were just two of its 
most notable adherents and there were claims that Queen Victoria also took a keen 
interest in the subject.917 Nevertheless, despite its eminently respectable devotees, British 
observers continued to present spiritualism at the Russian court as peculiarly Russian, 
sensational, bizarre and politically dangerous.  
    The war years saw the height of the ‘Rasputin Affair’ but, as early as 1908, the popular 
Daily Graphic had reported the existence of unsavoury characters within the imperial 
court and claimed that the tsar ‘had permitted himself to succumb to the magnetism and 
trickery of [disreputable] advisors’.918 In Russia, in 1910, as Simon Dixon tells us, 
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rumours that Rasputin was an enthusiastic member of the notorious religious sect the 
Khlysty were made public.919 For many British observers of Russian affairs, the friendship 
between an empress and Rasputin, a sort of Russian ‘mad mullah’ as Hanbury Williams 
described him was inexplicable.920 Some commentators concluded that the empress must 
be mentally unbalanced. In 1910, the then British ambassador, Sir Arthur Nicolson, 
complained that Robert Wilton had telegraphed The Times claiming that Alexandra was 
‘the victim of a mental disease’.921 Nonetheless, although he believed that this particular 
claim was an unfortunate exaggeration, Nicolson accepted that the empress was showing 
signs of ‘a nervous depression and lassitude’.922  By May 1914 Sir George Buchanan, who 
had replaced Nicolson as Britain’s ambassador in St Petersburg, reported as a fact that, 
not only was Rasputin a member of the Khlysty but he had been made a priest. In addition 
he informed London, as a sign of imperial approval a dacha had been taken for Rasputin 
near the imperial retreat at Livadia.923   
    In the light of such stories, as the war progressed, amongst diplomats and other British 
officials, the empress took on the characteristics of a bête-noire. Together, Alexandra and 
Rasputin were seen to be the ‘dark forces’ which exercised an unnatural control over the 
tsar and were behind every military calamity, every change of minister and every rumour 
of a separate peace.     The heart of British concerns about the empress lay in the 
desperate need to keep Russia in the war.  Russians complained that Britain ought to 
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supply them with more arms and did not believe those who told them that the country 
lacked sufficient for its own use.924   Some British attempts to convince the Russians that 
she was a good ally were comically tragic and indicate a disregard for Russian 
sophistication. In the absence of supplies of shell and rifles the British authorities 
searched around for alternatives including a fleet of ambulance cars. The ambulances 
were transported to St Petersburg however, inspection of them in situ revealed them to be 
‘utterly hopeless and of no practical use at all’.925 Unable even to provide a decent set of 
ambulances for the Russian Red Cross, a mixture of desperation and naïve paternalism, 
promoted a suggestion from Captain Alexander Proctor that ‘a cargo of sugar’ ought to be 
sent to Russia because ‘the childish mind of the moujik and his wife would be impressed 
by such practical sympathy’.926     
    As the situation on the eastern front deteriorated so references to Rasputin in 
diplomatic and other correspondence increased. In August 1915, Buchanan filed the 
following report in which he observed that: ‘the unpopularity of the empress is assuming 
serious proportions [since] it is known that she still sees the monk Rasputin whose private 
life is a scandal’.927 Two months later Buchanan‘s impression was even more grave. He 
told London that ‘hatred is the only word to describe the feeling against the empress’.928 
She and Rasputin are regarded as the tsar’s ‘malignant counsellors’.929 At the start of 
1916, Bruce Lockhart added to the dismal impression, writing that knowledge of 
                                                          
924
 TNA, ADM 1/8434/280, General Sir Alfred Knox to British Admiralty, 19 September 1915.  
925
 TNA, FO 371/2450, Sir George Buchanan to Foreign Office, 27 Oct. 1915. 
926
 Lords, Lloyd George Papers’, E/3/3/1, Captain Alexander Proctor, to Lloyd George, 30 Nov. 1916.  
927
 TNA, 800/75, Sir George Buchanan to Lord Grey, 23 Aug. 1915. 
928
 TNA, FO 800/75, Sir George Buchanan to Lord Grey, 13 Oct. 1915. 
929
 Ibid. 
277 
 
 
 
 
 
Rasputin’s relationship with the empress was no longer confined to elite circles and, as a 
result, ‘the tsar had lost considerable popularity with the common people’.930   As the war 
dragged on gossip circulated in all levels of society suggesting that Alexandra was 
Rasputin’s mistress. Perhaps exhausted by his work and weary of the war Bruce Lockhart 
began to suspect that even these colourful stories about the empress and Rasputin were 
‘were not devoid of truth’.931 By December 1916, even General Sir John Hanbury 
Williams, who had received many kindnesses from the empress, added his weight to the 
clamour against her. On 18 December 1916, in a letter to the Prime Minister, Lloyd 
George in which he claimed that all of Russia had ‘asserted itself against the Rasputin 
clique [making] it seem impossible that the fate of a huge empire should remain much 
longer at the mercy of the plotting of a hysterical woman with [Rasputin] a depraved 
peasant’.932 A popular film made by Gaumont and apparently shown in Russia, told the 
story of a French woman who discovers that her German husband is a spy and shoots him 
dead. The intended moral was that ‘loyalty to the abstract idea of patriotism was more 
important than the love for a human being’.933 For its Russian audience, the film could 
well have seemed an analogy for the tsar, the empress and Rasputin.  
     A reading of Alexandra’s wartime correspondence with her husband shows that she 
was both loyal to Russia and vehemently opposed to the Kaiser’s Germany.  If she did 
hope for an early end to ‘the hideous war’ it was as a result of her experiences treating the 
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wounded in the palace hospital rather than any sympathy with the German Kaiser.934 The 
tsarevich’s English tutor, Charles Sydney Gibbes, later insisted that Alexandra had 
‘voluntarily refused to receive any communication from her relatives on the enemy 
side’.935 However, the empress was extremely close to her brother the Grand Duke of 
Hesse and, although he was a serving officer with the German army, she engaged in 
correspondence with him until least December 1916.936   The evidence as to whether the 
grand duke visited Russia during the war remains inconclusive but it was certainly 
viewed as a distinct possibility, even as an actual fact, by some British officials. For 
example, in July 1915, General John Yarde Buller advised General Kitchener that he had 
‘private information’ that the grand duke of Hesse was in Russia and was actively 
discussing peace terms’.937 Nonetheless, unaware of her private correspondence, 
Buchanan reassured London that the empress had ‘sacrificed all family ties with Germany 
on account of the war’.938 However,  a month after Buchanan’s placatory report, Hanbury 
Williams noted that the Russian newspapers were openly stating that the German grand 
duke was attempting to broker a peace with the empress.939 In the light of such reports 
Francis Bertie, the British ambassador to Paris, worried that ‘the empress and Rasputin 
might persuade the tsar to break the promises he had made to the allies’.940  In October 
1916 Buchanan, hoping to discuss these stories of German sympathisers at the highest 
                                                          
934
 Fuhrmann, Wartime Correspondence, p. 140.  
935
 ‘Unpublished Article by Charles Sydney Gibbes concerning his time with the Imperial Family’ Special 
Collections’, Bodleian Library Oxford.  
936
 Petra H. Kleinpenning (ed.). The Correspondence of the Empress Alexandra of Russia with Ernst 
Ludwig and and Eleonore, Grand Duke and Grand Duchess of Hesse 1878-1916, p. 370.  
937
TNA, FO 800/75, General John Yarde Butler to General Kitchener, 20 Jul. 1915.  
938
 TNA, FO 800/75, Sir George Buchanan, to Lord Grey, 23 Jul. 1915. 
939
 SSEES, Hanbury Williams’ Diary, 19 Aug. 1915.  
940
 Lords, E/3/14/6, Lord Francis Bertie to Sir Charles Hardinge, 24 Aug. 1915. 
279 
 
 
 
 
 
level of the imperial court but ignorant of the tsar’s irritation with diplomats, believed that 
during a visit to imperial headquarters special precautions had been taken to prevent him 
speaking to the tsar on the subject.941  
     In the midst of a terrible war that was consuming thousands of lives it was perhaps 
only to be expected that fraught nerves would imagine pro-German plots. The situation 
was not helped by the imperial couple themselves since they guarded their privacy and 
their family life from the public gaze. In these circumstances it became possible for 
people to believe any wild story which purported to be ‘the truth’ about life at Tsarskoe 
Selo. Not many people from Britain had the chance to meet Nicholas and even less so 
Alexandra and to gauge for themselves their characters, their relationship with each other 
and the truth about the empress’s national allegiances. Rear-Admiral Sir Richard 
Phillimore was one of the few people who were able to meet the imperial couple in 
relatively informal surroundings.  He is notable for the fact that he subsequently 
commented on his experiences in a private letter to his wife rather than in an official 
report as was more common with some of his colleagues at the British Embassy.  
    At a reception at Tsarskoe Selo Phillimore was able to observer both Nicholas and 
Alexandra at relatively close quarters. The tsar lacked the height of some of a number of 
his illustrious predecessors, a fact which was sometimes said to have detrimentally 
affected perceptions of him as a ruler.  However, although Phillimore admitted that 
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Nicholas was not very tall, he insisted he was ‘very manly’.942 In a further observation 
which may well have amused the tsar, given his irritation with assertions that he 
resembled George V, Phillimore noted that he looked ‘not at all like the king’.943   In 
regards to the empress he offered an explanation for Russian antagonism towards her. 
Significantly, it did not include her relationship with Rasputin although this may have 
been because he hesitated to discuss such an unsavoury topic in writing with even with 
his wife. Phillimore was sympathetic, but resigned, to Alexandra’s plight. He asserted that 
the cause of much of her unpopularity was due to the fact that she had numerous 
daughters but only one son and that she spent her time nursing instead of travelling about 
the country to see the people.  Thus, he wrote, ‘she is not now beautiful but you can see 
that she is very womanly. Her face was sad. I thought she spoke with deep feeling about 
everything. It is sad to think that so good a woman should be so unpopular in Russia but 
so she is. The people think she ought not to nurse in hospitals herself but visit them and 
show herself. They are [also] very angry with her for having daughters instead of sons’.944  
During early January 1917, as part of the Allied Mission to Russia, Major General Sir 
John Headlam was also received at Tsarskoe Selo.945 In a letter home, in which he too 
noted that Nicholas did not look like George V,  he described the Russian court in terms 
which fulfilled stereotypical British expectations of it as a mixture of riches tinged with 
Asiatic or uncivilised aspects. It also contradicted other British impressions of the 
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relatively simple lifestyle led by the tsar and empress. Thus, he reported, the imperial 
court is ‘a magnificent sight [with] great beauty [but] with some barbaric survivals’.946 
What these apparently uncultured elements were Headlam did not elaborate but his 
description fitted with British impressions of the Russian court which had been 
commonplace since the reign of Tsar Ivan IV. In the wake of the revolution, as we shall 
discuss in Chapter 7, rumours that the empress had kept Nicholas in a drugged induced 
stupor enjoyed common currency. It may be that Headlam was privée to these rumours 
because he contradicted these claims when he noted that far from being apathetic the tsar 
was ‘alert and vigorous’ and ‘looked interested’ with whoever he was talking to.947 
(iii) December 1916: Murder of Rasputin 
 Rasputin’s death had been reported in the summer of 1914 when he was the victim of an 
assassination attempt in Siberia. He was seriously wounded by Khina Gusseva but he 
lived a further two years. On 30 December 1916 Rasputin was finally murdered at the 
home of Prince Yusoupov, one of the richest men in Russia.948 Nearly a century after his 
death, the dramatic circumstances of his murder, the poisoned cakes, the gunshots and his 
grave beneath the ice of the River Neva, as well as suggestions of possible British 
connivance in his fate, continue to fascinate.949  
  When news of his murder was made known to officials in London the press was 
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instructed by the government to avoid mentioning Rasputin’s association with the 
‘highest personage in the land’ but British diplomats and government ministers discussed 
the implications of his murder and looked back over the whole ‘Rasputin affair’.950 In a 
report to Whitehall Francis Lindley, Senior Counsellor at the Embassy, sought to put 
Rasputin’s murder in context. In particular he noted that ‘the scandalous stories about the 
relations of this man with certain members of the imperial family, although possibly quite 
untrue, were felt by patriotic Russians to be an intolerable humiliation to their country. 
For my part I have never heard anyone have a good word to say about the tsar or empress 
and their assassination is quite openly discussed. No one is shocked by it’.951 On 2 January 
1917 Buchanan admitted that more assassinations were expected to follow and that a list 
had been drawn up of intended targets, including members of ‘the empress’s so-called 
clique’.952  
     Rasputin was buried, in the presence of Nicholas, Alexandra and their four daughters, 
near the imperial palace at Tsarskoe Selo. In so publicly showing their support for the 
dead man it seemed to the British ambassador that the imperial couple were ignoring 
Russian public opinion. On 13 January 1917 Buchanan exasperatedly described how 
Rasputin had been ‘buried as if he was a sainted martyr’.953 The elites in particular had 
welcomed Rasputin’s death. It now seemed to Buchanan that in their response to 
Rasputin’s murder the imperial couple were alienating the natural supporters of the 
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autocracy. At a loss to discover a rational explanation he concluded that they were 
‘possessed of madness [and were] wantonly courting disaster’.954    
     Those who had plotted against Rasputin had hoped that his death would either shock 
the empress into withdrawing from politics or that Nicholas might send her to a convent, 
a traditional place of exile for bothersome consorts. On the contrary, his murder seemed 
only to bring the couple closer together.  Moreover, a little over a fortnight after 
Rasputin’s death, Buchanan offered an assessment of the situation which indicated that 
although the assassins had succeeded in killing Rasputin they had not ended his influence 
in the covert goings on at the imperial court. In his missive to London the ambassador’s 
frustration was clear, as he declared that: ‘it was thought that Rasputin was dead: this was 
a mistake, Rasputin was killed and even buried after a funeral service attended by the 
imperial family but he is not dead. He is daily invoked in the secret councils at Tsarskoe 
Selo’ the tsar and empress ‘are isolated and appear like a besieged fortress’.955   The 
imperial couple’s reaction to Rasputin’s murder has been seen as a factor which led to the 
tsar’s abdication. In retrospect, it can seem inevitable.  However, at the time not everyone 
agreed with Buchanan’s gloomy prognosis. Charles Hardinge was notably more 
optimistic. Perhaps he was unaware of the extent to which the divide between senior 
members of the imperial family and Nicholas and Alexandra had grown in the years since 
he had served in St Petersburg.  Perhaps it was distance which caused him to fail to 
understand the rupture in the relationship between the tsar and many of his subjects as a 
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result of Rasputin’s alleged sway over the empress. Although he admitted that the ‘whole 
Rasputin incident had been disgusting from the very beginning’, he retained ‘immense 
faith’ in the tsar and believed that he had been afforded ‘sufficient breathing space’ to 
save his throne.956   
     In spite of the strictures by the Press Bureau the story of Rasputin’s murder was too 
big for the British press to ignore. Reactions varied.  For example, at the beginning of 
January 1917 The Times did not conceal from its readers Alexandra’s friendship with 
Rasputin but the newspaper’s discussion was relegated to page eight when overseas news 
more typically appeared on page five.  The article sought to play down Rasputin’s 
influence in political and military affairs. Ignoring the historical record, which showed 
that the empress had not met Rasputin until 1905, the article asserted that although the 
‘empress was said to have attributed the birth of her son to Rasputin there was no instance 
of his interference in public affairs’.957 Clearly The Times had no proof that Rasputin had 
lacked influence over events, indeed the newspaper’s assertion flew in the face of a 
myriad rumours to the contrary. Unlike The Times, the Daily Mirror was seemingly 
determined not to play down the drama of Rasputin. Erroneously describing him as a man 
of the cloth, its front-page headline splashed sensationally: ‘Mystery of the Death of the 
Monk Rasputin’.958 Perhaps wanting to give this ‘patriotic act’ a specifically British tinge 
and thereby to share in some of the ‘glory’ the article noted that Prince Yusoupov had 
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been a student at Oxford before the war.959  
      For centuries British commentators had portrayed Russia as an antique, backward 
nation where ‘irrational’ beliefs in household demons and evil spirits were an accepted 
part of life.960 In its coverage of Rasputin’s death, the Manchester Guardian, in keeping 
with its non-conformist roots which rejected such superstitions, declared that his murder 
had brought to an end a ‘hideous medieval nightmare’.961 For its part the Spectator was 
apparently unable to fully comprehend the phenomenon of Rasputin and could only 
compare his death to a popular melodrama. An article in the periodical on 6 January 1917 
opined: ‘Nothing has been more sensational and more reminiscent of blue lights and the 
accents of war and suspense from the orchestra than the murder of the monk Rasputin; the 
round hold cut in the ice, the footmarks on the snow, the drops of blood, the recovery of 
the body dented with wounds, the suspicion that the wounded man was killed at the 
palace of one of the most outstanding families in Russia [are] too theatrical for real life 
and yet, they happened.’962   
         Some commentators may really have believed that Rasputin had taken Holy Orders 
but for others it simply added a frisson to stories of his more notorious activities. The 
more lurid aspects of the ‘Rasputin story’ provided material for several novels by the 
thriller writer William Le Queux. Before the war Le Queux had made a name for himself 
writing fictional tales of a German invasion of Britain. In his novels about Rasputin 
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symbolised all that was fantastical, medieval, alien and distasteful about Russia. In 1916 
patriotic novels, such those written by Le Queux, were amongst the most read in the 
British army.963 They seem not to have been subject to the same censorship as the press 
and, as a result, Le Queux seems to have been able to portray Alexandra in a detrimental 
light with impunity. Although the empress was the wife of an allied leader and a cousin of 
the king, she was depicted in his plots as a domineering, evil, and very dangerous woman.   
      In an attempt to give his Rasputin novels credibility to his ludicrous accounts of life in 
Tsarskoe Selo, Le Queux invariably prefaced them with the claim that he had been given 
the information by ‘patriotic Russians’ who wished to alert the British public to the nature 
of the empress’s relationship with Rasputin. In his first fictional account of life in the 
palace, Le Queux ‘revealed’ the extent of Rasputin’s power over the imperial couple. He 
quoted Rasputin as saying: ‘the empress does my bidding […] Nikki [the Tsar] only 
smiles as an idiot therefore am I not the real emperor of Russia?’ 964 In another chapter Le 
Queux described how Alexandra greeted Rasputin when he returned to the palace after 
some absence. According to Le Queux in a highly emotional state ‘the hysterical woman 
[fell] on her knees […] wildly kissing [Rasputin’s] dirty hands’. 965   In a second novel, 
the title of which Minister of Evil: The Secret History of Rasputin’s Betrayal of Russia 
summarised the plot Le Queux accused the empress of worse crimes than being enthralled 
to a so-called monk.  In a damming indictment which would have left his readers in no 
doubt as to the danger posed by Alexandra, Le Queux revealed that she was surrounded 
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‘by German servants and herself spoke with a pronounced German accent which 
reminded people that she was not a true born Russian’.966  Amidst all the rumours of 
scandalous tales of life in the imperial household, references to a medieval past, 
melodramas and secret plots to sign a separate peace with Germany, rational explanations 
for Rasputin’s influence were rare. In the press and in cheap novels at least, mundane 
reasons behind the empress’s relationship with Rasputin did not sell newspapers. One 
person who did attempt to put the friendship in context was William Birkbeck.  In light of 
his understanding of Russia’s wandering ‘holy men’, although he agreed with more 
popular assertions that Rasputin had hypnotic powers, he insisted that it was Alexandra’s 
devotion to her religion which had been the source of his influence. In the knowledge that 
Rasputin had not only met with had met with, but had impressed high-ranking and 
influential members of the St Petersburg clergy, Birkbeck explained that Rasputin had 
come to the imperial court not ‘as the monster of popular imagination [but] as a starets or 
reputable spiritual adviser’.967 The Saturday Review magazine rejected the idea that any 
Russian starets might be a holy person, let alone Rasputin. In an article which reflected 
both the horror and the titillating fascination with which the British public regarded 
Rasputin the Review described him thus: ‘his manners were disgusting even for a 
[peasant]. In Russia these holy men [are] arrant rascals who wander up and down the 
land. One can only stand aghast at the power which seemed to have come over the whole 
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[female] sex from princesses to peasants’. 968 
(iv) March 1917: Abdication 
In January and February 1917 representatives of the allied powers met at Tsarskoe Selo. 
The atmosphere of intrigue, plots and gossip was hardly conducive to promoting inter-
allied confidence.  The head of the British Mission, Lord Milner, informed Lloyd George 
that the internal situation in Russia was on a knife-edge. Every member of the mission he 
said heard from all sides of ‘the inevitability of something happening the only question 
was whether the emperor, the empress or Mr Protopopov [the Interior Minister] would be 
removed or perhaps all three. No one could say how the power of the empress for evil 
could be broken’.969  On 1 March a further confidential report on the mission was 
submitted by a senior clerk in the Foreign Office. He made some interesting observations 
about the political situation in Russia both of which turned out to be incorrect.
970
  Firstly, 
he reported that a number of Russians who opposed the current regime believed Milner 
had intended to offer Nicholas the post of supreme commander of the Allied Armies, thus 
necessitating his departure and the appointment of a liberal-minded regent’.971  Secondly, 
despite the obvious existence of forces, within the court, which were opposed to the tsar, 
he concluded optimistically that ‘there will not be a revolution before the war is over’.972  
   On 13 March 1917 Milner submitted a full report of his impressions of the Allied 
Conference to the War Cabinet in London. He complained about the superficiality of 
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many of the discussions, the presence of court hangers on and persons whose loyalties 
were suspect as well as the frequent changes of ministers. However, his conclusion was at 
variance with his list of complaints. Seemingly swayed by centuries of British perceptions 
that ‘the autocracy alone’ held Russia together he expressed confidence that ‘talk of [a 
popular] revolution was greatly exaggerated’.973  
        The day following Milner’s optimistic assessment of Russia’s future the tsar entered 
the final crisis of his reign. In Whitehall, the British government instructed the Press 
Bureau ‘not to pass anything relating to any internal trouble in Russia’.974 On, the same 
day, the 14 March Buchanan reported to London that he had met with the tsar’s brother, 
Grand Duke Mikhail, who had told him of plans by senior members of the Duma to 
approach the tsar directly in order to obtain his agreement to form a government which 
had the confidence of the nation. Buchanan noted that he had told the grand duke he 
would urge the tsar ‘in the name of King George, who had sincere affection for him, to 
sign the manifesto and show himself to the people in order to effect a complete 
reconciliation with them’.975 The following day, March 15 1917, under considerable 
pressure from his generals and members of the Duma, Nicholas abdicated his throne for 
himself and for his son. The autocracy, which Milner had insisted was the glue which 
held Russia together, was swept away. 
   Although the press had been forbidden to refer to the political news from Russia 
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Nicholas’s abdication was too big a story to suppress.  British responses to the news were 
varied.  Some were sympathetic to the tsar’s plight while others called him a man of 
honour and reiterated earlier reports of his desire to pursue the war until victory. A 
number were delighted that the autocracy had been overthrown and revelled in the sight 
of the red flag flying from the imperial palace in St Petersburg.  None predicted the 
advent of a Red Terror and the brutal murder of the tsar, empress and their children in less 
than eighteen months.   
    At the time of his abdication Nicholas had ruled Russia for twenty-three years. He had 
twice embarked on a costly war and the country had several times been convulsed by 
violence. However, Russia had endured many such crises and the Romanov dynasty were 
such an integral feature of British perceptions of Russia that it seemed impossible to 
imagine her without the crown.   Therefore, a number of commentators assumed that a 
constitutional monarchy would be established, failing to realise the depth of feeling 
against the tsar as a person, the monarchy as an institution and the relative strength of the 
opposition.  For example, the Westminster Gazette (a supporter of the governing Liberal 
party) reported the reassurances of a Russian diplomat in London that the tsar was ‘in 
perfect safety at Tsarskoe Selo’ and that the revolution was ‘not a move against the 
dynasty’.976  The Daily Chronicle’s front page headline, perhaps basing its account on the 
same sources, informed its readers that the empress was ‘under guard’ but indicated a 
smooth transition from autocracy to a democratic state was more than likely and that ‘a 
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limited monarchy’ would be established in Russia within days.977 In the light of its 
understanding of Russian history Blackwood’s Magazine reflected on Nicholas’s reign 
and explained his overthrow as a specifically Russian phenomenon. Thus the periodical 
declared: ‘the sudden deposition of the tsar seems strange to us [but in] Russia it is but a 
common experience that a Romanov should be superseded or suppressed’.978  Having 
dealt with the abdication in a matter of fact way Blackwood’s discussed the role of 
Rasputin and in doing so reiterated British images of as Russia a society with only the 
thinnest veneer of civilisation ‘a land of late development’ where a ‘hideous creature’ 
such as Rasputin could flourish.979     
     Popular expectations of a Russian tsar were rooted in an earlier era, long before the 
dawning of the twentieth century with its industrialisation and a world war involving 
thousands of civilians as well as soldiers and sailors which could be communicated in the 
columns of cheaply available newspapers. The tsar’s political failure seemed to contrast 
with his apparently successful encounters with the Russian people. During the jubilee 
years of 1909, 1912 and 1913 as well as at the outbreak of war in 1904 and again in 1914 
commentators observing persuasive scenes of loyalty suggested that Nicholas had only to 
show himself more frequently in order to cement a close bond with his people. Following 
the abdication these scenes of public enthusiasm were the focus of interest for Professor 
James Young Simpson.  A professor of natural sciences at New College Edinburgh, he 
was also a  member of the Political Intelligence Department at the Foreign Office and 
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subsequently a delegate to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, he published an article in 
Nineteenth Century and After in which he discussed the tsar’s reception in Moscow 
during the celebrations to mark his coronation.980  The article entitled ‘Russia’s Self-
Realisation’ noted ‘the wild acclamation of the multitude, but Simpson concluded that 
this sense of unity had been illusory because the task of ruling had been beyond 
Nicholas.981  
Throughout Nicholas’s reign, particularly at moments of crisis, a number of British 
commentators’ had argued that the tsar had been kept in the dark about events by ‘the 
bureaucracy’ by ‘a court camarilla’ or, more latterly, by ‘pro-German dark forces’.  It was 
in such a vein that the Church Times defended the tsar. Nicholas had abdicated leaving a 
country divided, an army much depleted, a wife hated and despised and a once mighty 
dynasty in turmoil, and his capital city threatened by the mob. However, for the Church 
Times the tsar’s personal culpability, his weakness or the fact that he was seemingly 
unable to prevent others making decisions on his behalf, mattered less than the fact that 
‘he had carried himself with dignity’.982    
    At this stage public accusation of the empress’s betrayal of the allied cause was largely 
limited to the pages of fantastical novels. Therefore recollections that she and the tsar had 
close ties with the British royal family could still be published without seeming harm to 
the British monarchy. The Daily Mirror which was one of the first popular newspapers to 
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report the abdication chose to focus its article on Nicholas’s ties with George V ‘to whom 
he bears a striking resemblance’.983 In addition, the Mirror considered the tsar’s character. 
Was he a man of peace or a tsar who violently suppressed opposition or had he been a 
reforming tsar who had sought to modernise Russia’s political institutions. The Mirror 
summed up the perception of many when it asserted that the last tsar had been ‘one of the 
most enigmatic characters in the history of modern Europe’.984 The supposed role of 
Rasputin in Russian affairs had, of course, been the subject of speculation. In an allusion 
to claims that his murder had been a patriotic act the Mirror asserted that ‘the killing of 
Rasputin was the match which set fire to [a] vast heap of patriotic determination’.985   
   In its coverage of events from Russia the Daily Express showed its parochial side for 
which some of the British press was noted. Thus, the newspaper assured its readers that 
‘the British in [St Petersburg] were unhurt’.986 In respect of the tsar, the Express’s 
editorial was extremely sympathetic. It reiterated positive images which had been popular 
since Nicholas’s accession, a well meaning ruler whose efforts to change Russia for the 
better were thwarted by those who should have served him. In an article which challenged 
the official record the Express informed its readers that fallen monarch was an ‘autocrat 
with good intentions who [had] openly professed democratic principles [but the 
reactionary] bureaucracy had ruled the tsar and not the tsar the bureaucracy’.987 In its 
discussion of the abdication the Westminster Gazette also took a kindly view of 
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Nicholas’s decision to abdicate. The article spoke of the ‘pathos and dignity of the final 
act’ and, whether through choice or the necessities of political expediency, the Gazette 
did not refer to Bloody Sunday and the violent suppression of unrest which had marred 
the tsar’s reign.988  Instead the periodical gave the impression that Nicholas’s record was 
unblemished since it insisted that: ‘from the beginning of his reign until now [Nicholas 
has been a] good man with honourable intentions’.989       Although telegrams from Russia 
gave little room for doubt as to the veracity of events in Russia there was some doubt in 
Britain as to whether Nicholas had really given up the throne because he did not proceed 
immediately to St Petersburg. An article in the Scotsman for example, was of the opinion 
that although the tsar had ‘not yet abdicated’ but a new government was at work which 
would ‘shortly announce reforms’.990 Stephen Graham, writing in The Times, also unsure 
as to the nature of developments in Russia, offered the following elegiac response should 
the news prove to be correct:  ‘If the tsar has abdicated he has acted nobly, undoubtedly 
he could have found forces greater than those at the disposal of the Duma and fought a 
civil war shedding the blood of thousands and devastating his own country [but] he has 
been consistently a monarch of ideals’.991   
    On 16 March the Daily Express had seemed to accept that Nicholas had renounced the 
throne and had offered a melancholic response which highlighted the tsar’s positive 
qualities. The newspaper declared: ‘no man was ever a better husband or father [who had] 
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always desired to be the servant of the people’.992  The following day however, the 
newspaper appeared less certain its front-page headline screamed: ‘Where is the tsar? The 
tsar is missing!’ The ensuing article claimed that his train had been twice stopped by 
revolutionaries but that he had not been found aboard. As for Alexandra, she was said by 
the newspaper to be ‘hysterical’.993  
     By 19 March there was no longer any doubt that the tsar had indeed abdicated.  The 
Daily News reported that the total number of casualties of the revolution were no  ‘more 
than 1,000’ but included one Englishman who, attempting to view events in the streets of 
St Petersburg, had ‘slipped from the roof’ and been killed.994  The Times, in its role as the 
serious newspaper of the establishment, might have been expected to take a more 
detached view of events than other publications.  However, the newspaper headlined its 
account of the abdication in homely terms of the type more often seen in the popular 
press: ‘The Tsar’s final ordeal-I cannot part with my boy’.995 The article itself averred that 
Nicholas’s ‘private sorrows and sufferings [at this time were] calculated to soften the 
stoniest heart’. 996   Nicholas’s preferred method of government was rooted in an earlier 
era, a mythical period in Russian history when the tsar and the Russian people were 
united in a common bond of love and mutual respect, sympathy and understanding. In 
Nicholas’s eyes it was a time when the mass of Russians had unquestioningly looked not 
to elected institutions for their well-being but to their tsar who understood their needs. 
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Nicholas had been frustrated in his desire to rule in the style of his medieval ancestors 
but, the Church Times insisted, his ‘personal integrity, love of country and affection for 
his people’ were never in doubt.997  
Although much of the press did not dwell on the reality of the tsar’s political record 
inevitably, given the longevity of British opposition to the tsarist regime, not all reports of 
the abdication sentimentalised Nicholas’s fall from power. Indeed, the understanding 
given to the fallen monarch by some newspapers aroused the suspicions of the Liberal 
M.P. Robert Outhwaite.  He complained that the many positive stories came, not from 
any genuine depth of feeling towards the deposed monarch, but because the government 
had ordered the press not to say anything negative about the former tsar.998  An official at 
the British Embassy was equally impatient with the British newspaper coverage. He 
lambasted what he called the ‘imbecile articles and crocodile tears’ of some sections of 
the British press and in particular he ridiculed suggestions that Nicholas had been 
sympathetic to the needs of his people as ‘ludicrous and absurd’.999   In keeping with such 
scepticism, the Russian Co-operator magazine was elated by the news that the tsar had 
abdicated. The short lived magazine, published by the Joint Committee of Russian Co-
operative Organisations in London (1917-1921), declared that ‘the long nightmare of 
oppression is over. The red flag is flying over the Winter Palace. The brutal and short 
sighted stained in blood autocracy had gone forever’.1000  The tone of the radical Daily 
                                                          
997
 Church Times, 23 Mar. 1917, p. 257.  
998
 Robert Outhwaite M.P. for Hanley, in Hansard, vol. 92, 24 Apr. 1917. 
999
 TNA, FO 371/2996, M. Lawley to Foreign Office, 28 Apr. 1917. 
1000
 The Russian Co-operator, 17 Mar. 1917, pp. 1-2.  
297 
 
 
 
 
 
News and Leader was equally euphoric, yet tinged with a sombre air as it reviewed 
Russia’s recent past. There was no place in the article for the sentimentalism which 
characterised accounts in some other British newspapers. Pity was reserved for the 
thousands of Russian soldiers, which the newspaper believed had died because the 
autocracy had betrayed them to the enemy. According to the article, now that the 
autocracy was gone: 
 There is spring in the air and there is spring in the souls of men. Russia is free, she has 
broken her chains. The host of brave Russians whose bones litter the soil from the 
Carpathians to the Pinsk marshes have not died in vain. They were left without weapons 
in their hands to be slaughtered by an enemy with whom their rulers were in secret 
sympathy. While they were being mown down […] one clique of pro-Germans fell to be 
succeeded by another yet more noxious. The empress and Rasputin always triumphed.1001   
 
   An article in the same newspaper on 20 March 1917 written by Arthur Ransome was 
headlined: ’Russia’s Day of Joy: Men call each other Comrade’.1002 It was less vitriolic 
than that which had been published a few days earlier but it was no more sympathetic to 
the fallen monarch.  Ransome claimed Nicholas had been kept in a state of drunkenness’ 
by his suite which had feared to tell him the truth about the unrest in St Petersburg.1003 
Ransome’s article managed to combine elements of traditional British perceptions of a 
tsar’s difficult relationship with his ministers and his court, as well as giving the 
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impression that Nicholas was a drunkard, susceptible to the influence of more dominating 
characters.   
    As Nicholas’s biographer, Dominic Lieven, reminds us, when the tsar signed the 
instrument of abdication he relinquished a burden which was far greater than that 
expected to be shouldered by any democratic politician.1004 The Daily Chronicle 
understood that the tsar’s military and political burdens would have been beyond even the 
most ruthless autocrat.  The newspaper argued that Nicholas had abdicated because he 
was ‘tired of everything’.1005  The Guardian concurred with the view that the tsar had 
unwillingly accepted the crown but more positively noted that far from revelling in the 
wealth and power of a tsar, Nicholas had envied the ‘simple [life] of an English country 
gentleman’.1006 However, there were others who failed to understand that Nicholas had 
been overwhelmed by the cascade of political, economic and military issues with which 
he had to deal. Francis Lindley rebuked the tsar for having given precedence to his 
personal desires over the needs of the nation and the dynasty. In a report to Whitehall the 
embassy official noted the scathing impressions of those he said were ‘closest’ to the tsar 
who castigated Nicholas for having ‘sacrificed the monarchy for purely egotistical 
reasons’.1007  
   Critical and baffled reactions such as those of Francis Lindley were coloured by the fact 
that, in spite of his fall from power, the tsar appeared imperturbable. Commentators such 
as Lindley failed to accept that his outward calm was symptom of a man who was 
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mentally and physically exhausted.  Indeed, so unexpected was the tsar’s abdication in 
some quarters that it was said he had either been given drugs by a person of malevolent 
intent or he had acted as a result of an addiction to alcohol.  Albert Stopford counted 
amongst his Russian friends Prince Felix Yusoupov and Grand Dukes Boris and Kyril 
Vladimirovich and he is said to have frequently dined with S.D. Sazonov, Russia’s 
wartime foreign minister. Stopford’s official role in Russo-British affairs remains 
somewhat mysterious. However, it may have been as a result of discussion with his 
highly placed friends that led him to assert that empress’s influence over her husband had 
been helped by his tendency to ‘intemperance’.1008 Whatever his sources, Stopford was 
not alone in alleging that alcohol had played a significant role in recent events. For 
example, an article by John Pollock in the Nineteenth Century and After implied that 
under the influence of alcohol, Nicholas may have blurted out Russia’s battle plans and 
other wartime secrets to persons outside of his military circle.  According to Pollock the 
tsar’s ‘garrulousness and drunkenness had become a byword for all that was wrong in 
Russia’.1009   Confirmation that the tsar enjoyed an exceptional fondness for alcohol 
apparently came from an impeccably placed source-the empress’s controversial friend, 
Anna Vyrubova.  In an interview with the journalist Childe Dorr, Vyrubova noted 
rumours that the empress encouraged Nicholas’s weakness for drink in order to keep him 
in a ‘muddled headed’ state of mind.1010 However, although she admitted that he did 
‘drink too much’ she insisted that Alexandra had encouraged him to fight his addiction 
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but that members of the imperial court had played on the tsar’s love of alcohol in order to 
advance their own interests.1011  
    Childe Dorr’s account of Vyrubova’s narrative of life behind the palace walls may 
have been accurate or it may have been influenced by the repetition of rumours then 
swirling around St Petersburg. However, court intimates, or those who spoke for them, 
were not the only ones who implied that Nicholas may not always have been fully 
compos mentis during the finally months of his reign. The British ambassador suspected 
that there was an especially sinister cause behind the tsar’s unexpected decision to 
abdicate. As a result of conversations with members of the aristocratic elite, Buchanan 
concluded that the tsar had abdicated without thought for the dynasty or the nation and he 
believed he knew why. At the end of April 1917 he informed London that Prince 
Yusoupov had come to the embassy to tell him that ‘someone close’ to Nicholas (the 
inference being that it was Alexandra) had given him drugs in order to induce an 
apparently supine state.1012 The story was extraordinary but the ambassador explained that 
he was inclined to believe the prince since he had been told the very same story by his 
‘good friend’ Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich who had argued that drugs alone could 
alone explain the tsar’s ‘childish indifference to the loss of his crown’.1013 
    Amongst the sensational claims that Alexandra had plied her husband with drink and 
drugs there were few, save Vyrubova, who defended the former empress. However, there 
was at least one British observer of Russian affairs who offered a sympathetic explanation 
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of Alexandra’s actions. This was Commander Oliver Locker Lampson.  Head of the 
British Naval Car Division in Russia, Locker Lampson asserted, like so many others, 
(invariably men), that the empress ‘was always hysterical’.1014 However, he offered a 
fairly rational explanation for her behaviour, blaming her poor state of mind on her son’s 
tardy birth and the dowager empress’s refusal to give up her rights of precedence.1015  
    The years between 1914 and 1917 were amongst the richest with regard to British 
perceptions of Nicholas and Alexandra.  British images of the tsar and empress during 
these years saw a confusion of emotions. They began with the euphoria in August 1914 
when it seemed that tsar and all his subjects, even the Duma, were united against 
Germany, to a feeling of pathos upon learning of Nicholas’s abdication in March 1917. In 
discussing Alexandra, commentators praised her activities as a nurse and her love of 
Britain but they also pondered the rumours of pro-German plots and whispers that the 
empress was working to betray the allies as well as disquiet over the role seemingly 
assumed by Rasputin as a result of Nicholas’s absence at imperial headquarters.  
    The motifs employed by British commentators during these years to explain the 
behaviour of the tsar his empress were based on centuries of British perceptions of Russia 
and her rulers. All the familiar tropes were still there: peasant loyalty, to Russian 
backwardness and superstition, to the tsar’s desire for power, not for its own sake but for 
the love of his people and to the interference in political affairs by nefarious officials and 
members of the Romanov family. In some quarters there was delight that the autocracy 
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had been overthrown and there was credulity at some of the positive characteristics 
attributed to Nicholas. More frequently, there was admiration and respect for the tsar who 
had shouldered the burden of supreme power for twenty-three years.  
     Responses to Alexandra during these years were perhaps more complicated. They 
began positively enough and British commentators who spent time with her in private 
were often understanding of her plight. In the last months of the regime however, the 
simmering tensions of war facilitated a torrent of suspicion and even hatred towards the 
empress on account of her German birth and her relationship with Rasputin. In this 
respect it is noticeable that the understanding given to the tsar was absent in regards to 
Alexandra. Nicholas who had signed the instrument of abdication at the height of a war 
he was fighting with Britain met with generally laudatory remarks. The empress, who had 
only sought to do the best for her husband and her adopted country, was castigated 
privately in diplomatic correspondence and the subject of much negative speculation and 
accusation publicly in the press and elsewhere. In the coming months, in the press and 
elsewhere, the balance was partially redressed and some of the understanding given to 
Nicholas was also accorded the empress when her terrible fate became known. 
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Chapter 7: March 1917-September 1918: Imprisonment and Death 
When Nicholas II began to reign in November 1894, he was only twenty-six years old. 
Mild, amiable and thoughtful, he was regarded with universal hope and goodwill. 
Ardently desirous of the welfare of his people he was convinced it could not be attained 
except by him.1016 
In every rank of society it was freely said that the nation and the army was sold by the 
empress’s minions and that she aimed at obtaining a regency to replace the emperor 
[and] to force upon Russia a separate peace which, while ruining forever the hopes of 
progress might save her native Germany. 1017  
For five months following his abdication Nicholas lived under arrest with his family at 
Tsarskoe Selo. He passed his days teaching his children Russian history, reading popular 
novels and Russian classics, clearing the ice from the canals and, when spring came, 
planting a vegetable garden.1018  Then, in August 1917, the imperial family were taken by 
train and paddle steamer to the small Siberian town of Tobolsk; the following spring they 
were transferred in still unexplained circumstances to the Ural city of Yekaterinburg. 
      In the immediate aftermath of the tsar’s abdication Britain’s public solidarity with the 
tsarist regime was abandoned. A majority in the House of Commons sent the Duma its 
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‘fraternal greetings’ and to the Russian people its ‘heartfelt congratulations’.1019  For 
political and military reasons, British criticism of the absolutist nature of the imperial 
regime had been held in check before 1917 for fear of alienating an important ally. After 
Nicholas’s overthrow this was no longer necessary.  As a result of the revolution, the 
British government hoped that Russia and Britain might more vigorously prosecute the 
war against Germany, ‘the stronghold of autocratic militarism which threatens the liberty 
of Europe’.1020  A further indication that the British establishment at least no longer 
needed to present an image of wholehearted support for Nicholas occurred within days of 
his abdication. In January 1916, in the king’s name the British government had been 
content to make the tsar an honorary Field Marshal of the British Army.1021 However, less 
than a week after his abdication, the War Office enquired of Buckingham Palace whether 
the deposed tsar should remain on the army lists. In retrospect the king’s wary attitude 
towards Nicholas was evident even then. Replying on behalf of George V, Sir Reginald 
Brade advised that the tsar’s name should remain on the lists, adding somewhat 
lukewarmly, ‘at least for the time being’.1022  
   At first it had seemed possible that Nicholas might continue to reside in Russia after his 
abdication. On 17 March an enquiry from the British ambassador to the provisional 
government as to the tsar’s intentions had been met with the response that he proposed to 
go to Livadia in the Crimea.1023 The Daily News and Leader reported Nicholas as saying 
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that he hoped to spend his time tending the palace gardens.1024 However, fearing for his 
safety, the dowager empress and the Grand Duke Aleksandr Mikhailovich (husband of 
Nicholas’s sister Xenia) believed that the tsar should leave Russia without delay, if 
necessary under British military protection.1025  On 22 March 1917, the British War 
Cabinet noted that in the ‘interests of his personal safety [..] the best plan would be to 
invite the tsar and empress to take up residence in this country’.1026  British military 
personnel located in Russia were best placed to offer effective protection to the deposed 
tsar. General Hanbury Williams, as the self-styled ‘doyen of the Allied mission’, and on 
account of his personal sympathy for the tsar, advised London that time was ‘of the 
essence’ and offered to travel with Nicholas to the port of Murmansk.1027 Perhaps sensing 
that his offer on behalf of the deposed sovereign might prove controversial, Hanbury 
Williams reminded Whitehall that the British ambassador had already offered official 
protection to another cousin of the king, Grand Duchess Victoria Melita. Significantly, 
the grand duchess was, by birth, a German princess.1028  As it later transpired, time was 
indeed of the essence but, in the days immediately following his abdication, Nicholas 
returned to Mogilev where he spent time with his mother and made his farewells to the 
army.  In the meantime, George V began to have doubts as to the suitability of England as 
a place of exile. At a meeting with Lloyd George, the king’s private secretary Lord 
Stamfordham, demanded to know how the tsar planned to maintain a lifestyle suitable to 
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his rank, brushed off suggestions that Nicholas might reside at Sandringham, and ruled 
out the possibility of Balmoral on the grounds of climate.1029  He did not suggest an 
alternative residence within the British Isles.  
      While talks about the tsar’s future went on behind closed doors, as early as 19 March 
1917, newspapers in Britain discussed the possibility of imperial exile in England.1030  At 
first the suggestion had seemed entirely reasonable. The tsar had been Britain’s ally in the 
war against the Central Powers for nearly three years in addition, both he and Alexandra 
were cousins of the king.  In the following months, as commentators mulled over the 
implications of the abdication, a number concluded that the need to cultivate good 
relations with the provisional government militated against permitting the imperial couple 
to be a guest of the British government and, de facto, the king. The many benign wartime 
images of Nicholas and Alexandra, with which, hitherto, the British public had largely 
been presented, were replaced by a succession of accusations against the empress in 
particular.  
     In the years before the war the British had lauded German society for its culture and 
progressive social policies. After August 1914 this was no longer deemed politic and 
Britain experienced waves of spy mania and anti-German hysteria. Many hundreds of 
men of German origin were interred, others were subject to police restrictions and a 
number were deported. In 1915 and again in 1916 German communities and their 
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businesses in London and elsewhere were the victims of mob violence.1031 In the 
heightened tension caused by the war which was far from won, reports of embedded 
German dominance at the Russian court and claims that Alexandra had been at the centre 
of German talks to sign a separate peace were accepted as fact in many quarters.  In an 
article for the colonial Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Archibald Francis Steuart revealed 
to his readers the depth and longevity of German influence over Russia.  He bemoaned 
what he said were the years of German suppression of Russian talents which he blamed 
on the generations of German princesses at court who had ‘despised and feared all native 
progress [and] dreaded and persecuted’ all aspects of native Russian culture.1032   
     Emboldened by events in Russia, the communist trade unionist Thomas Mann called 
on his fellow countrymen to establish their own workers and soldiers soviets.1033  Like 
their political brethren in Russia a soviet administration in Britain would have had little 
need of a monarch, even a constitutional one. The Trade Union Worker magazine, 
explained that since a king reigns solely because he is the son of his father a republic was 
the ‘only intelligent form of government’.1034  
By its very nature, the readership of the Trade Union Worker was limited to a narrow 
interest group. Its views could be interpreted as extreme, unrepresentative and therefore 
unlikely to carry weight with a majority of the populace.  However, British 
republicanism, which had been a feature of Victoria’s widowhood, had not been entirely 
                                                          
1031
 Panayi, The Enemy in our Midst, pp. 223-58. 
1032
 Stueart, Russian Revolution, p. 336.  
1033
 Laurence Thompson, The Enthusiasts: A Biography of John and Katherine Glasier (London, 1971), 
p225.  
1034
 Trade Union Worker, Apr. 1918, p. 8. 
308 
 
 
 
 
 
extinguished during the reigns of her successors.1035 Ian Fletcher has argued that feature of 
this discontent manifested itself in the frequent complaints in the radical press about the 
cost of royal ceremonials.1036 In the tinderbox atmosphere and in the light of the Russian 
revolution it was all too easy for the flames of republicanism to be reignited. In April 
1917 William Thorne, a radical socialist politician, travelled to Russia as part of a 
‘fraternal delegation’. During the visit he met the British ambassador and the two men 
discussed the possibility that the tsar and empress might come to Britain.1037  Buchanan 
informed London that Thorne had threatened that should Nicholas and Alexandra come to 
Britain ‘the consequences might be very serious’.1038  Buchanan pressed Thorne who 
insisted that even if the ‘Russian government were to ask us to allow the ex-tsar to come 
to Britain and [the British authorities] consented we must not allow him to stay in 
England under any circumstances’.1039 On 15 April, the same day that Thorne had made 
spoken to Buchanan, the new Russian justice minister Alexander Kerensky hinted to the 
ambassador that he had papers in his possession which ‘proved’ the empress had been 
involved in a plot to bring about a separate peace with Germany.1040   
  Although he did not refer directly to either Thorne or Kerensky, on 17 April 1917, 
Charles Hardinge confided to his friend Frank Lascelles that although the king ‘did not 
                                                          
1035
 Anthony Taylor, ‘The Nauseating Cult of the Crown’: Republicanism; Anti-Monarchism and Post 
Chartist Politics 1870-5’, in David Nash and Anthony Taylor, (eds.), Republicanism in Victorian Society 
(Stroud, 2000), p. 52. 
1036
 Ian Christopher Fletcher, ‘Some Interesting Survivals of a Historic Past?: Republicanism, Monarchism 
and the Militant Edwardian Left’ in Nash and Taylor, (eds.), Republicanism in Victorian Society (Sutton, 
2000), pp. 97-99. 
1037
  L. Radice and G. H. Radice, Will Thorne: Constructive Militant (London, 1974).  
1038
 TNA, FO 800/205, Sir George Buchanan to Foreign Office, 15 Apr. 1917. 
1039
 Ibid. 
1040
 Ibid.  
309 
 
 
 
 
 
want to give the tsar the cold shoulder and although devoted to his cousin the tsar, he is 
most anxious he should not come here’.1041 In the knowledge of the empress’s supposed 
treasonable behaviour, a recognition that there was a ‘strong feeling of hostility to the tsar 
amongst the working class’, and an acceptance of the king’s dogged opposition, Lloyd 
George now reconsidered the government’s offer of refuge.1042  On 17 April he suggested 
that Spain or France might be a more suitable place of exile and Buchanan was instructed 
‘to make no further mention of the matter [of exile in Britain] to the Russian 
government’.1043  In the spring of 1917, the war on the Western Front was far from won 
and, as a result, the British were desperate for the provisional government to bolster their 
fighting troops in the east. If either the king or the government had any doubts Lord 
Francis Bertie, Britain’s ambassador to France, provided additional reasons as to why it 
would be unwise for the imperial family to be given exile in Britain.  In the months before 
his death Nicholas retained a lively interest Russian affairs and the progress of the war. 
However, whether he would have allowed himself (even nominally) to become directly 
involved in Russian politics is a moot point. Nonetheless, on 22 April he warned Charles 
Hardinge that should the imperial couple be allowed to come to Britain they could 
become the focus of a counter-revolutionary movement which might well damage the 
country’s important relationship with the new government in St Petersburg.1044 
     Although by May 1917 it was unlikely that Nicholas and Alexandra would be allowed 
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to come to Britain, the writer and socialist H.G. Wells appeared to believe it remained a 
distinct possibility. As result he fired a metaphorical shot across the royal bows.  On 15 
May he published a polemic on the idea of asylum, which he coupled with a wider 
discussion of monarchy as an institution.  Although the article entitled ‘The Future of the 
Monarchy’, was published in the populist Penny Pictorial, an advert in The Times, 
exhorted the public ‘to borrow a copy if you are too late to buy one-the subject matter 
concerns us all’.1045 The piece was illustrated by a row of thrones which had been toppled 
over. Each was labelled with the name of a different country: Portugal, China, Russia and 
one about to be pushed over by a man in workman’s attire was labelled Germany. Several 
more thrones stretched into the distance awaiting their fate.  Four out of five of the major 
European powers involved in the conflict were monarchies. The ties which had bound the 
royal families of Britain and Russia, and which had once seemed such an asset for peace, 
now seemed a distinct liability. Thus, it was Wells’ contention that the European 
monarchies had caused the war so, although he admitted to having ‘certain sympathy’ for 
the tsar, he nonetheless, struck a threatening tone towards George V.1046 Wells declared 
that should the tsar and empress come to England ‘where they would have frequent access 
to our royal family’ it might be ‘extraordinarily unfortunate for the British monarchy’.1047  
In a further thinly veiled threat towards Wells advised: ‘The tsar is not an evil figure, he is 
not a strong figure but he is the sort that trails revolution in its wake. He has ended one 
dynasty already. Our royal family owes it to itself that he brings not the infection of his 
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misfortunes thither’.1048 
In the summer of 1917, as Britain was in the midst of one of several wartime bouts of 
Germanophobia, George V was forced to renounce his German titles and to adopt 
Windsor as the name of the ruling house. When these factors were combined with radical 
calls for a British republic it became politically difficult to offer exile to the imperial 
couple. This atmosphere of xenophobia, an upsurge in republicanism in Britain and 
articles in the press which associated George V with the deposed monarch gave the king 
pause for thought. In April 1917 the British government instructed Sir George Buchanan 
to ‘make no further mention of the subject to the Russian government’. 1049 
    While the king worried about the stability of his own throne should the imperial couple 
be permitted to reside in Britain, ironically in Russia itself, where a republic had been 
established, some commentators believed there were signs of some resurgence in favour 
of a crowned head.  Centuries of British commentators had recorded the central role of 
the monarchy in Russian life. Even during the revolutionary troubles of 1905, Robert 
Nisbet Bain, in his survey of Russian history, declared: ‘Russia owes everything to her 
tsars, her prosperity her greatness, her empire, her very existence’.1050  Perhaps influenced 
by such stories, as well as his own experiences travelling across the Russian Empire from 
Finland to the Caucuses, Locker Lampson believed, that despite the revolution, the 
monarchical principle was so firmly rooted in Russia that ‘when the time comes the 
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country will undoubtedly vote for a tsar’.1051 Furthermore, he reported that, although at the 
start of the revolution portraits of Nicholas had been removed from public places 
including army hospital wards, the wounded were now demanding ‘their monarch’s 
picture back’.1052 Even Francis Lindley, whose reaction to the abdication had been deeply 
unsympathetic, believed that there was a residual affection for the monarchy in Russia. In 
a memorandum on the subject to Whitehall he declared that although there were few 
people who wished ‘to retain Nicholas II on the throne, few desired or expected the 
institution of a republic’.1053 On 16 April the British ambassador added to these 
impressions of monarchical sentiment when he reported that the Grand Duchess Maria 
Pavlovna (senior) was confident that before much longer ‘things will probably quieten 
down and the imperial family will be able resume their old position on the throne’.1054  
In retrospect the fact that members of the deposed dynasty were blind to the reality of the 
situation in Russia does not surprise us.  They lived lives within a relatively small, like-
minded, social circle whose everyday concerns were far removed from those of the mass 
of population. Having survived the 1905 revolution they had no reason to suppose they 
could not survive the upheavals of March 1917. However unrealistic this now seems, as 
we have seen British commentators had not been especially perceptive in predicting the 
revolution. As late as May 1918, Bruce Lockhart assured London that ‘even the Social 
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Revolutionaries admit that a return to some form of monarchy is now inevitable’.1055 With 
the benefit of hindsight a more realistic assessment of the mood of the nation was 
submitted to London by Major J.F. Neilson which indicated that perceptions of the so-
called monarchical instinct, which Lindley and Lampson believed was a immutable 
feature of Russian life, was based on a misunderstanding. Neilson had come to Russia in 
December 1913 and after the outbreak of war was attached to the Russian Army. In spite 
of his relatively short period of time in Russia in comparison to some other commentators 
he was apparently more perceptive, albeit that his explanation of Russian attitudes was 
rather unflattering.1056 He explained that the mass of Russians had ‘under-developed 
minds’ and therefore a contradictory understanding of what a republic meant for them.1057  
Thus, he explained, they were wont to insist that a Republic was indeed ‘an excellent 
thing’ as long as it had a tsar at its head.1058   
(i) Siberian Exile and Death 
  The provisional government, concerned for the safety of the imperial family, and in 
order to frustrate the demands of the Petersburg Soviet that Nicholas be imprisoned in the 
Peter and Paul Fortress, determined to send them away.  On 13 August 1917, earlier plans 
to send them into exile abroad having long since fallen through, Nicholas, Alexandra and 
their five children left Tsarskoe Selo for the last time. Their destination was the Siberian 
town of Tobolsk. By now the tsar had been off the throne for almost six months, and in 
                                                          
1055
TNA, FO 371/3286, R.H. Bruce Lockhart to Foreign Office, 28 May 1918. 
1056
 www.ukwhoswho.com 2013.  
1057
TNA, CAB/24/11, Major J.F. Neilson to Imperial War Cabinet, 31 Mar. 1917.  
1058
 Ibid.  
314 
 
 
 
 
 
Britain at least, he was no longer the central political figure he had once been. 
Nonetheless, the British press noted the family’s departure. The Times painted a 
depressing picture of the imperial family’s future home. Tobolsk, it said, was a bleak, 
straggling village’.1059 As for the new imperial residence, according to the same 
newspaper, it was ‘a crude dwelling, totally devoid of elementary comforts and 
conveniences [with] no place for the exiles to take exercise or even a breath of fresh 
air’.1060 In fact the town was a good deal more substantial than the image suggested by The 
Times and the imperial family were housed in a villa which had previously served as the 
governor’s residence. Although their living quarters did not match the luxurious 
surroundings with which the imperial family were more familiar, they were waited on by 
a large retinue of servants and surrounded by furnishings and possessions brought from 
Tsarskoe Selo.  
    The Spectator speculated as to the reasons which had caused the Russian government 
to send them so far away. The article made mention of demands from radicals within the 
revolutionary movement that the tsar be imprisoned in the fortress traditionally reserved 
for enemies of the state. Rather, it suggested that he had been sent to the other side of the 
Urals to prevent him ‘falling into German or counter-revolutionary hands’.1061  Siberia, of 
course, had for centuries been a place of imprisonment and exile for political prisoners 
and common criminals alike and it was with this in mind that Albert Stopford commented 
that the government had made a serious error in sending Nicholas to Tobolsk. Stopford’s 
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family and social connections place him firmly within the elites of both Britain and 
Russia.  His father had been chaplain to Queen Victoria, Edward VII and George V and 
an aunt had been maid-of-honour to Queen Victoria.  In light of his ‘elite’s view’ of the 
Russian peasant Stopford was convinced that the decision to send ‘Lord’s anointed’ to 
Siberia was bound to make a bad impression on the mass of the people.1062  
     The train which carried the imperial family to Siberia had been adorned with flags of 
the Japanese Red Cross, causing The Times to suggest Japan would be their ultimate 
destination.1063  However, the family remained living in the Governor’s Residence until 
the spring of 1918. In the meantime, the provisional government was overthrown and a 
Bolshevik regime installed in St Petersburg. In March 1918 Lenin signed the Treaty of 
Brest Litovsk which ceded the Baltic provinces, Finland, much of Ukraine and parts of 
the Caucuses to Germany.  That same month the British troops established bases in 
Murmansk and Archangelsk in what was the beginning of a substantial allied military 
intervention in Russia.  
George V had played a pivotal role in ensuring Britain’s offer of asylum had been 
withdrawn. However, whether as a result of his perception of the political situation in 
Russia, or latent familial feelings towards the imperial couple, the king instigated plans to 
rescue them from Tobolsk.1064 One of the better documented accounts involved a 
Norwegian by the name of Jonas Lied.1065 Before the war Lied had operated Siberian 
mineral and timber concessions and in the course of his work had become well acquainted 
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with the Siberian river systems.  Stephen Graham later recalled having met Lied and 
noted the existence of plans to kidnap Nicholas and Alexandra in Tobolsk and to take 
them, by river to the port of Murmansk and thence to Western Europe.1066 The extent to 
which Lied’s plans were advanced remains largely a matter of conjecture but, in any case, 
before they could be implemented the couple were taken to Yekaterinburg.   
   In the years since, the reason for their forced departure from Tobolsk in April 1918 and 
the loyalties of V.V Yakovlev, the man who accompanied them, have been the subject of 
much speculation. Conspiracy theories abound, some being more plausible than others.1067  
Alexandra assumed that Nicholas was being taken to Moscow, to counter sign to the 
treaty of Brest Litovsk.1068  Although the imperial family seem to have been taken by 
surprise at Yakovlev’s arrival, the English tutor told an aunt in England that he had 
‘expected something like this to happen in the spring’ and that the entire family would 
shortly be sent [..] to Norway.1069 In May 1918, Sir John Oliver Wardrop the British 
Consul General in Moscow reported that the imperial couple had been ‘taken away for 
their own safety’ but he did not indicate the nature of the dangers which they may have 
faced had they remained in Tobolsk.1070   A report in The Times contradicted such views 
and focused on the apparent monarchist loyalties of the local populace. According to the 
newspaper Nicholas and Alexandra had been removed from Tobolsk because of ‘efforts 
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being made by the local peasants to promote their escape’.1071 After some perambulations 
across the region, the tsar, the empress and their daughter Maria were taken to the Ural 
mining town of Yekaterinburg. The remaining imperial children who had stayed behind 
in Tobolsk joined them a few weeks later but most of the servants and suite who had 
accompanied the family to exile the previous August were now dismissed.  
     Since the imperial confinement in Yekaterinburg was more severe than had hitherto 
been the case, the tsar and empress had little meaningful contact with the outside world. 
As a result a number of myths and legends as to their fate were easily constructed. Even 
when the family were living in Tobolsk there were rumours that one daughter had 
escaped via Japan to San Francisco where she was reported as having ‘strongly 
democratic sympathies’ and, despite the fact that the remainder of her family were still 
presumably thought be imprisoned in Russia, was said to have ‘no regrets for the 
overthrow of the Romanovs’.1072 In mid-June 1918, Sir John Oliver Wardrop writing from 
Moscow recorded other rumours which indicated that Nicholas was not dead but was with 
regiments of the Czech army which were then located in Siberia.1073 As part of the myriad 
factions engaged in fighting in Siberia, the Czechoslovak Legion was made up of 
disaffected former combatants of the Austro-Hungarian army. They had been taken 
prisoner of war and subsequently, at the request of the allies, were being sent via 
Vladivostok to France. When the Bolsheviks demanded that they hand over their arms 
they resisted and seized much of the trans-Siberian railway. 
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  Alongside fanciful stories of escape, in the early summer of 1918, there were also a 
series of rumours that suggested Nicholas was dead. Robert Wilton filed one such account 
on 23 June 1918. By now Russia was in the full throes of a civil war and, presumably 
because of logistical difficulties in sending it to London, Wilton’s article was not printed 
until eleven days later. He asserted that the tsar had been killed following ‘a violent 
altercation with a soldier’ on a train taking the imperial family away from Yekaterinburg 
to the Siberian city of Perm.1074  The same report suggested that the tsarevich had died two 
weeks before the tsar’s demise but that the ‘ex-empress and her children had arrived 
safely in Perm’.1075  On 12 July 1918 an article in the Morning Post, contradicted Wilton’s 
claims that the tsar was dead although his account admitted the idea of Perm as a third 
place of exile. By lined ‘Stockholm’, the unnamed journalist reported that ‘travellers 
recently arrived here from Perm have all expressed the firm conviction that the [tsar] has 
not after all been killed but that a bomb thrown into the house where the imperial family 
was kept imprisoned [at Yekaterinburg] has killed the tsarevich’.1076 
On 18 July 1918, nearly a month after Wilton filed his report to London suggesting that 
Nicholas was dead the Bolshevik authorities announced that the tsar had been executed in 
Yekaterinburg on the night of 16/17 July. The official acknowledgment that Nicholas had 
been executed put an end to the credibility of reports that claimed otherwise.  It was now 
well over a year since Nicholas had abdicated, the entente powers were still at war but 
Russia had made a separate peace with Germany and was no longer Britain’s ally. In 
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response to the tsar’s death some newspapers simply re-printed the official Bolshevik 
communiqué.  For example, the popular Daily Graphic, which in previous years had 
provided extensive coverage of the imperial couple, initially at least, simply observed that 
whilst Nicholas had been reported dead on a number of occasions in recent months ‘this 
communiqué appears to be authentic’.1077  
    However, there was considerable interest in reports of the tsar’s death beyond the bald 
facts as reported in the Daily Graphic. The tone of articles in the press included a mixture 
of the ‘human-angle’ as well as simple prurience mixed with a newspapers’ love of 
sensation, tragedy and pathos.  The Scotsman for example, looked back to happier days 
and recalled the family ties between the Romanovs and the British royal family.  A year 
earlier these ties had led to the withdrawal of Britain’s offer of exile to the imperial 
couple. On this occasion the Scotsman reminded its readers that in 1896 Nicholas and 
Alexandra had visited Scotland and that the tsar had courted his bride in England. 
Furthermore, the article also recalled that the empress was a niece of the late king, 
Edward VII.1078  At the time of his accession and during his visit to Cowes, the tsar’s 
choice of literature had been the subject of much fascination in the British press which 
had allied his choice of English novels with ‘a personal like of the British people’.1079 His 
enjoyment of English novels had given the British public the pleasant feeling that, not 
only did he hold their culture in high regard but also that this reflected his personal 
esteem for the British people. On this occasion the Scotsman, which naturally gave 
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prominence to his choice of Scottish authors, noted that Nicholas had read the works of 
Robert Louis Stevenson and Sir Walter Scott.1080    The Times took up this congenial 
Russo-British theme and recalled that the tsar had ‘been tutored by an Englishman 
[Charles Heath] of whom he was very fond and from whom he learnt to speak English as 
fluently as his mother tongue [which] he habitually used when alone with the empress’.1081   
     Amongst the other broadsheets which reported Nicholas’s death an article in the Daily 
Telegraph by E.J. Dillon was the most extensive.  Published over a period of two days, 
the acknowledged expert on Russian affairs added to his ‘Russian credentials’ by 
claiming to have met Rasputin whom he dismissed as ‘a charlatan’.1082 The Daily 
Telegraph’s front page, which was surrounded by a black mourning border, was 
illustrated by a picture of the tsar in Cossack dress uniform. The article was headlined: 
‘The ex-Tsar Nicholas II: an imperial tragedy. A tragic history of opportunities 
missed’.1083 Interestingly, given that it written to mark the death of the tsar, it was 
Alexandra who was the focus of the article.  A common, if sometimes publicly unspoken, 
presumption at this time was that had Alexandra not interfered in politics, Nicholas might 
still be on his throne. Whereas Nicholas was still given the benefit of the doubt for an 
alleged record of liberal intent, the days when Alexandra had been identified as a 
potentially democratising force at the Russian court were long since forgotten.  Dillon 
accepted that the empress had been ‘an excellent wife and mother’ but he believed that 
her good points had been outweighed by her interference in affairs outside of the 
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domestic sphere where she had been ‘a reactionary’ and ‘an evil influence on her 
husband’.1084                
   Dillon was a harsh critic of the ex-empress but he was at least qualified to offer his 
opinion as a result of his long association with Russia. Other commentators may have 
been influenced against the imperial regime for rather more mercenary reasons as may 
have been the case with an article in Russia: A Journal of Anglo Russian Trade.  Given its 
title which suggests it sought cordial relations with the Bolshevik regime, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the periodical chose to highlight the tsar’s faults rather than to dwell on the 
tragedy of his death.  The trade magazine proffered no sympathy for Nicholas’s violent 
end, coldly asserting it was only that ‘which he had ordered for many of his subjects’.1085  
At the time of Nicholas’s abdication the Church Times had lauded the fallen monarch. 
For reasons which are unclear the newspaper abandoned its earlier sympathetic stance and 
denounced the deceased ruler in no uncertain terms as ‘unstable, superstitious and ill-
informed’.1086   In a similar vein, Aylmer Maude, who as we have discussed, was critical 
of the tsar at the time of his coronation, informed The Times that the tsar had been an 
obstinate ruler who had ignored numerous warnings from the Duma and the grand dukes 
to change direction preferring ‘to be guided by Rasputin and his associates’.1087     
    W.T. Stead, who had been personally sympathetic to Nicholas, was now dead.   How 
Stead might have reacted to the tsar’s abdication and execution can only be imagined. 
However, given his vigorous support for Nicholas it is ironic the Pall Mall gazette, a 
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magazine which Stead had once edited was especially harsh. In a review of the tsar’s 
reign the gazette concluded that there had been chances to save the Russian monarchy but 
that Nicholas had thrown them away. As a result, the article asserted, any ‘pity for his 
unhappy fate is tinged with contempt’.1088       
 It was not only Nicholas’s political outlook and the significant events of his reign which 
proved of interest to the British public at this time. The manner of his death fascinated the 
populist Morning Post and presumably its readers.  Beginning on 22 July and continuing 
until mid-August, the newspaper published a number of articles, which purported to be 
descriptions of the tsar’s final days. It did not baulk from including the most graphic of 
details, but the most poignant, almost akin to a Victorian melodrama, was published on 1 
August. It recounted how Nicholas had been awoken at 5 in the morning and told by his 
guards that he was shortly to be executed. When the time came for him to be taken away 
(according to the newspaper) Nicholas ‘tried to rise from his chair but was unable to do 
so’ and had to be helped down the stairs by his soon to be executioners.1089 In a dramatic 
denouement the Morning Post claimed the tsar had tried to speak as he stood before the 
firing squad but that before he could so ‘the rifle shots rang out and Nicholas II was 
dead’.1090  Setting the scene for future presentations of Nicholas as a martyr who went to 
his death for the sake of his country the news agency Reuters contradicted elements of 
this account of events. It claimed that before being shot the tsar had been permitted to 
speak and that his last thoughts were for his family and his country and that he had called 
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out ‘spare my wife and my innocent and unhappy children! May my blood preserve 
Russia from ruin!’1091  
     Few of the commentators who offered opinions about the tsar and motivation had ever 
been to Russia let alone met him. In light of what he perceived to be ill-judged or naïve 
response to the late monarch Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Phillimore felt moved to defend 
him.1092  In a letter to The Times he politely, if firmly, took issue with the tsar’s armchair 
critics.  He began his letter with a tone of ironic self- deprecation explaining that his ‘only 
qualification’ for speaking about the tsar was the fact that he had ‘been privileged to be 
much in his company for a year during the present war’.1093 He went on: ‘It is surely one 
of the grimmest of satires, while all are rendering lip service to universal peace, that the 
monarch who first endeavoured to put the theory into practical form at The Hague should 
be allowed to depart this life almost unnoticed save by ignorant abuse. He was courteous 
and considerate to others, he was a great gentleman who honestly endeavoured to do his 
duty to his God and his people and I feel sure that history will do hers by him’.1094  In 
November 1917 the provisional government led by Alexander Kerensky had been 
overthrown and the man who had sent Nicholas to Siberia, fled Russia aboard a ship of 
the Royal Navy. The irony of the two men’s fate men and the treatment each had received 
from Britain was not lost on Phillimore. The tsar, who had stoutly resisted the siren calls 
to make a separate peace, now lay dead in an unmarked grave, in contrast, Phillimore 
noted bitterly, Kerensky, ‘the demagogue who paved the way for Russia’s desertion of 
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her allies’, had been received in Britain as ‘an honoured guest’.1095  In another letter to The 
Times, General Sir Hanbury Williams who had also spent much time in the tsar’s 
company defended his loyalty to the allies. The general admitted that Nicholas had 
shortcomings as a ruler but he rejected allegations that he had been the dupe of a pro-
German clique and insisted that he had been loyal ally’.  As Phillimore had done, 
Hanbury Williams ended his letter by identifying himself in a very personal way with the 
late tsar when he declared that Nicholas had been ‘the kindest of friends’.1096     
    An understanding response to Nicholas was to be expected from Phillimore and 
Hanbury Williams. Both men had been much liked by the tsar and they, in turn, had been 
charmed by his personal qualities.  A more unexpected response came from the Labour 
Leader: A Weekly Journal of Socialism, Trade Unionism and Politics. As we have seen 
there was substantial  opposition from the left and from republicans to the British offer of 
asylum to the tsar. Indeed, it had been a significant factor in George V’s suggestion that 
Nicholas reside elsewhere, at least for the duration of the war.  The Labour Leader was 
opposed to capital punishment and this may explain the sombre tone of the article. 
However, there was no requirement on the newspaper to acknowledge, with sympathy, as 
it did, the manner of the tsar’s passing which it declared was ‘neither necessary nor 
justifiable’.1097   
      British understanding of Russian reaction to Nicholas’s death was as mixed as it had 
earlier been in relation to his abdication. Opinion was divided between those 
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commentators who asserted that the mass of ordinary Russians had been deeply moved by 
his fate and those who claimed that it was of no consequence to his erstwhile subjects. 
Whether from a feeling of loyalty to the crown, a sense of the passing of an era, a 
yearning for a past way of life or simply pity for a human being who had met a violent 
death the Morning Post  did not say. Perhaps it was a mixture of all these factors, 
according to the newspaper publication of the tsar’s murder made a ‘profound 
impression’ on the Russian people.1098 The newspaper explained that people had ‘prayed 
in churches across Moscow for Nicholas’ adding conspiratorially that ‘everyone knew the 
significance of this simple Christian name’.1099 An article in The Times echoed these 
impressions of a resilient sympathy for the deposed monarch. The newspaper insisted that 
for the Russian people the former tsar ‘will be a saint [..] now surrounded with the halo of 
a martyr’.1100  However, the British were not unanimous in holding such seemingly naïve 
views of Russian attitudes to a fallen ruler who had brutally suppressed opposition and 
was believed, through weakness, to have become entangled in a web of pro-German (and 
therefore anti-Russian) influences. As Orlando Figes and Boris Kolonitskii remind us, in 
the aftermath of his overthrow: ‘the burning of straw effigies of the tsar, the pornographic 
pictures of the empress and Rasputin, the tearing down of emblems and the cutting of 
eyes from tsarist portraits [were] expressions of mockery and anger’ which was not 
confined to out and out revolutionaries.1101  Therefore, in light of such accounts, the notion 
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that Nicholas might widely perceived as a saint seems unlikely, even if some Russians 
felt sympathy for the manner of his death.  
    In his account of the reception given to the news of the tsar’s death, Sir John Oliver 
Wardrop made an oblique reference to claims that there had been strong pro-German 
influences at the heart of the imperial court.  Thus, Wardrop insisted that with the 
exception of those he called the ‘German aristocracy’ few people in Russia had even 
taken much notice of the news.1102   Stories of supposed German influence at the Russian 
court and rumours of talks to conclude a separate peace continued to fascinate even after 
the overthrow of the monarchy. In June 1918 British officials in neutral Switzerland 
reported that the German authorities were taking an active interest in the fate of the 
imperial family.1103 It was said that, as part of a scheme to establish pro-German states 
from Ukraine to the Baltic, the authorities in Berlin had offered the Russian crown to any 
Romanov, including the deposed tsar, who would pledge loyalty to Germany.1104 Nicholas 
had abdicated on behalf of his son, then twelve years old, to keep him out of politics and 
within the close family circle.  However, Russian monarchists abroad were reported as 
saying that the tsarevich was the ‘legitimate heir’.1105  Using phraseology which recalled 
both an earlier era and the recent tsarist past the monarchists declared that should the 
Germans place him on the throne, they would ‘set about freeing him from his evil 
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counsellors’.1106   
    Despite reports which suggested Nicholas was now dead and even garnering sympathy 
from at least one socialist publication in Britain, George V remained concerned that the 
public might yet perceive his relationship with the tsar in negative terms. Therefore, when 
the king received an invitation to a memorial service for his cousin at the Russian 
Orthodox Church in London’s Welbeck Street, he sought the advice of his government. In 
a written response the Foreign Secretary advised the nervous monarch that since the tsar 
‘had always been loyal to the entente no criticism need attach to the king’ should he 
attend the service.1107 George V was apparently reassured since the Lady magazine noted 
that not only the king, but Queen Mary and the tsar’s aunt Queen Alexandra attended the 
service.1108  Furthermore, the Lady noted that the king had ordered the court to go into 
mourning in order to mark the death of the tsar. The upper class woman’s magazine also 
used the occasion of the memorial service to offer comment on recent events in Russia. 
The article struck a tone of sympathy towards Nicholas and Alexandra and one of 
bewilderment and utter disbelief towards the wider Russian tragedy. This it set in terms of 
the popular view that Russia was a medieval society far removed from that which 
pertained in Britain. Thus, the article explained: ‘The history of Russia during the last two 
years has been so tragic and so appalling in its far-reaching calamity that no one would 
believe it had one not lived through it. There is nothing modern about the disaster which 
swept the tsar and empress from the throne and turned the country of our ally into a 
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nightmare of anarchy and revolution. The whole tragedy sounds more like the Middle-
Ages than our twentieth century’.1109  
(ii) Alexandra’s Fate 
Not long after the Bolsheviks’ announcement that the tsar was dead anti-Bolshevik forces 
captured Yekaterinburg. The house in which the imperial family had been imprisoned 
was empty but there were signs of violence and an amount of charred Romanov ephemera 
was later discovered in some woods outside the city. However, in spite of this evidence 
which appeared to indicate the entire imperial family had been murdered, because of the 
chaotic situation caused by the civil war, there was still some considerable uncertainty as 
to their fate. An initial investigation by the White Russian authorities was sceptical that 
they had all perished.1110  Indeed, in the years since July 1918, an entire library of books 
has been published which purport to show that one, or even all of the imperial family 
were rescued.1111  
      By August 1918, Britain was entering the fifth summer of her war with Germany as 
well as pursuing a military campaign against the Bolsheviks in Siberia and northern 
Russia.
1112
 In the light of these political and military concerns the focus of British 
attention on Russia centred on the progress of allied forces rather than the fate of an ex-
empress. Nonetheless, the tragedy of her fall and her fate, as well as the death of her five 
innocent children, remained the subject of considerable official correspondence and some 
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press interest at least until as late as May 1919.  
     Although the British royal family later accepted that the entire family had been 
murdered in Yekaterinburg, for some while after July 1918 their fate remained uncertain. 
Sir Charles Eliot, the British High Commissioner in Siberia, suggested Alexandra and her 
children had been taken to the Bolshevik stronghold of Perm.1113 On 6 August 1918, The 
Times reported that ‘negotiations for the transfer to Spain of the late tsar’s family are 
taking a favourable course’.1114 However, the same edition of the newspaper recorded a 
contradictory Reuter’s report which asserted that although ‘the ex-empress is safe the 
[Bolshevik] government intends to bring her before a Revolutionary Court owing to her 
relations with Rasputin’.1115     
       Based on reports that, although the tsar was dead, his wife and children remained 
alive, George V and Queen Mary sought help from Spain ‘to rescue the family from their 
pitiable position’.1116   In their quest to secure Alexandra’s freedom the British royal 
family sought the help of Spain firstly, because that country was neutral and secondly, 
because the king and queen of Spain were related both to George V, to the empress and 
her German family in Hesse Darmstadt. Parts of Russia’s western borderlands were then 
under German control and it was believed that the German authorities carried influence 
with the Bolshevik authorities. However, the British Royal Family clearly could not 
correspond directly with their German counterparts. Despite the obvious humanitarian 
aspect to their plea’s it was notable that it was Queen Mary and Queen Alexandra rather 
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than the king who corresponded with Spain on the subject of the imperial family’s 
imprisonment. However, the king must surely have responded to Alexandra as a human 
being and therefore been to secure her release it is unlikely that either Mary or Alexandra 
would have acted without his approval.  However, George’s avoidance of any public 
association with his controversial cousin may also be taken as a sign of his continued 
nervousness of the outcome should he be identified in the public mind with a woman who 
was accused of betraying the allies. Perhaps, the king need not have worried since on 28 
August 1918 however, a British official in Archangel reported news from Yekaterinburg 
that Alexandra and all her children had been ‘shot with the tsar’, presumably in July.1117   
    With British forces involved in the Russian civil war the central focus of British 
interest lay elsewhere than the fate of the imperial family. However, the tragic end of 
once powerful family who had suffered imprisonment and humiliation and violent murder 
remained a source of fascination for sections of the British press. An article in the 
Spectator discussed the fate of Aleksei who, it asserted had been ‘cruelly done to 
death’.1118 The Spectator also focused on the reasons why Alexandra had been driven to 
seek help from Rasputin. The periodical did not condemn the empress but recalled the 
long years before the heir was born and the subsequent discovery of his terrible illness. 
The tone was rather elegiac as it declared that:  ‘All British men and women will 
remember the long period of patient hope and disappointment in the tsar’s family which 
was rewarded by his birth.  Love, care and anxiety were the motives which caused the 
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empress to become prey to malign influences which developed into an unendurable 
scandal’.  In a heartfelt conclusion the Spectator asked rhetorically ‘surely no member of 
any civilised nation can reflect upon the obscure grave of this poor child without the 
profoundest of pity’.1119  
     At the start of the war British commentators had lauded Nicholas for pledging his life 
in the fight against Germany and for taking command of his armies. Some of these 
plaudits stemmed from a perhaps rather romantic view of Russia and the tsars, others 
were rooted in political necessity or perhaps because people simply wanted to believe the 
tsar really could make a difference. In addition, much was said immediately after his 
abdication about his resolute support for the allied cause and his rejection of German 
offers of peace.  More than a year after his abdication there was little requirement in the 
press and others to repeat such claims. Nonetheless, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Review 
recalled stories of pro-German intrigues at the Russian court but affirmed that even under 
arrest, Nicholas had stood loyally by the entente’ and that until the very end he had 
remained ‘the foe of the Kaiser and [had done] his best to foil plots which the Huns were 
making on his throne and fatherland’.1120 In November 1918 Germany was finally 
defeated and the Kaiser went into exile. This might well have seen the end of any 
substantial discussion of Nicholas and Alexandra. The world they represented had passed 
into history and monarchs across Europe had lost their thrones as H.G. Wells had 
indicated they might. George V had retained his but only at the cost of ensuring that 
Britain’s offer of asylum to the imperial couple was rescinded and a very public 
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renunciation of his German heritage. Britain and Russia were very different countries 
from the ones which had gone to war in August 1914. Nonetheless, Robert Wilton of The 
Times continued to file stories about the fate of the tsar and empress. It is well known his 
propaganda campaign to present the imperial family as martyrs of a brutal and degrading 
regime was connected with his association with White Russian forces. Wilton enjoyed a 
close friendship with General Diterikhs whose right wing anti-Semitic philosophy fuelled 
these propaganda stories. When faced with reports that perhaps the imperial family had 
not been killed Wilton insisted that even if the tsar and his family ‘are alive it is necessary 
to [publicly] say they are dead’. 1121  Given Wilton’s evident determination to ignore any 
inconvenient facts we can be sceptical about the content of his articles. However, the fact 
that his reports were published must surely show the resilience of the British public’s 
interest in Nicholas and Alexandra’s fate.  One of his most lurid accounts was published 
in December 1918 purporting to be based on the testimony of a servant of the Romanov 
family it told the grim story of the conditions in which the imperial prisoners were held.  
Its tone, more representative of popular newspaper or a Le Queux novel than The Times, 
the article declared that: the entire family had been ‘locked up in one room, where there 
was only one bed. In this the empress slept, the others being compelled to sleep on the 
bare floor. The family were frequently woken in the middle of the night and compelled to 
answer the most brutal and shameless questions. The grand duchesses were exposed to 
the grossest of insults’ and their death had been ‘deliverance’.1122 
     In Britain since the start of the First World War, representation of Nicholas and 
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Alexandra had passed through a number of different phases. On balance, between the 
time of his abdication and death, British perceptions of the tsar remained (with the 
exceptions we have noted) rather favourable. If he was criticised it was often others--his 
wife, his court or his mother--who were castigated for their influence over him. In 
particular, in official correspondence between diplomats, civil servants and members of 
the government, Alexandra was berated for her influence over political affairs. The 
empress was perceived as being pro-German, domineering and with regard to her 
friendship with Rasputin, even mentally deranged. Some British commentators, who 
offered opinions and created negative perceptions of Alexandra, had met her and her 
husband. Few, if any, ever changed their minds let alone publicly admitted that their 
assumptions had been incorrect. Sir George Buchanan was one of a minority.  In the latter 
half of his service in St Petersburg he had suspected the empress of pro-German leanings 
and became utterly exasperated with the tsar’s attitude to Russia’s political situation.1123 
His sometimes tetchy reports to London contributed to the negative images of Nicholas 
but most especially of Alexandra since Buchanan suspected the empress (and Rasputin) 
of exerting great influence over the tsar and thereby the course of the war on the eastern 
front.   Despite years of diplomatic service both in Russia and elsewhere, Buchanan 
sometimes failed to recognise the nuances of court etiquette and had begun to imagine 
that Alexandra and members of the tsar’s entourage were plotting against him. Of the tsar 
Buchanan recalled his ‘inbred fatalism’1124 but he blamed Alexandra for having been 
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‘instrumental in bringing about the final catastrophe’.1125  He described his relationship 
with the tsar as one of ‘of mutual sympathy’ and claimed that he ‘never once resented my 
outspoken language’.1126 Michael Hughes has concluded from Buchanan’s account that, 
like Hardinge, he established something of a rapport with Nicholas1127 However the reality 
may have been rather more complicated than the image which Buchanan’s recollections 
suggest.  Because he had known Nicholas and Alexandra in their youth, on account of his 
ease of entrée into St Petersburg society, or simply because the tsar disliked 
unpleasantness, Buchanan may have mistaken politeness and reserve for amicability. In 
his memoirs Buchanan had claimed that he rarely hesitated to be ‘outspoken’ at his 
audiences with the tsar.1128 However, as the son of the tsar’s doctor recalled in exile, 
imperial etiquette dictated that no one ever contradicted a member of the imperial 
family.1129  
     Given the quantity of his reports and his memoirs which still contribute to modern 
images of Nicholas and Alexandra it is fitting that we conclude this chapter with an 
observation Buchanan offered to the Russo-Scottish Society. In a lecture reported in the 
Fortnightly Review on 24 October 1918 the former ambassador attempted to explain the 
context against which the tsar and empress had lived during the final years of imperial 
Russia. In particular he recalled the first days of the 1914 war and the scenes of jubilation 
in Palace Square and claimed that he had felt an uneasy presentiment that the loyalty of 
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‘the huge crowd [which had] prostrated itself before the tsar might be short lived.1130  If 
this was indeed the case, he does not appear to have committed his forebodings to writing 
at the time.  
     As a result of the perception amongst in some quarters of the press about Alexandra’s 
relationship with Rasputin, Buchanan’s audience would have been intrigued to hear the 
ambassador’s interpretation of her friendship. However, if they were hoping for some 
title-tattle along the lines of a Le Queux novel, they were to be disappointed since 
Buchanan vehemently dismissed the authenticity of ‘the scandalous stories’ which had 
circulated about the nature of the empress’s friendship with Rasputin.1131  He still blamed 
her for influencing her husband in policies which he said had proved ‘so disastrous’ to the 
regime. However, having had the opportunity to reflect on events away from the hothouse 
of gossip and intrigue in St Petersburg, the former ambassador now felt pity for 
Alexandra, a characteristic which had previously been absent from his ambassadorial 
reports. Contrary to allegations made during the war, he now insisted, that empress had 
not been ‘working in Germany’s interests nor [had] she contemplated] a separate peace 
with Germany’.1132  Although did not elaborate on the source of his information, which 
contradicted the tone, if not the content, of reports which had emanated from his own 
embassy, he did insist that the empress ‘had a strong personal dislike’ of the Kaiser.1133 
   During the months between March 1917 and when Sir George Buchanan gave his 
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lecture in and October 1918, British perceptions of Nicholas and Alexandra passed 
through a number of phases. British responses to the imperial couple included sympathy, 
fear of upsetting the new regime in Russia, anger that the Russian army had been 
‘betrayed’ by pro-German forces at court and concern that their presence in Britain might 
fuel republican sentiments. Pity and scorn were the extremes of reactions to the tsar and 
empress during this time. In the end however, as Sir George Buchanan’s softened 
approach to Alexandra indicates, the overriding British perception was one of pity for a 
couple, who only twenty-four years earlier, had seemed to promise so much and who had 
met with a violent and tragic death. 
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Conclusion 
 
People often ask, what is the true character of the potentate who is obliged to posture 
before his people and move in melancholy pageantry? That he is a good father and a 
faithful husband I have never found any Russian to doubt. 1134 
 
Such a transformation as was brought about by [Alexandra’s] marriage has seldom been 
heard of outside of a fairy-tale.1135 
Twenty-four years passed between the engagement of Nicholas and Alexandra in April 
1894 and their murder in July 1918. In commenting on the imperial couple during these 
years British commentators considered a variety of topics and events which they 
approached from a range of perspectives. For example, in response to the Khodynka Field 
disaster some commentators discussed what they perceived to be evidence of Nicolas’s 
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inability to stamp his authority on those at court who had organised the festival. Others 
examined the tsar and empress’s response to the tragedy in the light of their 
understanding of the relationship between Russia’s rulers and their subjects. In 1904, on 
the eve of the war with Japan, British observers of Russian affairs compared the apparent 
contradiction of the tsar’s seeming belligerence on this occasion with his calls for arms 
reduction at the start of his reign. Commentators considered the extent to which 
Nicholas’s claims of peaceful intent were simply a charade by a tsar who was not only a 
warmonger but who was seemingly willing to sacrifice the lives of his subjects in defence 
of his personal wealth. During times of internal unrest, such as the 1905 revolution, 
commentators discussed to what degree Nicholas’s subjects revered him or whether he 
was an unpopular monarch and victim of plots against the throne, emanating perhaps, 
even from within his own family.  In 1905, when his troops fired on unarmed civilians on 
Bloody Sunday commentators reviewing the massacre questioned whether the tsar was 
really an uncaring tyrant or a paternalistic ruler in the ‘typical Russian’ mould whose 
subjects had been led astray by political radicals. These conflicting impressions of 
Nicolas were also present in discussion of his motivation during 1906, when the tsar 
instituted the Duma. For example, some observers of Russian affairs pondered whether 
the fledgling parliament signalled a genuine commitment to constitutional reform or 
whether it simply represented a sop to the Russian people and an opportunity for the 
regime to bide its time before reasserting its authority. In 1909 and in 1913 some 
commentators who discussed the tsar’s apparently successful interactions with his 
humblest subjects concluded that the revolutionary years were behind him and that he had 
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regained the people’s utter loyalty to the throne and devotion to his person. In 1917, when 
the tsar was overthrown, the image presented in the popular press and in the broadsheets 
was of an honourable man who had sought to act for the best.  Thus, at different times, 
and by different people, Nicholas was perceived as an uncaring tyrant, an ardent lover of 
peace, as a tsar whose own family was plotting to overthrow him and as a ruler who was 
adored by the mass of ordinary Russians, as a gentleman and, as tragic victim of events. 
    Although not a reigning sovereign, Alexandra too was subject to a variety of, 
sometimes conflicting, British perceptions of her personality, her motivation, her role as a 
mother and her role in Russian politics which, in the last years of the regime, included 
particularly perceptions of her relationship with Rasputin. At the start of her life in Russia 
she was seen as a conduit for peace in Europe on the grounds of her familial ties with the 
German and British ruling houses. At the time of her engagement and marriage she was 
the focus of British hope for the influence she might have for the good over her husband. 
During the early years of her married life and, by a minority, during the First World War, 
the empress was perceived as a loyal supporter of Britain. At other times between 1894 
and 1918 she was viewed as unhinged, as meddlesome and as pro-German. By the time 
the regime collapsed perceptions of Alexandra were much more negative and her sway 
over Nicholas was seen as a key factor in the fall of imperial Russia.  
     In order to examine a wide range of opinion about Nicholas and Alexandra we have 
looked at a variety of sources including royal correspondence, official and unofficial 
correspondence by members of the diplomatic corps, broadsheets and popular 
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newspapers, serious periodicals and family magazines. In addition we have analysed 
travelogues, biographies and memoirs with which British commentators constructed 
images of Russia which, in turn, influenced British perceptions of Nicholas and 
Alexandra.  We have identified three key features which help to colour British 
commentators understanding of the tsar and empress.  Firstly, no commentator, whether a 
member of the royal family, a diplomat, a journalist, an expatriate or a traveller to Russia, 
whether sympathetic to the imperial couple or actively opposed to the tsarist regime, 
could escape the influence of his or her own background and life experiences. Thus, a 
commentator’s sense of national superiority, his education, his employment,  his 
snobbery, his disdain for the ‘lower orders’ were all features which coloured their 
perceptions of the imperial couple.  Conversely, a commentator’s desire for social change 
in Britain and, or, political reform in Russia could affect the way in which they perceived 
the tsar and empress.  
     Secondly, commentators were persuaded in their views of Nicholas and Alexandra as a 
result of impressions of Russia and of Russian history which had been formulated in the 
years since Britain first ‘discovered’ Muscovy in the sixteenth century.  By the start of 
Nicholas’s reign in 1894, concepts of Russian barbarism were outdated.  The publication 
in English of Russian authors and the well-received performances in London by the 
Ballets Russe acknowledged that some Russians were now capable of producing high art. 
Nonetheless, British commentators continued to perceive the mass of the Russian people 
in less complimentary terms and to understand Russia in terms of ‘the other’; the oriental, 
the despotic, the superstitious, and the backward.  So enduring were the myths about 
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Russia and the tsars, that people in Britain interpreted events during the last reign in terms 
which sometimes implied that Russian society had retained all the characteristics of 
tyranny, despotism and cowed servility which had been characteristic of Russia under the 
tsar’s of the sixteenth century. Fragmentary, romantic or outdated British views of earlier 
Russian rulers and their relationship with their people contributed to their perceptions of 
Nicholas and Alexandra. A number of commentators reasoned that, although the tsar and 
empress were members of a network of European royalty, their subjects expected them, 
for example, in the aftermath of the Khodynka Field disaster, to react in very different 
ways than might have been required of a British monarch. On this occasion it was said 
that the imperial couple had had to continue with the coronation festivities in spite of the 
deaths of many of their subjects in order to meet the expectations of those who had 
survived.  
      British understanding of Russian society also affected attitudes towards the Duma. In 
the light of their perception of the political naivety of the mass of Russians, some 
commentators viewed the Duma as an institution whose members’ radical rhetoric was 
ill-matched to serving the needs of the nation. Taking their understanding from centuries 
of impressions of Russia complied by writers and travellers and Russian specialists, many 
British commentators perceived that peasant discontent was directed, not at the tsar, but at 
the local landowner or town functionary. During the 1905 revolution such commentators 
did not necessarily feel that their convictions were challenged when the peasants rioted, 
burned or looted aristocratic estates which were blamed on alcoholic inebriation or the 
malign influence of charismatic demagogues. The sight of Nicholas, virtually unguarded, 
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in amiable and knowledgeable conversation with his awestruck peasant subjects, at events 
such as the anniversary of the Battle of Poltava, only reinforced their positive perceptions 
of the relationship between the tsar and his people.  
      A third factor which influenced a British commentator’s perception of Nicholas and 
Alexandra was the concept of monarchy. When considering the tsar and empress British 
commentators would naturally contrast it with the familiar the role of the crown in British 
life as representative of the nation, as a unifying force and focus for national pride the 
monarch was also perceived as a person whose joys and sorrows were the same as their 
poorest subjects. In addition, king or queen might also be presented as a ‘celebrity’ whose 
private life as well as their public role was a source of fascination to readers of the 
popular press.  Thus, when they looked at Nicholas, they saw a human being who, as a 
young man, had been called by God to assume the heavy burden of monarchy. A British 
commentator’s perception of Russian society as relatively backward gave weight to the 
view that the tsar’s task in ruling Russia was even more onerous than that expected of a 
British monarch. Thus, for many observers of Russian affairs, the last tsar was simply a 
man who in other circumstances might have lived quietly on a country estate but whose 
destiny and sense of duty and service to his country had resulted in him having to assume 
a heavy burden of responsibility from which only death or overthrow could release him.  
    There were other aspects of royalty which influenced British attitudes towards 
Nicholas, not least his family ties to the British royal family. This connection was 
sometimes a source of controversy especially in the wake of the 1905 revolution and 
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again in 1917, more frequently they were presented in a positive light as a conduit for 
improved Russo-British relations as was the case in 1908 and 1909.  In addition, the tsar 
could be seen as representing a new generation of rulers.  Until 1910, when his near 
contemporary George V, came to the throne, the tsar’s fellow monarchs on the thrones of 
Britain and Austria: Queen Victoria, Edward VII and Emperor Franz Joseph- were all 
elderly. For British commentators Nicholas provided a particularly strikingly different 
comparison with Edward VII. In contrast, the tsar was a man who was clearly much in 
love with his wife and who preferred to spend his free time within the family circle. 
Where Edward VII was pleasure loving and dissolute, the tsar appeared less worldly with 
the glamour and aura with which youthful royalty is imbued.  His good manners, his 
fluent English and his modesty charmed people who spent time in his company. The fact 
that he had come to the throne shortly after his engagement, when it had been assumed he 
and Alexandra would enjoy many years of married life before having to assume the 
responsibilities of the crown only added to the poignancy of British perceptions.  
     Nicholas, of course, was not without his critics but the most persistent were, in the 
main, left-wing politicians and anti-tsarist activists, for whom all aspects of the tsarist 
regime were abhorrent. Amongst other commentators, such as diplomats and journalists 
employed in the mainstream press, if the tsar was criticised then the tone was often more 
in sorrow than in anger. Notwithstanding that both Nicholas and Alexandra were subject 
to criticism, a perhaps unexpected feature of British perceptions of the last years of years 
of the regime, was the durability of the many sympathetic responses. Thus, a majority of 
British commentators separated their generally positive perception of Nicholas and 
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Alexandra as human beings, from their sometimes more negative opinions which they 
focused on the Russian state rather than the tsar and empress.  
     British perceptions of the imperial couple were partly based on a melange of a sort of 
‘folk memory’ of Russia and a caricature of Russian history.  In terms, which repeated 
images of earlier tsars, commentators explained that the imperial couple acted as they did 
in order to meet the expectations and traditions of the Russian people, or that Nicholas 
sought to act for the best but was surrounded by officials, whose self-serving interests 
were very different to his own. Even some of Nicholas’s most persistent critics, who 
depicted him as a weak ruler, a physical coward and an incompetent fool, laid some of the 
blame for actually carrying out the worst excesses of the regime at the door of those who 
advised him. Although diplomats, journalists and government officials could not ignore 
the less admirable aspects of the last tsar’s reign, understanding voices outnumbered 
those of the critics, right up to the end of the old regime. Thus, when sympathetic British 
commentators considered Nicholas, they did not see an autocrat whose court had been 
unable to safely organise a festival for his humblest subjects, but as tsar whose own 
sorrow had to be set aside in order to meet the hopes of his ‘simple’ peasants who 
expected the festivities to continue.  
   In 1904, when the British press whipped public opinion into a rage over the Dogger 
Bank Incident, commentators blamed the tsar’s officials and not Nicholas himself for 
Russia’s intransigence in admitting fault and agreeing to pay compensation to the families 
of the victims. During the First World War, when the tsar pledged to defend his country 
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and assumed command of the army, most commentators did not see a ruler ill-equipped to 
deal with strategic military matters, or a tsar whose decision to reside hundreds of miles 
from his capital meant he avoided dealing with important political questions. Even those 
who had initially been wary of his decision were swayed by his charm and, like many of 
their compatriots they saw an allied leader who had assumed the mantle of his ancestors 
in order to personally lead Russia to a great victory. Similarly, when Nicholas abdicated, 
the immediate response of most commentators was not the tsar’s failure as a political and 
military leader or his weakness in dealing with the scandal of Rasputin, but as a family 
man and as dutiful ruler who loved his country and who had always aspired to do his best 
for his people. 
    Although often perceived to be a more controversial figure than her husband, 
Alexandra was also given a substantial amount of understanding by a variety of British 
commentators. In the press, for example, the empress’s early years of her life in Russia 
were met with optimism and, in the following years, commentators sympathised with her 
long unfulfilled desire for a son. In the last years of the imperial regime, negative British 
attitudes towards the empress centred on her relationship with Rasputin and his nefarious 
activities. In part, reaction to this friendship was based on British attitudes towards the 
Russian Orthodox Church. Although, as we have discussed, some members of the Church 
of England sought closer relations with the Russian Church, for many people in Britain, 
Orthodoxy conjured up negative images of superstition, relics of doubtful authenticity, 
the worship of icons and the use of incense to dull the faculties of the congregation. 
Queen Victoria’s relationship with her highland servant, John Brown, and her Indian 
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munshi, Abdul Karim, had also provoked controversy, even within the queen’s own 
family. However, in spite of Victoria’s reliance on people who were from outside her 
social circle, and that of the class which more normally advised a monarch the notion that 
an empress might rely upon an immoral peasant for advice was unthinkable.   
    Although Rasputin was undoubtedly a feature of British discussion of Alexandra, for 
many Britons the empress was foremost a granddaughter of a British queen, a niece of 
Edward VII and a cousin of George V. As a child she had played on the beach at Osborne 
in the Isle of Wight and as a young woman she had graced the drawing rooms of Windsor 
and Balmoral. She had four attractive daughters and, after many years of marriage, gave 
birth to a son only to discover that he was stricken with a terrible illness. On account of 
her motherhood, her English ancestry, and as a woman whose formative years had been 
spent in Britain, Alexandra was given a great deal of sympathy and understanding. Her 
foolish reliance on, and defence of, Rasputin was bitterly criticised in diplomatic 
correspondence and ridiculed in popular novels. However after her violent death, 
following months of incarceration in surroundings which were far from luxurious, such 
negative perceptions of the empress were pushed to the background. Even Sir George 
Buchanan, whose reports during the First World War had done much to give the 
authorities in London the impression that Alexandra posed a danger to the Russo-British 
alliance, defended her and reflected on her humanity.   
     No British commentator really knew the source of the imperial couple’s motivation, 
the opportunity to meet Nicholas and Alexandra was limited and moreover, the tsar and 
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empress were extremely reserved and did not freely divulge their opinions, especially to 
foreigners. Even W.T. Stead and Sir John Hanbury Williams, although they spoke to both 
the tsar and empress in relatively informal circumstances, could not be fully cognisant of 
their innermost thoughts. The imperial couple’s critics and their admirers constructed 
their own views of Nicholas and Alexandra many of which were contradictory. For 
example, some perceptions were based on a commentator’s abhorrence of the autocracy 
while others defended the tsarist regime through fear of the outcome should power be 
given to ill-educated peasants. At other times British perceptions of the imperial couple 
were influenced by less politically driven factors including a sense of deference and a 
popular fascination with the lives of royalty.  
    The British came to view the imperial couple with a contradictory mixture of 
admiration and pity, with hatred and disdain, as reactionaries and as reformers, both pro-
German and as staunch defenders of the allied cause, as monarchs who enjoyed a close 
rapport with their peasant subjects and as blood thirsty tyrants who fired on their innocent 
subjects and as a couple who plotted to sign a separate peace with Germany even as they 
sent their ill-equipped armies into battle.  There was no one consistent image of the 
imperial couple: British perceptions of Tsar Nicholas II and Empress Alexandra 
Fedorovna were multifaceted, even contradictory.  However, the overwhelmingly most 
persistent response to the imperial couple was one of understanding for a tsar and empress 
who had met with a terrible fate. In regards to Nicholas in particular there was a 
consistent feeling of sorrow for the tsar, who for all his faults, has never sought supreme 
power and, when asked to do so, had laid it aside for the good of his people.   Perceptions 
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of Alexandra could, as we have noted be less understanding, but after her death even her 
controversial relationship with Rasputin was explained as a result of a mother’s love for 
her child.  
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